Citizen Soldiers and the Key to the Bastille

Julia Osman

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War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850
Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–54532–8 hardback
978–0–230–54533–5 paperback
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Citizen Soldiers and the Key to the Bastille

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© Julia Osman 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-48623-3

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First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-50384-1 ISBN 978-1-137-48624-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137486240

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

To Mom and Dad

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Series Preface

The century from 1750 to 1850 was a seminal period of change, not just in Europe but across the globe. The political landscape was transformed by a series of revolutions fought in the name of liberty – most notably in the Americas and France, of course, but elsewhere, too: in Holland and Geneva during the eighteenth century and across much of mainland Europe by 1848. Nor was change confined to the European world. New ideas of freedom, equality and human rights were carried to the furthest outposts of empire, to Egypt, India and the Caribbean, which saw the creation in 1801 of the first black republic in Haiti, the former French colony of Saint- Domingue. And in the early part of the nineteenth century they continued to inspire anticolonial and liberation movements throughout Central and Latin America.

If political and social institutions were transformed by revolution in these years, so, too, was warfare. During the quarter-century of the French Revolutionary Wars, in particular, Europe was faced with the prospect of 'total' war, on a scale unprecedented before the twentieth century. Military hardware, it is true, evolved only gradually, and battles were not necessarily any bloodier than they had been during the Seven Years' War. But in other ways these can legitimately be described as the first modern wars, fought by mass armies mobilized by national and patriotic propaganda, leading to the displacement of millions of people throughout Europe and beyond, as soldiers, prisoners of war, civilians and refugees. For those who lived through the period these wars would be a formative experience that shaped the ambitions and the identities of a generation.

The aims of the series are necessarily ambitious. In its various volumes, whether single-authored monographs or themed collections, it seeks to extend the scope of more traditional historiography. It will study warfare during this formative century not just in Europe, but in the Americas, in colonial societies and across the world. It will analyse the construction of identities and power relations by integrating the principal categories of difference, most notably class and religion, generation and gender, race and ethnicity. It will adopt a multifaceted approach to the period, and turn to methods of political, cultural, social, military and gender history, in order to develop a challenging and multidisciplinary analysis. Finally, it will examine elements of comparison and transfer and so tease out the complexities of regional, national, European and global history.

Rafe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest and Karen Hagemann

Acknowledgments

This project has been eleven years in the making, and I while I can never properly acknowledge all the debts I have accumulated in that time – the names of friends who patiently listened to me rant about some aspect of this project alone would fill a volume – I will do my best.

Several key institutions and people made this research possible. A Chateaubriand Fellowship and a Faherty grant funded most of my research in France. The Tyree-Lamb Fellowship allowed me to work at the Library of the Society of the Cincinnati in Washington D.C. The College of Arts and Sciences at Mississippi State University and the Institut Français d'Amérique also furnished generous funding for extra research in Paris. I am grateful to the archivists of the Archives d'Outre Mer and Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), who were generous with their time and knowledge. Gilbert Bodinier, former chief of the SHD, personally ensured I found what I needed and gave generously of his time during multiple research trips. I am also indebted to Valerie Sallis, Elizabeth Frengel, Rachel Jirka, and Ellen Clark of the Library of the Society of the Cincinnati for helping me navigate and process their superb collection of French material.

Parts of this work originally appeared in the *French History Journal* in 2008 and in *The Seven Years' War, Global Views* in 2012. I am grateful to Oxford University Press and Brill University Press, respectively, for allowing me to republish parts of those articles here.

While working on this project, I benefited from the company and conversation of many scholars and friends. While in France, Professors Jean-François Ruggiu and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol graciously shared their time and work on France and North America. During an initial trip to Paris, Sam Scott put me in contact with Jean-Paul Bertaud, who spent Bastille Day discussing the French army with me at the Sorbonne café. Colin Jones and David Andress both shared time and expertise at a conference in Cardiff and helped me find a logical conclusion to my final chapter. Stateside, David Bell, Jeremy Popkin, Gail Bossenga, Wayne Lee, Lloyd Kramer, Dick Kohn, and

Chris Browning challenged me with thoughtful questions and criticisms. John Lynn provided extensive written suggestions at a crucial stage. Jay Smith, Micah Antipaugh, and Arnaud Guinier all shared unpublished manuscripts with me. Erica Charters, Guy Chet, Joseph Bryan, and Sarah Vierra read rough chapter drafts and provided excellent suggestions for improvement. So many of my colleagues who challenge me intellectually are also warm and wonderful friends, and I am thankful for Erica Charters, Meghan Roberts, Bethany Keenan, Micah Antipaugh, Wynne Beers, Kevin Passmore, Christian Crouch, Ron Schechter, Christy Pichichero, and Huw Davies. This book began as an honors thesis, and I will always be especially grateful to Paul Mapp, Ron Schechter, Giulia Pacini, and Jim Whittenburg for their encouragement in this project's earliest stages and for their continued guidance and friendship.

I have more recently been blessed with wonderful colleagues and resources at Mississippi State University, which provides a supportive environment for research and the thoughtful exchange of ideas. Marc Lerner and Jonathan Gienapp (of Ole Miss) and Judy Ridner and Peter Messer in particular helped me articulate this project's broader significances. The excellent librarians at State have helped me track down numerous sources, and Ben Nagel worked last-minute inter-library loan magic.

There are a few friends whose help has been especially integral to this book. I am lucky to have the brilliant historian of gender and medicine, Jessica Martucci, as my friend and writing partner. She has read all of the chapters multiple times and offered wonderful suggestions as well as a sane perspective in our weekly meetings. Jay Smith read the entire manuscript – twice. As my graduate adviser, he gave me an incredible respect for language, both that of my subjects and that of my own hand. Since then, he has become my colleague and my friend, but he continues to help me navigate through research and make my words and thoughts make sense. Sarah Vierra is a fierce friend of unfailing optimism, keen insight, and excellent advice, who always knows exactly what to say.

I owe my greatest debts to my families. Gilles and Catherine Coulomb not only hosted me during many of my visits to France, but truly integrated me into their family. They have made Neuilly my home away from home, taught me how to navigate life *comme une française*, shared their *bons vins*, and shown unwavering confidence in me and *ma recherche*.

Most of all, I would like to thank my parents, Laura and Pete Osman, who fully supported me in this undertaking, always confident in my ability, especially when I doubted it most, and who listened to me, encouraged me, inspired me, and kept me grounded. Thank you to my Dad, who helped me work through some tangled ideas and tough decisions, and to my Mom, who in addition to cheering me on unwaveringly, first told me about the Key to the Bastille and even suggested that it would make a good title.

Introduction: The Key

> ‘Give me leave, my dear General, to present you with a picture of the Bastille’ along with ‘the main key of the fortress of despotism. It is a tribute, which I owe, as a son to my adoptive father, as an aide de Camp to my General, as a Missionary of Liberty to its Patriarch.’[1]
>
> – Marquis de Lafayette to George
> Washington, March 1790

In the summer of 1790, while serving as first president of the United States in New York, George Washington received a letter and two gifts from Marie-Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Moitier Marquis de Lafayette, his close friend and fellow veteran of the American Revolution. That Lafayette would send Washington a gift seemed fairly ordinary, as the two enjoyed a close relationship. Lafayette had arrived in America from France in 1777 as a passionate volunteer to help the American colonists in their war for independence from the Britain. Only 19 years old at the time, the French nobleman had willingly left his expecting wife, young daughter, and pampered lifestyle in order to volunteer as a common soldier under the command of General Washington. Washington had taken notice of this French adventurer, and even appointed Lafayette as his aide-de-camp, or personal aid. By the end of the war, Lafayette considered Washington as an adoptive father, and Washington likewise saw Lafayette as his own son. As a sign of his affection, Lafayette had even named his heir ‘George Washington Lafayette,’ and the two friends corresponded frequently.

The contents of Lafayette’s gift, though, proved extraordinary. Washington found a large iron key and a picture of the Bastille, a Paris prison and arsenal that had just been torn down by angry French laborers and soldiers the previous summer. Despite the many other revolutionary events occurring within the same timeframe – the bankruptcy of the state, the calling of the representative assembly known as the Estates General, the creation of the National Assembly as France's new representative government, and the establishment of the Parisian National Guard of armed citizens – it was the people's destruction of the Bastille on 14 July 1789 that signaled the beginning of the French Revolution, which in turn promised a new era of liberty, equality, and fraternity and ushered in the modern world.[2] Revolutionaries recognized its importance and celebrated the anniversary of the Bastille's fall with the Festival of the Federation exactly one year later, in which members of the line army and National Guardsmen from all over France pledged their allegiance to the Nation and friendship to each other.[3] Today, fireworks light the sky of Paris every 14 July to celebrate the event that gave rise to modern France and modern Europe. Although not present at the taking of the Bastille, the Marquis de Lafayette had played no small role in the beginning of the Revolution, and the day after the Bastille lay in ruins he took command of the National Guard of Paris, made of the same kinds of citizens and former soldiers who had taken the Bastille. With Lafayette as their chief, they would serve as a local police force to keep order in the city and serve with the regular line army in case of an attack – it was in a sense similar to the militias of the American Revolution that Lafayette had worked with during his time as a volunteer in the American army. During these promising first months of the French Revolution, Lafayette obtained the very key to the fallen Bastille, and decided in March of 1790 that its rightful place lay with George Washington.

In the letter accompanying the key to the Bastille, Lafayette explained that he gave it to Washington as 'a tribute, which I owe, as a son to my adoptive father, as an aide de Camp to my General, as a Missionary of Liberty to its Patriarch.'[4] That George Washington would become the steward of such a richly symbolic object indicates that, for the people of the period, there was a powerful connection between revolution in the United States and revolution in France. Lafayette's letter points to the larger forces at work that contributed to the fall of the Bastille, the coming of the French Revolution, and its triumphant and optimistic beginning. The center of Lafayette's statement, that he owed Washington the key as an aide-de-camp to his general, highlights their shared military service and its importance in general to the outbreak of revolution. It has been well established that the French army played an important role during the French Revolution by embodying revolutionary ideals of service and sacrifice to the Nation, protecting the Revolution, and exporting it to other countries once it was well underway. But what was the army's role in the coming of the French Revolution? Did it make certain events possible or inspire larger French society to act in a 'revolutionary' manner? Lafayette's final statement, that he owed Washington the key as a 'missionary of liberty to his patriarch,' speaks to the larger Atlantic context of the French Revolution, and even hints that the American Revolution just might have ushered in the French Revolution. The American Revolution concluded in 1783, just six years before the Bastille fell at the hands of agitated French citizens in 1789, and the values of greater political participation, liberty, and equality were integral to both Revolutions. These similarities invite the question of how the American Revolution might have facilitated the outbreak of the French Revolution.

Lafayette's letter to Washington serves as a springboard to understanding these larger themes. In addressing the connections between them, I argue that the French army, which pursued the possibility of transforming itself into a citizen army during the last 50 years of the old regime, often served at the forefront of social change and created conditions that allowed for and encouraged revolutionary activity such as the taking of the Bastille. French involvement in North America, both in the Seven Years' War and American Revolution, played a large role in structuring the French army's perceptions of and attractions to the notion of the citizen army, and it subtly colored civilian society's reactions to the army's activities and evolution. This interplay between the army and larger French society, especially over the common terrain of the idealized 'citizen army,' helped to bring about the fall of the Bastille and the French Revolution.

Historians have studied the French army of the old regime and Revolution in great detail and probed the relationship between the American and French Revolutions, but this book focuses on the central cultural importance of the army in old regime France. Military change and reform after the Seven Years' War dominate the literature that focuses on the eighteenth-century French army. Starting as early as 1750, French officers noticed that their army suffered from specific weaknesses, such as desertion, poor discipline, poor living conditions for soldiers, and often unprepared officers. The officer corps had become unwieldy with too many high-ranking officers, which put a financial strain on the state. Multiple reformers tried to improve the army, but with mixed results. Some, such as St Germain and Choiseul, attempted to enforce strict regulations that would ensure a more educated officer corps and more disciplined soldiers, but some officers objected that these changes did not support the *esprit* of French soldiers and interfered with their pursuit of personal advancement though the army.[5] Attempts to render the army more disciplined and competent led to controversial reforms that tried to solidify the elite status of officers by excluding the recently ennobled from military service.[6] While the period from the Seven Years' War to the Revolution saw many reform proposals for the French army that laid the groundwork for great change in the Revolution and Napoleonic periods, few of them instigated the immediate change many had hoped for. Much work has shown that the reforms of the 1770s and 1780s created the foundations for revolutionary changes in the 1790s.[7] This book builds on earlier scholarship, but it particularly emphasizes the dialogue between the French army and the rest of society, which makes these reforms more immediately meaningful for the end of the old regime.

At the same time the army underwent this confused and at times chaotic reform period that would have consequences for the Revolution, much of French society engaged in Enlightenment discussions on citizenship, natural rights, and the socially reinvigorating effects of patriotism. French writers used patriotism in particular during the Seven Years' War, fought largely against the English and the Prussians, to further define 'Frenchness,'[8] and saw patriotism as a virtue that would ward off social malaise and corruption.[9] In this context of encouraging patriotism, other historians have highlighted the significance of the Enlightenment public sphere in shaping public opinion.[10] While censors in place supposedly controlled what the French populace read, an illegal book trade thrived, and some books and periodicals that would ordinarily stop at the censor passed into print.[11] Such studies point to a vast literary culture that affected the way that readers (and listeners) thought about politics, the state, and themselves, but these studies have given little consideration to an important dimension of the Enlightenment public sphere that included discussions on military institutions and the values that underlay them.

Likewise, questions concerning the American and French Revolutions have a long history. The close proximity of the two events has tempted historians to argue for a causal relationship between the two, but the details of such a relationship have been difficult to pin down. R.R. Palmer famously argued that all the revolutions of the eighteenth century were 'of one great movement,' and scholars have continued to question the relationship between the many revolutions that rocked the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century.[12] Because a portion of the

French army fought in America during the War of Independence, along with some French volunteers like Lafayette, historians have hypothesized that French officers and soldiers brought 'revolution' back to France with them. These studies have discovered that with very few exceptions, however, most military personnel did not return to France with revolution in mind.[13] To paraphrase Lee Kennet, *admiring* the American army did not mean the French meant to *imitate* it.[14] While these historians have established that time spent in America did not necessarily mean that French officers or soldiers wanted to follow suit with their own Revolution, focusing purely on the contingent of French officers in America limits the potential for understanding how America's influence was mediated through the army. Considering the vibrant nature of public discussions about values, institutions, social mores, and the direction of reform during the Enlightenment, representations of the American and French armies in the American war proved influential to social and military reform efforts. The larger context of military reform, not people shuttling between the two continents, gave meaning to the American Revolution's 'citizen-army' style of fighting. French obsession with the American Revolution found expression in texts, images, fashions, and material culture, which had a subtle but profound impact on the way French civilians related to military forces and how French reformers 'thought' their way to revolution in military terms.

All of these elements that help to understand better the coming of the French Revolution – the reforming army, the intense discussions of social and military change in the public sphere, and the Atlantic influence – come together in how the French army tried to transition from a dynastic, disciplined line army, the typical army of Europe at the time, into a citizen army, the likes of which were practiced by the ancient Greeks and Romans and that the American army and militia seemed to revive. From the time of Louis XIV's rule in the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, France maintained a state-commissioned army. Nearly all the officers were men of noble status, and their soldiers came from the lowest classes. Louis XIV centralized this army and expanded it, requiring a bigger officer corps and a bureaucracy to run it. For the noble officers, serving the king in his wars led directly to additional status, promotions, and pensions; the institution of the army was tightly connected to hierarchy and social status. At the same time, the army remained distant from the majority of the populace, and the occasional encounters were tense, especially between civilians and soldiers. While Louis XIV had built a powerful army, the expanding officer corps and bureaucracy caused problems that intensified in the years leading up the Seven Years' War. Unwieldy and undisciplined, the French army proved no match for the lightning-fast Prussian troops or the well-supplied, better-financed British army. The loss of the war proved so humiliating that all of French society, not just the army, felt the sting of defeat, and civilian and army reformers alike committed their minds and their pens to reforming the army and society. Both groups imagined that if the French army incorporated elements of a citizen army, such as patriotism, dignity for soldiers, and greater investment in the cause for war, it would amend all their military and societal woes. Under the right conditions, people would want to become soldiers and fight for their country. A citizen army, with its republican connotations, may seem like an odd inspiration for an army that operated under a monarchy. Based on their understanding of ancient Greek and Roman armies, however, writers insisted that patriotically inspired troops fought fiercely and without relying heavily on discipline, which had never been the French army's strong suit. It was in this context that France became heavily involved in the American Revolution, sending funds, supplies, engineers, and finally a contingent of the French army to help. Over the course of this war, French authors marveled at the ability of the citizen army of the Americans, made up of farmers and simple tradesmen with no training but a burning desire to fight for their country, to match the well-disciplined British forces. Authors and artists could not sate the market for American news and representations. Such an experience supported the army in its attempts to incorporate more patriotism into its ranks and encouraged French civilians to reconsider their own relationship to military service and military values. While some officers' fears over losing privileges delayed the institutionalization of these citizen army ideas, soldiers and citizens took matters into their own hands and stormed the Bastille together, arming the citizens and creating the National Guard of Paris. The National Guard proved an early triumph in the Revolution, but the line army never fully followed suit in becoming a citizen army of willing soldiers fighting out of patriotism. For the first two years of the French Revolution, officers, the new revolutionary government, soldiers, and citizens all embraced the concept of the citizen army and heralded its arrival, but it never took shape as writers of the old regime had envisioned. As the Revolution became increasingly radical in 1791, the very officers who had campaigned for a citizen army fled, and with them the commitment to a citizen army based on voluntary service. In order to adequately fill the ranks of the army, especially as hostile neighboring monarchs threatened invasion and internal discord fueled fears of a counter revolution, the French army had to resort to conscription and unpopular drafts. The fleeting era of the French citizen army had ended before it had really begun.

Discussing military change in these terms departs from the standard picture of the French citizen army, which supposedly emerged between 1792 and 1793 after the old regime offered early hints of what was to come.[15] Volunteers did respond to calls to arms in 1792, and gradually over the course of the next year subsequent groups of soldiers joined the army either of their own design or through conscription. The famous *Levée en Masse* of 1793 brought an additional 300,000 men into the army in order to help fight France's growing international conflicts.[16] The incredible size of the Revolutionary army is one reason it maintains its reputation as a citizen army.[17] Such huge numbers meant that the army contained a greater cross-section of society than ever before, and some of the soldiers did feel a strong patriotic call to serve the Nation. There are reasons to think that many saw military participation as essential to maintaining their rights as citizens.[18]

The old regime army, however, came closer to meeting the definition of the 'citizen army' than did the army of the Revolution, as a citizen army relied on citizens serving willingly as soldiers out of patriotism. For a brief time at the beginning of the French Revolution, the officers of the old regime who had dreamt of a citizen army saw their visions fulfilled in the line army, but if at this point France did have a citizen army, it was not effective and did not last long. Officers and civilian writers had overestimated French volunteerism and underestimated the degree of resentment towards the noble officer corps, and the citizen army petered out just as it emerged. While the citizen army never took shape as anticipated, the extended experiment with 'citizen soldiers' gave France an important vehicle for articulating and even catching a glimpse of a more republican government, and it ultimately helped establish an environment that made that Revolution possible.[19] For it was in contemplating the citizen army and trying to bring it about that military and civilian writers discussed ideas of citizenship and patriotism, challenged the social and military hierarchy, and celebrated the army and militia of a burgeoning republic. In pushing for a citizen army, they helped create a revolution.

While the bulk of this study focuses on changes in the French army and the larger public attitudes towards military service during the old regime, it has significance for understanding the French Revolution and the source of its genius in the old regime. Other scholars have focused on continuity between the old regime and Revolution, whether through looking at attitudes in political economy, taxation, or nationalism; in short many have recognized the long process of mental preparation required for launching a revolution, and often hallmarks of the Revolution have meaning not because of immediate consequences, but because they reference long-standing problems or phenomena in French society, stretching deep into the old regime.[20]

In a similar fashion, understanding the military reforms and backstory of the citizen army will help clarify the momentous meaning of the taking of the Bastille. It is common knowledge that the Bastille served as a 'symbol of despotism,' to quote Lafayette, and that it contained the munitions French citizens sought in order to protect themselves from the forces that Louis XVI brought into Paris that summer. The taking of the Bastille resonated so strongly with everyone, though, because it also built on and responded to decades of discussion about military reform, the meaning of citizenship, and French patriotism. In taking the Bastille, civilians and soldiers demonstrated their citizenship by actively arming themselves for larger, patriotic aims. In so doing, citizens with little previous military experience and active-duty or recently-deserted soldiers became equally invested in the Nation as citizen soldiers. Simultaneously throughout France, citizens created their own militias to protect against raids, and soldiers refused to fire on civilians reluctant to give up their meager grain resources. With the civilians taking their own initiative to participate in military activity, and established soldiers taking part in campaigning for citizens' rights, including their own, they fulfilled the citizenship functions that nearly all citizen-army discussions had envisioned. As the elite in military and civilian spheres recognized the birth of the citizen army, the center of military power shifted from the officer corps to the new citizen-soldiers. With the melding of civilian and military spheres, and the draining of power from noble officers, other revolutionary ideas suddenly seemed possible. As the regiment of Forez acknowledged, with the fall of the Bastille, the Nation began the process of 'recovering liberty.'[21]

With the exception of some specialists in military history, scholars often tend to regard warfare as the uncomplicated expression of more consequential political and economic conflicts, but the fact is that how a nation's military is deployed and how it conducts war have broad implications for all realms of society. As with the French army in North America, this is especially true when troops engage with different military cultures that force them to amend both their tactics and their attitudes towards military structure and command. Rather than being unproblematic extensions of pre-existing political aims, war and the military that wages it interact meaningfully with a nation's character, society, and culture. Established military historians and well-known cultural historians are currently attempting to breach the superficial methodological divide between cultural history and military history, either by trying to take a cultural approach to the experience of battle or by using the army to understand new paradigms in nationalism.[22] On its broadest level, this work speaks to the value of using cultural methodology for military history, as well as how military institutions are fruitful sites for cultural analysis.

The following chapters take a broad chronological and thematic approach to understanding transformations in the old regime's army and society. The first chapter examines the French army during the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV and argues that while Louis XIV created a powerful, centralized army that served the state and the king, his army contained the seeds of its own destruction. French noble officers required constant warfare in order to support their positions at court and justify the privilege they received by birth. As the officer corps grew, its need for constant combat and reward overwhelmed the army and drained the state. French soldiers, on the other hand, often lacked basic necessities and, by the mid-eighteenth century, the discipline to compete with other European armies. The French army, partly as a result of its traditions of 'limited' warfare, also remained largely isolated from the rest of French society. Even in times when soldiers wintered with inhabitants in their homes, the different cultures of the civilians and soldiers, and the king's use of the army to occasionally coerce taxes from his subjects or convert religious dissidents, made relationships between the army and society tense. The *milice*, in which civilians became suddenly roped into the line army, only strengthened the fear and distrust civilians had for military service. Despite these tensions between the army and society, no one questioned the army's centrality for the pursuit of international power and glory and for the maintenance of domestic hierarchy and order.

All of the weaknesses inherent in the line army created by Louis XIV came to a head during the French army's experience fighting the Seven Years' War in Canada, the subject of the second chapter. While this global conflict from 1754 to 1763 also featured clashes between the French army and the Prussians in Europe, conditions in the Canadian theater inspired French officers to express their expectations and difficulties with the structure and rewards system of the army. In Canada, French and Canadian forces allied with Amerindian nations to halt the British advancement into New France. The resulting loss of the Seven

Years' War forced both the French army and larger society to reconsider the very philosophy behind their military and civilian structures and called for a complete reform of French military forces. Interestingly, in fighting alongside the Canadian militia, which did have patriotic reasons to defend their country and way of life, the French army got a taste of the type of national wars on the horizon that would require a reconfiguration of their own military structure and philosophy.

The third and fourth chapters address French society and the army in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War. From the 1760s until 1781, reformers grappled with the possibilities of making patriotism the center of French army and civilian life. Inspired by Greek and Roman examples, French reformers and civilians interested in military affairs proposed improvements for the soldiers' living conditions and morale that would make them more zealous when fighting for their officers and their country. Writers such as Jacques Antoine-Hippolyte, the comte de Guibert and Joseph Servan envisioned a new army that would inspire French citizens to become soldiers out of patriotic duty, and treat soldiers as fellow citizens. Using contemporary sources on ancient warfare, published reform literature, and military *mémoires* addressed to the minister of war, this chapter argues that by the 1780s reformers had in their own minds 'citizen-ized' their soldiers, not just to improve the army's performance in battle, but also to revive virtue in civilian society. This direction for the French army received a great deal of support from the American Revolution, the subject of Chapter 4, as the American army and militia seemed to embody of the citizen armies and virtuous societies of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Civilian and military personnel alike found it inspiring. The American Revolution also provided the French army with the opportunity to reinvent itself as a tenacious, virtuous fighting force that supported a citizen army. This new French army fought to defend citizens from tyrannical kings, and many French readers embraced this new image of the army enthusiastically.

The desire to create a citizen army met with resistance from some branches of the officer corps, as long-standing commitments to noble privilege in the army inhibited attempts at lasting modifications. Chapter 5 considers reform efforts to professionalize the officer corps by providing equal opportunities for promotion, emphasizing talent and merit, and limiting the corrupting influence of wealth, while still maintaining noble privileges. Such reforms proved nearly impossible as competing pressures for a meritorious officer corps stood in opposition to the privileges that court nobles expected to maintain. This chapter examines the contradictions working against the emergence of a French citizen army at the end of the old regime and the building tensions that eventually made way for a citizen army born of the initiative of citizens and soldiers. With violence erupting all over France against a backdrop of financial catastrophe and the calling of the Estates General, conditions had become ripe for citizen and soldier action. This tension culminated with the taking of the Bastille. While reforms within the officer corps had stalled, the taking of the Bastille showed that a citizen army had emerged in France organically, and the change was confirmed the next day in the creation of the Parisian National Guard.

Despite the optimism and success of the Bastille's fall and the heralding of the new citizen army, the window of opportunity would not last. Chapter 6 chronicles the final gasp of the old regime's vision of a citizen army. While the National Guard in Paris and other parts of France did embody the definition of a citizen army, based on patriotism and citizens' desire to serve their country, the line army had a difficult time following suit. Officers were slow to see that such a new army would necessitate a change in their status, and soldiers and citizens used their new-found agency to confound their officers and seek revenge for past grievances. As officers and civilians in power alike recognized that the line army had become a citizen army, the officer corps that lingered from the old regime gradually saw its power ebb away. Scorned by their soldiers and decried as enemies of the Revolution by increasingly radical revolutionaries, officers found themselves disenfranchised by the Revolution, and they clung to it only because King Louis XVI voiced support for it. When the king tried to flee France in 1791, however, and exposed his opposition to the Revolution, officers had no choice but to flee France, as well. Their departure for better fortunes abroad signaled the end of the citizen-army scheme, for even as revolutionaries likewise hoped for a large voluntary army, they soon resorted to a conscripted one.

This book challenges long-held notions that that the French army operated as a consistently aristocratic force until the French Revolution introduced it to new practices and *mœurs*. World-shattering innovations in military thinking began during the Seven Years' War, received affirmation during the American Revolution, and continued through the outbreak of revolution in 1789. When Lafayette presented George Washington with the key to the Bastille, he reflected not just on their personal relationship, but referenced these larger forces at work in both nations. In France, military officers and the reading public would forge a citizen army by thinking in new ways about patriotism, citizenship, and military service, but in the process they would spark a Revolution they could not control.

1

The King's Army

The citizen army that France built and experienced during the old regime and early Revolution had its roots in the line army as it had been designed and fashioned during the reign of Louis XIV. Because Louis XIV saw the army as crucial to building and maintaining his power at home and abroad, he crafted it in a manner that would give him full control over the army and keep it isolated from the greater population, while at the same time reinforcing social hierarchies. Over the course of his reign, from 1661 to 1715, Louis XIV transformed the army from a conglomerate of largely mercenary forces, who could be contracted for a campaign or the duration of a war, to a massive, state-run institution that he could use at his discretion against international challenges as well as domestic ones. Louis XIV likewise instituted the morals, methods, and mindset that supported his new state-run army as part of the scaffolding structure of much of French society.

In Louis XIV's army, officers and soldiers operated in a relatively ordered and disciplined manner that contrasted sharply with the chaotic and gruesome religious wars of the previous centuries. Officers, nearly all men of noble status, strove to obtain honor and glory on the battlefield, which they used to showcase their bravery and desire to serve the king. Such displays relied on an implicit code of conduct while on campaign that required officers to honor the enemy and spare civilians. Louis XIV's changes also altered the custom of hiring mercenary soldiers, who used their position in the army to enrich themselves through pillage and preyed on any towns in their path. By transforming the earlier 'aggregate contract' soldiers-for-hire army into a 'state commission' army of disciplined soldiers centralized under the king's command, Louis XIV created more dependable troops who relied on their officers and the state for their livelihood and care.[1] This dynamic reinforced the difference in class that had always separated soldiers from their officers just as it further distinguished and separated the soldiers from their peasant peers and former communities. Because the reasons for going to war in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were largely dynastic or mercantile, neither officers nor soldiers necessarily knew or even cared about having an over-arching cause for the war. Rather than fighting for a patriotic or otherwise meaningful 'cause,' both officers and soldiers found motivation in how the war would benefit them personally, professionally, or economically. Wars and their outcome could affect the common populace, especially if they were on the borders of France or in a state of rebellion, but under normal conditions, the greater French populace did not feel or interact much with the French army.

Louis XIV did increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the French army, but his creation was not built to last. He developed the habit of awarding promotion on the basis of courage or sustaining battle wounds, and many officers advanced in rank without the necessary skill or experience. The practice of venality – selling offices to those willing to pay a high price for ennoblement – increased the number of officers beyond what the army could sustain, and compounded the lack of professional cohesion among the officers. The interest in incorporating more light infantry and partisan tactics into the French army, which would require greater freedom and rely on the initiative of soldiers, signaled further change. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Louis XIV gave the French army a unique character that both enhanced its status and distinguished it from the rest of French society, but that ultimately proved unsustainable. The transformation of the army during the reign of Louis XIV from disjointed bands of officers and soldiers, to a centralized army under his authority, to an unwieldy force growing in size and afflicted by incompetence not only positioned the French army for another transformation, but influenced how reforms would unfold. This chapter will outline the important aspects of Louis XIV's army in terms of officer and solider responsibilities, as well as its relationship with the French populace and the kinds of violence it used. By the end of Louis XIV's reign, France boasted a large and menacing army, but one whose distance from the rest of the populace, dependence on constant war, and bureaucratic inefficiencies would soon render it incapable of defeating fellow European forces and require a drastic change in order to regain its effectiveness.

When Louis XIV assumed full command of the French throne in 1661, France was at peace, thanks largely to the diplomatic efforts of his regent, Mazarin. The young king, however, had been taught that glory and greatness came through victory in warfare, and he did not intend to keep the peace for long. The powerful Cardinal Richelieu had made France the greatest power in Europe (next to Spain) during the reign of the previous monarch, Louis XIII, and Louis XIV intended to maintain or advance France's powerful international status.[2] He also wished to continue Richelieu's efforts to further centralize the entire kingdom under the monarchy's control. When Mazarin died in 1661, Louis refused to replace him with another adviser, and heard all of the reports and concerns of his secretaries of state directly.[3] He continued to develop his kingship around the concept of absolutism: that all matters of the kingdom came directly under his authority.[4] Maintaining this position, and having everyone at court eager to please him, depended partially on cultivating glory, or *gloire*, through warfare. More than the grandeur and splendor usually associated with glory, French *gloire* connoted legitimacy, renown, and an honorable reputation, all essential for Louis XIV's kingship. While he had legitimately inherited the throne through his birthright and had already defeated powerful factions to secure it, he desired to exhibit his martial prowess in an international war to prove himself as an able monarch both to his subjects and to his European neighbors.[5] Such military activities had domestic advantages, as well, and promised to confirm his authority over his court, where everyone recognized that the highest attainment of *gloire* came through warfare.[6] To cite Joël Cornette, the glory of the king and the state depended on Louis XIV's ability to 'incarnate the culture of war,' and the king knew from a young age that France expected him to fulfill his role as the 'king of war' in order to fulfill his role as king of France.[7]

The young king did not wait long to begin his campaigns. In 1665, he leaped at the opportunity to start a war with Spain when Philip IV died, leaving a sickly child as heir to the throne. Louis XIV claimed that he should have access to the Spanish succession through his wife, a Spanish princess. His claims were weak, but when Spain refused to engage with them, Louis XIV saw it as sufficient pretext to send his armies to Flanders. The Emperor of Austria intervened with a secret plan to take all of Spain and share it with France later, when the weak boy-king died. Louis XIV agreed and called off the war. His actions had demonstrated to the rest of Europe, however, how eager he was to engage in conflict. They even motivated the Spanish Netherlands, usually an ally of France, to break the alliance and join France's greatest nemesis, England, in order to keep France from obtaining the Spanish throne. Louis XIV was incensed, but now he had a stronger pretext for war.[8] Louis's thirst for *gloire*, of course, played no small role in his decision to attack, and in 1672 he launched the Dutch War, his first major military engagement, in which he personally led his army during certain campaigns.[9]

The Dutch War provided Louis XIV with plenty of opportunities to demonstrate the power of his army, especially in siege warfare. Louis's reign boasted not only some of the greatest ministers of war in France's history – Letellier and his son, Louvois – but Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the engineering mastermind behind France's greatest fortresses and the army's unrivaled ability to besiege enemy strongholds. His contributions to the French army were on display at the fortress Maastrict in 1673, where Louis XIV himself conducted the siege. Adam François van der Meulen, a Flemish painter celebrated for his battle scenes, even immortalized the siege of Maastrict on canvas as a 'well-orchestrated spectacle.'[10] After five years of fighting, the war could have ended in 1677, and Louis XIV's army was in a position to negotiate a peace favorable to French interests. As the tide of the conflict happened to flow in Louis's favor, though, he continued the war for another year to obtain a better peace and more glory for himself and France. His strategy worked: French elites through the eighteenth century remembered the Dutch War as a hallmark of French military victory, which even pacifist Voltaire recognized over 70 years later.[11]

The quest for *gloire* did not always deliver such dividends, but complicated conflicts did not discourage Louis XIV in his life-long pursuit of military glory. Later in his reign, Louis XIV proved stubborn in his pursuit of victory over German princes in the Nine Years' War. When Louis XIV first attacked, he intended for the war to conclude after four months, but it stretched from 1688 to 1697. While Louis XIV claimed purely defensive motives in this conflict – he wanted to fortify the borderlands between France and the German states – the rest of Europe read his initial actions as offensive in both senses of the word: an attempt to absorb more land and power at the expense of his neighbors, a view that was not inconsistent with Louis XIV's earlier conquests. The many years of fighting that followed defied the usual norms of European warfare, with greater atrocities on both sides. The war finally ended with few gains for France, especially considering its costs in resources and lives, but Louis XIV's persistence in this conflict speaks again to his passion for obtaining *gloire*, and his reluctance to settle for a simple peace. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, war would continue to fuel and justify French royal power, on international as well as domestic fronts.

Louis XIV's need for war also conveniently suited the needs of his officers, who almost exclusively boasted noble status. They, too, had been schooled in war and needed an outlet that would allow them to prove themselves and to justify the privileges they enjoyed by right of birth. In order to maintain their reputations, noble officers had to cultivate and publicly display their courage, self-sacrifice, and honor. Such qualities determined their reputation and acceptance in society, but proved difficult to gain and easy to lose. Missteps in society or on the battlefield resulted in ridicule, disgrace, and a significant drop in reputation from which some nobles would never recover.[12] Noble officers kept their honor and courage intact by participating in France's wars, but also through duels and personal confrontations. Louis XIV harnessed their pre-existing desire for glory through violent confrontation and attempted to channel it exclusively into the French army; he outlawed dueling, and while the practice continued, he communicated that the lives (and deaths) of his nobles were at his disposal, not their own. Competition between army officers and feats of bravery would have to occur on the battlefield. Because the purpose of the noble class for centuries had been to shed blood for the king, officers already based their self-worth on their performance as warriors. As servants of the king, noble officers had the responsibility of building and maintaining their reputations and winning glory for king and country.[13] High expectations for courage and self-sacrifice further motivated army officers and made nobles further dependent on the monarch to provide wars and opportunities for them to showcase their merits.

French nobles intended for the officer corps prepared for these duties from a young age by studying the warfare of ancient Greeks and Romans as well as the histories of their own families. During the reign of Louis XIV, and continuing until the mid-eighteenth century, noble and military education consisted of a combination of book study and practical military experience. As young boys, officers-to-be either attended a Jesuit college or received private tutoring at home and learned their letters and morals by the *émulation* of the heroes of antiquity. Their schooling emphasized a learn-by-imitation approach by having students copy Latin and Greek texts, thereby absorbing the language, writing style, and laudable values of Caesar and Cato.[14] According to educator Charles Rollin, who published a multi-volume series chronicling the exploits and virtues of ancient civilizations, studying the ancients naturally cultivated students' critical reasoning, judgment, inquisitiveness, and good taste, while immersing them in the heroic deeds of the ancients, teaching them to love glory and virtue.[15]

By the mid-eighteenth century, the number of military schools had increased, including Louis XV's *Ecole Militaire*, which provided instruction for poorer families of the *noblesse d'épée* and emphasized mathematics and military engineering. The study of Latin and languages decreased for noble officers, but the emphasis on the ancients remained. Officers were expected to understand tactical maneuvers of modern-day generals and mathematics as well as have a thorough knowledge of ancient history. Studying the ancients provided them with a solid foundation for understanding the art of war while also teaching them military virtues. They drew directly on their studies of Sparta and Rome in organizing and maintaining their regiments and in making battlefield decisions.[16] Because of the general belief that military and political principles remained absolute and unchanging, studying ancient warriors provided useful information and examples for contemporary officers. Military lessons, such as 'distress[ing] the enemy more by famine than the sword' to achieve victory could best be learned by studying ancient authors and exploits, not accounts of more contemporary battles.[17] From their earliest days, nobles learned to imitate the ancients' moral code and to use warfare as a platform for pursuing *gloire* for the king and themselves.

Studying family histories contributed to this calling by providing more immediate examples of heroic deeds, self-sacrifice, and feats of *gloire*. These family histories served two principal purposes in the education of young men destined for the officer corps. While they presented examples of 'fine and glorious actions,'[18] at the same time, the fact that these stories sprang from their own parentage galvanized the youth to match or exceed their accomplishments.[19] These family histories further solidified the noble officer's place in the continually unfolding story of his family and gave him a sense of his family's expectations for his own life – they cultivated a deep sense of pride and destiny in a young man of noble birth, challenging him to be worthy of, and to add to, his family's name and legacy.[20]

Battle of the period allowed officers ample opportunity to showcase their military talents and win honor and glory for their family name. The period from 1650 through 1789 was a unique time when political, economic, and intellectual trends conspired to make the warfare of this period one where combatants 'shoot each other politely.'[21] Unlike the bloody and passionate wars of religion that preceded this period and wars of revolution that followed, the military culture of honor, reputation, and discipline of this era insisted on a style of warfare that most historians tend to classify as 'limited.' Warfare in the eighteenth century had specific and achievable goals usually involving the possession of a piece of land, or determining which monarch would have access to certain trade routes. Although Louis XIV had to endure the occasional accusation that he sought a 'universal monarchy,' monarchs of the time in fact generally respected the 'balance of power' in Europe, and did not want to overturn it by unseating a ruler or completely overtaking a country.[22] The logistical difficulties of providing for the large armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries restricted the campaign season to a period of about five months. Battles and sieges could be costly affairs, in terms of both men and money, meaning that generals avoided combat if they could. They preferred to maneuver the enemy into a corner that would prompt surrender rather than lose a battle and a large percentage of men in casualties.[23]

Beyond these practical matters, historians have argued that the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on reason and humane values, influenced the way officers engaged in war. Beginning with the era of Louis XIV and lasting through the eighteenth century, monarchs and officers discouraged violence against civilians and had stringent rules to prevent their soldiers from plundering towns in their path. Officers even generally agreed with Voltaire that the continued use of cannon and shot to settle disagreements between powers was obsolete in an enlightened age.[24] If war was to be waged, it had to be waged as humanely as possible. This approach fit into the aristocratic culture of the officer corps, in which war was seen as a 'gentlemanly game' between aristocrats, who felt more connected to each other through class and status than to common members of their own state. Officers of similar social ranks did believe in an obligation to treat each other with respect and a certain form of chivalry. French and English officers in particular sought to outdo each other in polite conduct on the battlefield. The religious wars had brought on a 'growing distaste for violence' that, until the national fervor of the French Revolution, demanded the lessening of military destruction.[25] This also coincided with the rise of the aggregate contract army, which placed soldiers under strict command and limited the violence they could inflict on civilians.

Noble officers relied on large, structured battles that allowed them to demonstrate military acumen and personal bravery, and despite the more polite form of warfare, officers did not shirk from exposing themselves to dangers. Even when artillery, more than the sword, became the primary means of inflicting casualties on the battlefield, officers found ways to exhibit individual heroism by exposing themselves to enemy fire. During the battle of Fontenoy, for example, 384 of the

5,161 casualties were officers.[26] These acts of courage only gained glory, however, if the officers' peers witnessed the heroic deed, and if the officer achieved his mission. As Vauban explained, 'True *gloire* … is only acquired by real and solid actions.'[27] Officers gained glory by demonstrating their courage and exposing themselves to danger, but they were not encouraged to do so lightly, or if doing so would lead to little gain. These acts of bravery also had to be visible to their fellow officers – and most French officers considered their appearance in battle as no insignificant detail. They made themselves visible (and worth seeing) by bringing some of the comforts of the court with them on campaign. Even in combat, an officer's dress and wig always properly adhered to the standards of his rank. Their appearance accentuated the *gloire* they won on the battlefield by maintaining their dignified appearance while winning it.[28] Even though the world of war and the world of the court seemed to occupy opposite ends of the spectrum, noble officers occupied both, and while on campaign the two cultures intersected.

In spite of the prevailing mores of aristocratic culture and 'limited' warfare, officers still inflicted brutal violence against civilians and often used less honorable forms of warfare to obtain the victories necessary for *gloire*. Civilians often got caught in a vicious crossfire, suggesting that perhaps warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not as 'limited' as some have argued.[29] Often unmentioned in these discussions of 'limited warfare' is the fact that smaller engagements took place alongside the battles and sieges, often because of the need to prepare the terrain or secure supplies. Although noble officers generally conducted honorable warfare that fulfilled their obligations to family and king, they also adapted to and benefited from small groups of soldiers targeting specific villages.

The most extreme versions of this *petite guerre* or small warfare occurred during the Dutch War in the 1670s, which saw small warfare and brief, forceful moments of violence that proved decisive in the overall conflict. While the monumental sieges, such as the celebrated siege of Maastricht, took center stage, *petite guerre* paved the way for French success in many larger encounters, and ensured French superiority in supply and communication.[30] Thanks to the 'bureau of contributions' that Louis XIV established during the War of Devolution, non-combatants of the Spanish Netherlands shouldered part of the burden to supply and fund French troops in their territory. French dragoons threatened to burn and pillage a community if the residents did not pay the required 'contribution,' consisting of money and supplies – a prospect frightening enough to ensure that most villages would pay their enemies rather than risk incurring violence. In addition to supplying the French army, these 'war taxes' sapped resources that otherwise would have supplied the enemy.[31]

Another means of obtaining lodging, money, and supply from noncombatants consisted of sending 'safe-guards' to protect the village from wandering troops. Even if a village was not singled out for paying a war tax, it could still come to a fiery end if it fell in the path of a wandering band of troops in search of supplies and plunder. Instead, small collections of French troops swore to protect towns against wandering groups of soldiers in return for quartering and providing necessities.[32] Every soldier required wood for fire, vinegar, candles, access to a bowl and cooking pot, and decent bedding.[33] Many troops would also steal food, animals and possessions, and take advantage of the town's women, but many still chose it over the possibility of becoming the target of a roving band of troops. The 'bureau of contributions' and 'safe-guards' provided two means for the French army to supply itself with its enemy's supplies, without distracting from the main stage of war in a large battle or significant siege.

French partisans could support these larger, public arenas of military display by conducting raids in villages adjacent to future battle sites in order to weaken the area. Even then raids were not conducted haphazardly by plunder-hungry troops. Each band of partisan troops fought under the watchful eye and direction of an officer, and commanders strategically chose the sites for raiding. Any soldier who strayed from the precise location faced dire punishments, including hanging.[34] During the Dutch War, Louvois, Louis XIV's minister of war, directly ordered an increase in the frequency and intensity of the raids on villages in 1675 and 1676, when he was pushing the war to a close. He reasoned that if Dutch civilians reached their threshold of suffering, they would demand that their government end the war.[35] Calculated suffering of civilians therefore comprised part of the overall French strategy to bring long or costly wars to a close. In such ways, these methods both contradicted and supported the concept of limited warfare, and provided the French army with some familiarity with *petite guerre* or partisan tactics, even before they were institutionalized or officially adopted into the army.

Partisan tactics further complicated ideas of limited warfare, because they comprised an important part of pre-empting possible conflict and securing French borders. When on campaign, armies would purposely turn the area around them into 'belts of waste' not only as a means of supplying their own armies from the surrounding countryside, but also to make sure that enemy armies could not encroach on their newly-won territory.[36] Not only would this support their own advance, but protect their bordering provinces from having to undergo the same treatment by enemy forces. It is important to note, however, that these areas would not be entirely destroyed and burned to the ground, but weakened and sapped of resources only to the point where the area would be incapable of hosting another army. While the destruction of the German Palatinate during the Nine Years' War would prove to be one of the more brutal and bloody chapters in French military history, it also presented the use of small groups of troops not just alongside large campaigns, but also as preventative measures against larger conflicts.

Such *petite guerre* continued as a standard in the French army though the War of the Austrian succession, which Louis XV waged from 1740 to 1748. The fiery use of *petite guerre* in this instance, however, especially at the taking of the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, underscored the value of limited warfare as a better alternative to the kind of violence possible with *petite guerre*.[37] Part of the rules involved in limited warfare established that a besieged fortress would most likely fall to its attackers. If the fortress held out and honorably defended itself for a time, then the attackers would allow the fortress to surrender peacefully and its defenders would maintain their honor, military colors, and soldiers. If the fortress did not surrender, however, then the besieging troops had free license to pillage and plunder the fort. On the night of 15–16 September 1747, the French army finally took the fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom after a long siege. Since it had not surrendered when offered the opportunity after some fighting, it suffered the fury of French soldiers. French officers expressed disgust at the violence, yet were simultaneously resigned to its necessity as one of the honored threats that made the rules of limited warfare, and therefore limited warfare itself, possible.[38]

Figure 1.1 exemplifies the relationship between noble French elites and military service. It is a game made for the duc du Berry around 1750 by the printer Paumant. This 'game of war' features 53 squares, arranged in a circular outside-in pattern, with each square presenting an element of warfare, from prisoners of war, to removing the dead, to sieges. Each player used playing cards to see where their token would move on the board, and each square instructed the player to advance, retreat, skip turns, or give over small coins, depending on where they landed. The siege, for example, at which the French excelled, but which took considerable time to accomplish, would make the player skip several turns, but would then advance the player several places. The end goal of the game, as in war, was to reach the center square, where the


LE JEU DE LA GUERRE

Figure 1.1 *Le Jeu de la Guerre. Ou Tout ce qui Observe dans les Marches et Campements des Armées, dans les Batailles, Combats, Sieges et Autres Actions Militaires, est Exactement Représenté avec les Définitions et les Explications de Chaque Chose en Particulier.* Le Pautre, Pierre, engraver; after Antoine Dieu, artist. Paris: Chez Daumont [ca. 1750]. The Robert Charles Lawrence Fergusson Collection, The Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, D.C.

player would receive a reward from the king for his valor and service. The caption reads, 'The valorous heroism that the king rewards, only appreciates the hand that's holding the prize.' In other words, it is the king's favor, more than the award, which has value for the truly honorable French officers. While it may be rather crude or reductive to call war an officers' 'game,' this image does reveal the competitive nature of combat, not just between rival armies, but between rival French officers. Whoever could charm the king most with his service and bravery in the context of limited warfare would win the game and collect pensions, promotions, or places at court. In war, noble officers played for keeps.

Because of their base origins and rough existence, soldiers drew disdain and condescension from their officers. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, a tactician of the mid-eighteenth century, referred to the soldiers with pity as 'the most vile and miserable class.'[39] Most officers would agree.[40] Whereas about 80 per cent of the officers in Louis XIV's army originated from noble families, soldiers represented the lowest classes.[41] Most came from peasant or artisan backgrounds, with a slight majority hailing from the countryside.[42] For many soldiers, the army enabled them to escape debt, experience travel, and flee the mundane aspects of life in the laboring classes. Though pillaging became less tolerated into the eighteenth century, some soldiers still saw the army as an opportunity to enrich themselves. While some may have joined the army to improve their condition, the army could not always guarantee basic necessities. Food, drink, clothes, and access to women (in the form of camp followers or prostitutes) theoretically came with army life, but such promises did not always bear out, and should a soldier become sick or wounded, he was more likely to meet his death in an army 'hospital' than on the battlefield.[43] Military training for even the common line-solider proved rigorous and difficult, and could take up to two years. Penalties for everything from poor marching to deserting ranged from beatings to execution, and officers debated means of disciplining their soldiers without crushing their spirits. Such conditions often inspired men to desert, which not only robbed the French army of fully-trained soldiers, but were likely to 'enrich the blood' of enemy armies, and be used against France.[44] The soldiers' sad state in the ranks and their propensity to desert did not improve their image in the eyes of their officers. Maurice de Saxe faulted recruiters for finding unsuitable men for the army in the first place. He decried their 'odious' custom of tricking young men into accepting money from them, only to reveal that he had just been enlisted in the army.[45] Some trickery in recruiting did happen, and recruiters sometimes accepted vagabonds and thieves, especially when more troops were needed. During the War of the Spanish Succession, which lasted for 13 years in the early eighteenth century, the mayor of Paris and Lieutenant General of Police allowed many officers access to the prisons to find potential enlistees.[46] Plenty of other recruits came to the army honestly and of genuine interest. In 1768, the Vicomte de Flavigny classified military recruiting as roughly equal parts volunteering, crime, and trickery.[47] Officers would not necessarily have a positive effect on soldiers who had been recruited in dishonest or desperate ways, as many officers avoided drill during peacetime and preferred to reside at court.[48] Guibert sighed that even though they protected France, and enabled the army to operate, 'the soldier, under his flags, continues to be unhappy and despised.'[49]

While soldiers were separated from their officers by class, status, and purpose, they also occupied a distinct sphere from the civilian classes. Peasants who longed to travel, to escape what they might view as the claustrophobic confines of village life, and to get closer to the nobility would join the army. Aided by their new environment and new comrades in arms, they would often separate themselves from their compatriots who stayed in the village. In integrating themselves into the army life, Yves-Marie Bercé has argued, ex-peasants were 'driven by an urge to scorn and abuse their old environment.'[50] Sometimes the men who enlisted as soldiers had already become outcasts in their village or city and sought new ties with the army. Chagniot noted that some families responded to their sons' decision to enlist in the army by excluding them from inheriting family property or even a place in the fathers' will. In other instances older teenagers enlisted in the army at their parents' insistence.[51] Many soldiers enlisted with the army as orphans, with few ties in the civilian world to cut. For the outcast or orphan, the army promised a new kind of family, a sense of belonging, and a clear path for his future life.[52] When soldiers joined this new family, they embraced their new status to such a degree that many changed their names. Their very style of dress separated them from their old ties and distinguished them as having joined a new group, as soldier uniforms appeared as simpler versions of their noble officers' clothes, and they wore or carried swords, something that caused them even to be called 'gentlemen.'[53] Such apparel brought them in closer proximity to their new officers but distinguished them even further from the peasant or artisan classes. As state-commissioned armies became the norm, and as the French army made that transition throughout the reign of Louis XIV, soldiers' reputations would improve as pillage decreased, but there would still be a separation, and relationships stayed tense when the king continued to use troops to exact taxes or put down revolts. David Hopkin notes that the soldier projected many identities, but 'whatever he was, the soldier was definitely not a peasant.'[54]

Soldiers' and civilians' lives overlapped, especially when civilians quartered troops, or soldiers stationed near a town for long periods of time worked for civilians to supplement their meager wages. Many of these interactions between soldiers and civilians, however, especially those initiated by the state, did not work to improve civilian–soldier relations. Before and during the reign of Louis XIV, when official military barracks were few and far between, soldiers would lodge in homes in small towns or villages during the winter months. The government regulated this *logement* carefully, but hosting strangers still proved a burden for residents, who could be subject to higher demands or threats even after already providing food and shelter. Residents regarded quartering with universal aversion, even as Louis XIV worked to decrease its effect on the populace.[55] The multiple mentions of the *logement* in the *Cahiers de Doléances* of 1789 as 'onerous' show that it persisted through the eighteenth century as an unpleasant association between civilians and soldiers.[56] On rare occasions, though, Louis XIV would use quartering as a means of coercing his people into paying unpopular taxes or converting Protestants; he provided his troops with winter lodging while at the same time squashing any rebellion or punishing a feisty town. Beyond mere *logements*, soldiers occasionally helped collect taxes from reluctant payers. Roy McCullough has shown that the king only used the army for this purpose as a last resort and tried to lessen the burden it would cause to the host town, especially after the 1660s, but animosity still flourished over the soldiers' presence.[57] In 1675, for example, Louis XIV hesitated to send troops to quell a revolt in Brittany, and the governor, the Duke de Chaulnes, agreed it would likely only increase tensions. When troops did arrive, Chaulnes worked to lessen the burden on the populace of quartering them, including taking out a loan to help pay for the soldiers' needs, rather than rely on individual households for support. Chaulnes also dared soldiers on pain of death to harm or make demands on their hosts. This seemed to help the situation, but the mere 'presence of the soldiers created a great deal of resentment among the civilian population,' and nothing Chaulnes could do would resolve the tension. In this instance, despite the work of Chaulnes to lessen its effect, the presence of the soldier only incited further revolt.[58] Perhaps it was not the soldiers themselves that upset the civilian populace, but that their presence represented unpopular crown decisions. Heading into the eighteenth century, the French army became an instrument for Louis

XIV to use against the Protestants, who would eventually be expelled from the country. Though he targeted a specific minority, Louis's use of his troops in this instance was wildly controversial. The army's brutality against Protestants added to the tensions between soldiers and civilians and countered the efforts of the state commission army to isolate non-combatants from military violence.

The tension between inhabitants and soldiers, and the royal will to use the latter to control the former, continued through the eighteenth century with the infamous *guerres des farines*, or 'Flour Wars' of 1775. The king's financial minister, Turgot, sent 25,000 troops to extinguish a revolt that occurred in response to his poorly-timed decision to allow freedom of commerce in the grain trade within the kingdom. The abysmal harvest of 1774 already forecast high prices, and the unregulated market only fueled fears that the shortage of resources would raise prices even further. Turgot refused to reverse his policy in light of the scarce grain, and on 27 April, the *guerres des farines* began in the market town of Beaumont-sur-Oise and continued in 300 separate riots over a period of 22 days. For almost a month throughout the Paris basin, angry rioters ransacked market stalls or bakeries, taking flour and bread and leaving behind what they would have considered a fair price. Local militiamen did not offer any help, as they were ill-equipped to deal with widespread violence. The French government called in 25,000 troops to guard Paris and the immediate surrounding area. The troops proved to be effective in some places, where the riots died down within a week, but in other places they only exacerbated the violence.[59] According to the subdelegate of Gournay-en-Bray, 'the troops [did] not make the buyers more docile, they [were] further inflamed.' One bold rioter, when met with cavaliers at the doors of a farm targeted for pillage, called to his compatriots to 'pick up stones and let's throw ourselves on these bastards. They are made of skin and bones like ourselves.'[60]

The interactions between soldiers and civilians, especially in times of *logement*, tax anxieties, or rebellion, reinforced this distinction between them. The limited warfare paradigm, that both contradicted and relied on *petite guerre*, affected French citizens as well, and may have contributed to their uneasy relationship with French troops. In addition to protecting or extending French borders, the French army also operated as a 'federal' police force and enforced sometimes unpopular policies through force or *logement*. While soldiers and civilians intermingled in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they considered themselves as different peoples and were tolerant rather than friendly with each other.

Such tension between inhabitants and soldiers raises questions about the status of the *milice*, an institution that might seem to straddle these two often opposing groups of people, but in fact did not bring soldiers and civilians closer together or make civilians more comfortable with military service. Like militias in America or England, the French *milice* consisted of subjects who bore arms for the purpose of defense, domestic control, and to supplement the regular army in battle as necessary. The *milice*, however, hardly served as a mediating institution between the army and civilians. On the one hand, the *milice* that existed for the purpose of domestic control and defense resembled much more an inefficient police force than an army. They did not fight foreign wars or join the army in domestic campaigns. Rather, their duties were to keep a night watch, man the town's gates by day, and occasionally patrol the streets – duties that did not involve engagement in battle or confronting an enemy any more numerous or dangerous than a highwayman, town drunk, or rebelling peasant. In other words, their duties consisted only of immediate local needs and did not necessarily involve large-scale violence or the kind of training required of the king's soldiers.

When called on by the regular army, the *milice* would play a part in quelling tax revolts, as they did in the town of Rennes, but it was not particularly effective. Although McCullough has argued that the *milice* was responsible for putting down tax or grain revolts in the provinces, the typical disorganization of the *milice* meant that it could not always be trusted. Looking at a larger sample of revolts in the seventeenth century, William Beik argued that while in an ideal world the *milice* would be well-equipped to deal with local problems, the reality differed greatly. If violence broke out in a town, the members of the *milice* and residents of the town would not necessarily agree which side of the conflict deserved official support. Nor did these residents always necessarily respect the *milice*'s authority. Additionally, there was no guarantee that during a violent uprising, members of the *milice* would report for duty instead of protecting their own homes, families, and property. Ideally, the *milice* could be called on to squash local revolts, but in reality execution proved extremely difficult.[61] Conflict between members of the *milice* could also hinder its effectiveness. As Beik stated, when mixing men of menial living with men of higher status, 'quarrels arose between officers and men, and the ambiance of the tavern was transferred to the ramparts.'[62]

Nor does the *milice* as a supplement for royal troops during foreign wars reveal any closeness between soldiers and the civilians who temporarily served alongside them. During times of war, parishes were responsible for furnishing a certain number of men for the king's service, but this institution was thoroughly hated, and young men went to great lengths to escape it. Wealthier men could buy themselves out of serving in the *milice* or find replacements, which, in some areas, resulted in too few men to tend the fields. As the inhabitants of Villeron stated, 'The *milice* depopulates the country more than misery ... men join it or escape it [by taking up] work in Paris. And there are no more hands to work the fields.'[63] The baillage de Nemours referred to service in the *milice* as 'slavery' and Auxerre complained that because of the royal militia, 'the widow saw her only son ripped from her arms,' ensuring her certain destitution.[64] In addition to being a hated institution among the populace, the royal *milice* provided very little training for its members, and the men served as little more than fodder for enemy cannons. The *milice* perhaps represented the greatest reservations and fear that civilians felt about the army as an institution. Even after many reforms in the eighteenth century, it remained one of the most mentioned declamations in the *Cahiers de Doléances* regarding army matters. The parish of Essonnes recognized that the *milice* could 'never make brave soldiers,'[65] and the sénéchaussé de Forcalquier requested that Louis XVI find other ways to recruit men into his army, as deciding by lot who should serve in the *milice* only inspired soldiers to desert.[66] Criticisms abounded of the *milice* as 'a great evil' and a 'cruel lottery.'[67] Aside from the recruitment methods and the *milice*'s effect on the families of the chosen, civilians understood that harm would almost inevitably come to a soldier, even if he never saw battle. The smallest fault, complained the civilians from Châlons-sur-Marne, brought on the 'most rigorous and infamous punishments,' further reason to avoid military service.[68] Even outside the *milice*, civilians had a fearful idea of what army life entailed.

Though the French army had faced significant changes when Louis XIV started organizing it, and while it had gone through small evolutions and gradual changes throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the mid-way point of the eighteenth century showed that it faced larger, more dramatic changes on the horizon. By the 1750s, the partisan tactics seen in the Dutch War or German Palatinate had come under serious study in the ministry of war. The Marshal de Saxe had introduced a more regimented use of light troops to the French army based on his experiences with the Hapsburg armies fighting the Turks in earlier wars. After 1743, both Hapsburg and French armies regularly used light and irregular troops, even in pitched battles, to harass enemy flanks, disrupt communication, and aid with reconnaissance.[69]

While the French had used partisan troops for similar purposes during the Dutch Wars 70 years earlier, by the 1740s, the use of partisans had been institutionalized and became a growing area for improvement and study. French officers could receive special training and properly prepare French troops for partisan warfare, which was employed more regularly within larger operations, as opposed to outside or just before a major battle or siege. Reformers discussing light infantry and how to make it work for the French army recognized that in addition to special training, and learning from German troops who had a better command of this kind of warfare, they would need to draw on locals' knowledge of the terrain and area. One writer in particular praised the 'good peasants' of a mountainous region who helped him navigate it.[70] Another argued that if the French army was to make regular use out of light troops, it would have to employ the strictest discipline to protect inhabitants from the small bands of soldiers.[71] Such observations and ideas about the army indicated that as partisan warfare became a larger part of the French army, relations between soldiers and civilians might require readjustment.

The officer corps, which had also benefited from Louis XIV's more direct command of his army, also experienced a shift. When Louis XIV had harnessed those qualities that made for honorable and victorious military officers, he had institutionalized it in a way that both strengthened the French army and set it on a course that would eventually see it weakened. In regulating and creating standards for the army that measured personal *gloire*, the king had also made it possible for members of the nobility with little talent in military duties, but great wealth, to obtain a place, and even senior rank, in the French army. The likelihood of having wealthy if unprepared officers had both positive and negative aspects as armies grew in size and expense. Because officers had to pay for their regiments, wealthy nobles were more likely to obtain rank than their poorer counterparts. By the 1700s, it was not uncommon for officers from old, distinguished families who had held rank in the army for generations to go into such great debt trying to supply and maintain their regiments, that eventually they had to sell them to wealthy financiers' sons, whose recently ennobled families lacked the prestige, history, and upbringing believed to be so essential in creating a worthy officer.[72]

Louis XIV's use of long, expensive wars to gain personal and state-wide glory in the European theater further led to the weakening of the officer corps through excessive venality, which expanded the officer corps so that it became too big and made the officers who did serve of largely a lesser quality. To help pay for the wars and cover state expenses, Louis increased the sale of offices, escalating the number of people with noble titles exponentially. Raising funds by selling offices may have helped Louis cover the costs of his wars in the short term, but because purchases of venal office excluded the new office holder from paying taxes, in the long term it reduced the state's tax base, creating further financial difficulty. Louis's transition from an aggregate contract army to a state commission army also entailed a massive growth in bureaucracy regarding the army and it continued to expand.[73] More importantly from a cultural standpoint, venality corrupted the nobility and turned it from an exclusive class of *gloire* and honor into a crowded one of wealthy office holders with little of the birth or kind of education geared towards motivating nobles to military greatness. Venality 'diluted the status' of the existing nobility and turned it into a mere commodity, as noble status could now simply be obtained for cash.[74] This also implied that it had a measurable worth. While many countries in Europe practiced some form of venality, it proved most popular in France; most of the families that entered into noble status in the eighteenth century did so through buying venal offices.[75]

While the army was essential to making French society operate as it did, it also remained detached from the greater populace. Officers tried to bring their sense of privilege and sometimes wealth on campaign with them, though often the charms of court proved too strong for them to spend much time with their regiments. Service, or at least the appearance of it, did bring social and financial rewards, but while such a system encouraged the nobility to preform bravely in battle and assured their place in a highly stratified society, it also gradually replaced their motives of family honor with inter-noble competition for the available pensions and promotions. As the officer corps expanded, it also increased the number of people vying for resources, which overtaxed the state and created problems with budgets and officer expectations. While Louis XIV wanted to reward nobles for winning *gloire* for himself and the state, his system gradually transformed into one that required constant exhibition. Officer competition created friction in the army and decreased its effectiveness.

When it came to the soldiers, Louis XIV's changes to the army faired a little better. Whereas aggregate contract soldiers had pillaged their way through Europe and threatened civilians, the state-commissioned soldiers that Louis XIV gradually constructed altered the image of the solider into a more protective, if still distant figure. State-contract armies gradually showed more discipline, and were used more rarely against civilians in cases of rebellion, religion, or tax evasion. In doing so, however, Louis XIV's changes widened the gap between soldiers and civilians; while they interacted with each other less, their interactions could prove violent and brutal. Civilians also continued to view the army, even when it was made up of people from their own class and county, as a distinct institution with a different culture and way of life. Louis XIV reduced some of the animosity between civilian and soldier, but his reforms did not bring them closer together.

The new tactics, a billowing officer corps, and the potential for more soldier initiative brought the army to the brink of change on the eve of the Seven Years' War. On one hand, a new restlessness came from the ineffectiveness of the army by mid-eighteenth century, owing to a bloated, less-skilled officer corps. On the other hand, philosophers and French elites began to encourage the army to interact more with the rest of French society, a change that would force officers to reconsider the very philosophy underpinning their ways of recruiting and maintaining troops. Rather than chase after chimeras of *gloire*, officers and soldiers would be expected to fight in response to patriotism. In the Seven Years' War, the French army would discover that its system could not continue, and that maintaining its importance to French society would involve incorporating all of that society as well.

While changes in the army during the reign of Louis XIV successfully united the army under the control of the king, and created a more regulated and organized institution, they also contained the seeds of the army's eventual dissolution. Soldier activity became more disciplined and regulated, but continued use of soldiers against civilians for specific campaigns and the difference between military and civilian cultures fostered tension between the two groups and made recruitment difficult. Rewarding officers for brave deeds or at least the appearance of brave deeds in battle led to greater competition and expectations for high ranks. For the officer corps in particular, the army became a vehicle by which to get social recognition, rather than military service being an end in itself. The series of reforms on the horizon would transform the French army from one in which the realms of military and civilian were largely separated to one in which they worked together, overlapped, and even melded. While no one in Louis XIV's army could have predicted this future for it, these changes and institutionalization of morals sowed the seeds for the army's dramatic transformation.

2
Defeat in New France

When François Charles de Bourlamaque, captain in the French army, heard rumors of a potential war brewing between France and Prussia in 1755, he hastened to write the King of France and present his candidacy for a commission. Like many other officers of the French army, he had 'languished during the peace,' following the War of the Austrian Succession in which he served through several campaigns, and now hoped for the glory in battle that would advance his position and solidify his reputation.[1] Begging the king for a prominent role in the upcoming conflict, he presented 'no other ambition, Sire, than to be able to serve in a manner that is essential' to the army. Other officers vied with him and each other for available commissions, writing the king or minister of war to pledge their 'live[s] and possessions,'[2] expressing their zeal for the king' service,[3] and begging to fill positions that had been in their families for generations.[4] The officers' eagerness and desperation were palpable; use of commissions and promotions as rewards had caused the officer corps to balloon to the point where there were far more officers wishing to serve than there were available opportunities. Positions at court, pecuniary rewards, and social rank depended on constant demonstrations from officers that they deserved their privileged status through at least appearing to serve the king, and officers depended on winning a prominent place in the upcoming war just to be eligible for honors or favors from Versailles. Each officer approached this war as necessary to maintaining or advancing his social position.

Bourlamaque secured a post, and with it a promotion to colonel of infantry, but not to serve in the European theater of the war against the Prussian army, as he had hoped. Rather, his assignment sent him to North America, to defend French imperial possessions in Canada from the encroaching Anglo-American settlers and British army. Bourlamaque and most of his contemporaries disparaged serving in a frozen and foreign land on the margins of the French Empire. Their experiences are the focus of this chapter, however, because their difficulties and methods of coping in North America expose many of the deep systemic problems of the French army in the Seven Years' War. French officers' culture and priorities conflicted with those of Canadians and their Amerindian allies, giving them reason to write to the minister of war, complaining of their difficulties and explaining how they merited consideration for promotion and pensions. While the European theater garnered the bulk of attention within France, I argue the Canadian theater provides an ideal laboratory in which to observe the French army as it began its major transition into a wholly new kind of institution.

While the French army under Louis XIV had become a centralized and well-operating machine, it became clear during the Seven Years' War that – with the overblown officer corps and poorly-regulated troops – the army needed to change in order to stay competitive against its European neighbors. Especially in Canada, where French troops and the Canadian militia fought to defend New France from encroaching British settlement, I argue that the Seven Years' War exhibited many of the elements of an early national war, the likes of which the French army would fight in the American and French Revolutions. Canadians, in particular, saw the fight as the defense of their homeland, and their patriotic motivations contrasted greatly with the French concern for glory. The experience of the French army in this war and its struggles with Amerindian and Canadian warriors illustrate how ill-suited French officers and their general approach to warfare would be in such conflicts. The Seven Years' War in New France provides a telling example of dynastic warfare in transition, and it makes clear why the French army of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had reached the limits of its effectiveness.

The Seven Years' War officially began in 1756 with the Battle of Minorca, and stretched across the globe, through Europe, India, the Caribbean, and vast stretches of North America. That year, the French government promoted Bourlamaque, and sent him abroad with Louis-Joseph, marquis de Montcalm, the major-general in charge of all French troops in North America. Six companies of French troops waited for his arrival, as their previous general, Jean Amrond Baron Dieskau, had suffered serious wounds earlier in the war and had been called home. In taking his command, Montcalm also took his place serving under the direction of Pierre de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, the governor general of Canada and the strategic mind behind the North American theater. Montcalm united his French forces with the French colonial troops, Vaudreuil's Canadian militia, and their Amerindian allies. After making a promising beginning, French forces fumbled their control of the war and following their dramatic defeat on the Plains of Abraham just north of Quebec in 1759, surrendered to the British. Explanations abound for why and how France lost the war, from a navy that could not compete with British ships, to lack of supplies, to difficulties with the terrain. Montcalm and Vaudreuil answered to the French minister of war and minister of marine, respectively, creating confusion and conflicting missions. For the duration of their time in New France, French officers in particular struggled to cope with their surroundings and their allies' expectations for the war, trying to make the most of their situation for achieving glory in the form of coveted medals and pensions. Few officers seemed pleased to be serving in New France, but fighting the British and winning attention in combat would offer them more tempting positions when they returned home.

Any idea that Canada could compare closely enough with the metropole to merit the title 'New France' dissolved when French officers first arrived with six battalions of troops in 1755.[5] The terrain differed greatly, as the vast majority of New France consisted of an intimidating wilderness. Little had been done to tame it beyond the scattered forts and towns that the residents of New France had slowly built since 1632, when missionaries had first established a permanent stronghold in Canada.[6] Most of all, the majority of inhabitants in New France had little to recommend them to French officers: rugged Canadians, officers and soldiers from the colonial *troupes de la marine*, and unconstrained Amerindian warriors, who now worked alongside French and Canadian forces as allies.

Whatever their French origins, the Canadians seemed more '*sauvage*,' the word for the 'wild men' native to North America, than French. Unlike the British colonial system, which worked to establish a landscape and a lifestyle very similar to the home country, the French colony in North America required a heightened degree of cooperation, even assimilation, with the Amerindians who inhabited the territory.[7] This cooperation consisted primarily of trade and war, as residents of New France became gradually incorporated into the complex and ever-shifting 'middle ground' of competing interests between various Amerindian nations, French colonists, and Anglo-Americans.[8] Canadian propensity for *petite guerre*, as well as their dress and some of their habits, distinguished them sharply from their French cousins.[9] The French army, while familiar with partisan warfare, was only just now beginning to incorporate it into the larger fabric of the French army, and many officers still had received little exposure to it.

Slightly more familiar to the French forces would have been the *troupes de la marine*, the branch of the French military responsible for colonial fighting. They came under the office of the Navy, and had a reputation for being comparatively mediocre forces.[10] Ever since 1665, the French government had sent groups of them to help the Canadians during colonial wars. During these wars, the *troupes de la marine* would execute subaltern missions, while the Canadian militia and Amerindian warriors would conduct destructive raids. Still, since 1690, the *troupes de la marine* had fought only in small groups, fighting *guerre à la Sauvage*, or Amerindian-style warfare that Europeans would have recognized as *petite guerre*.[11] Some of them would elect to stay in Canada, even after the rest of their regiment returned home to France, and eventually those who stayed resembled Canadians born in New France more than soldiers raised in the home country.[12] While the *troupes de la marine* still officially operated in a different sphere than the Canadians, they combined forces in war and at home, and had become an almost indistinguishable part of the Canadian people.[13]

The Amerindian nations allied with the Canadians acted as auxiliary troops to the Canadian militia and *troupes de la marine*, and they often enjoyed a close relationship. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, French colonizers had tried, through a policy of *francization* to 'civilize' Amerindians though intermarriage and co-habitation; but rather than make Amerindians more 'French', it had the opposite effect of making French Canadians more inclined to adopt Amerindian ways of living and working.[14] While French officers in Canada spoke about Amerindians and Canadians separately, there was a great deal of cultural and racial hybridization between the two, which made the groups harder to distinguish. Members of the Canadian militia trained their sons in matters of war from an early age, and it was likely that these boys grew up near, and may have even played with, Amerindian youths, who, when grown, would also be warriors and allies. Just as for Europeans, war for Amerindians was intimately connected with the nature of their societies; it provided opportunities for the young to prove themselves, and to enrich their nations with prisoners and war trophies.[15] As the purpose of warfare in French and Amerindian societies paralleled each other so closely, Amerindians became rivals to French officers for glory on the battlefield and for credit due at the end of the conflict, which made French officers reticent in letting them fight. Part of this reticence likely sprung from French officers'

Eurocentric prejudices, but most officers mentioned more specific ways in which Amerindian participation impinged on their honor. One of the reasons for the French dislike of the Amerindians as allies consisted of the type of violence that the Amerindians practiced in war. Scalping, for example, a 'custom of these barbarians that revolts nature,' horrified French observers,[16] as did torturing (or even eating) a prisoner of war.[17] Officers rejected the type of violence and raids that Amerindians executed on behalf of the French, because it sullied noble ideas of pride and martial honor. Christian Crouch has persuasively argued that their different approaches to warfare and clashing perspectives on the conflict compelled the French crown to surrender the colony.[18]

But were raids and terrible violence really so different and shocking? Even if the French voiced their revulsion at these particularly 'barbaric' means of making war, their army was no stranger to similar forms of violence. Torture, for example, was not officially considered a part of European warfare, but soldiers were known to bring terrible violence to fortresses that had not surrendered when given the opportunity. Furthermore, European justice included torture either as means of abstracting testimony or punishing a particularly heinous crime. At the time of the Seven Years' War, Louis XV's would-be assassin, Robert-François Damiens, underwent execution by slow torture, including burning and skinning.[19] The 'unruly character of combat,' the ability for the Amerindians to hide in the woods during a skirmish, would also have been familiar to some French military men.[20] With the exception of scalping and cannibalism, therefore, the types of violence that the French allegedly found so dishonorable were not entirely unknown in French society. Europeans likely saw their use of these kinds of violence in a different light than the Amerindian practices, but there must have been additional motivations behind French rejection of Amerindian allies, considering their vital role in the war effort.

Vaudreuil certainly considered Amerindian assistance essential to the defense of New France. He had been chosen as governor general of Canada partly because of his ability to cultivate beneficial relationships with Amerindian nations.[21] At one meeting with the Abenakis, he happily reported to the minister of the marine, they responded to his call for their military aid by declaring, 'your presence today is like a new sun whose rays draw in all our members and our hearts.'[22] Vaudreuil may have exaggerated the natives' affection and respect for him, but he genuinely treasured their alliances. In the beginning of the war, he assured the minister of the marine of the care he took in assuring the friendship of the Five Nations,[23] and throughout the war he updated the minister of the marine on how his relationships with certain nations only improved.[24] As governor general of Canada and as the commander of the war in North America, Vaudreuil embraced his role in working with the Amerindian allies, whom he saw as pivotal to French and Canadian success in this war.

The Amerindian allies had earned his esteem, as they excelled at removing settlers, or getting settlers to remove themselves, from the frontier. As early as 1755, the minister of war received word that, 'The natives during winter burned many British homes and took a great quantity of prisoners and took many scalps.'[25] Amerindian raids would destroy whole families of Anglo-American settlers and turn an entire village and the land surrounding it to ruin. Montreuil, one of the French officers serving under Montcalm, reported to the king in 1758 that in just one raid their Amerindian allies burned a settlement and took prisoner a hundred women and children back to their village.[26] Such raids would also kill animals, burn British ammunition, and destroy crops.[27] Just as in the partisan warfare examined in Chapter 1, these kinds of raids took supplies from enemy forces and rendered towns uninhabitable. Vaudreuil reported these raids as so intimidating that 'many British families retreated to the provinces of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania to escape the fury of our natives.'[28] By attacking the Anglo-American frontier and taking prisoners, Amerindian fighters created an atmosphere of such fear that terrified settlers left the frontier on their own accord rather than risk finding a raiding party in their settlement. Such raids also allowed French forces to attack in more than one place at a time. With great satisfaction, Vaudreuil recounted one instance where he coordinated an attack between Canadian militiamen and Wolf Indians that caused 'great hurt' to the enemy.[29] By frightening settlers, killing them on their farms, making prisoners of their families, and destroying their settlements, Amerindian allies achieved the destruction and intimidation of the settlers without the French officers or soldiers having to sully their national reputations. Even the marquis de Montcalm, who would become one of the Amerindians' greatest enemies, happily reported to the minister of war in 1757 that some of these allies in a '*partis*' – a word implying coordinated military action – killed or captured 200 people on the frontier.[30] By carrying out raids and employing partisan tactics, Amerindian allies allowed the French troops in America to concentrate their energies on larger line battles and European-style sieges.

French army officers, however, did not embrace these Amerindian allies. Junior officers could not seem to work with them, in what were probably some mutually frustrating situations. Amerindians responded well to the direction or coordination of the few Canadian officers who typically accompanied them on escapades to harass the British or Anglo-American troops.[31] When raids or skirmishes involved staying in the woods for some time, Amerindians and the Canadians who accompanied them could live off the wilderness and travel relatively light, carrying only ammunition.[32] When Montcalm attempted to place French officers in charge of groups of Amerindian allies, the results were fairly damaging to the French–Canadian–Amerindian alliance. As Vaudreuil explained, 'the Canadians and the natives do not work with the same confidence under the orders of a commander of the troops of France, as with the officers of this colony.'[33] It is not surprising that French officers, who were in their own minds the most elite warriors in North America, desired further control over the actions of the auxiliaries.[34]

The poor relations between the two, however, went beyond command disagreements. Mission Indians, who had willingly adopted European religion and customs, complained of poor treatment from Montcalm, including verbal insults and exclusion from activities that they felt they had a right to participate in. These allies were so insulted and so angered by their encounters with him at Fort Carillon that they refused to fight in any engagement where Montcalm was in command. Vaudreuil, in turn, scolded Montcalm for having treated the Amerindians 'publicly in this manner.'[35] Montcalm countered by explaining that during the dispute in question he had only refused the Amerindians items they wanted to carry off with them, including whiskey. He went on to complain about the disorder Amerindians caused in the camp such as pillaging hospital provisions.[36] For Vaudreuil, the Amerindians were far too important to the French war effort in Canada to risk their alliances with relatively petty disagreements. 'I beg you, Sir,' he wrote to Montcalm, 'to have for these nations all the regards that they merit. It is the intention of the king; they have contributed for a long time to the honor of his army and to the defense of the colony.'[37]

This reply holds a clue to why Montcalm and many of his officers found it so difficult to accept Amerindian allies. The fact that Amerindians had 'contributed for a long time to the honor of the [King's] arms' impinged on the territory of the French army – who believed that job to be their sacred duty. Vaudreuil, however, rarely recognized the service of the French army in his letters to the ministers of war and marine – a major snub, as Vaudreuil outranked Montcalm and commanded the entire North American theater – but instead praised the zeal of his Amerindian allies. On the eve of the battle of Quebec, Vaudreuil wrote of the Canadians and natives, that their 'zeal' and 'ardor promise[d] the happiest success.'[38] He illustrated their loyalty, recounting how the Illinois nation sent him 'two young warriors … [who] assured me on behalf of their chiefs and their entire nation … that they were wholeheartedly declared for the French.' They had performed exceptionally well during the fight against General Braddock, and 'have resolved to never leave the French and to die with them.' Vaudreuil added that he received these troops graciously as a way of convincing others 'to follow in the same path.'[39] He took further pleasure in presenting medals to the Amerindian chiefs who had expressed support for the French or whose warriors had behaved courageously in battle, accompanied by commissions very much like those read to French officers. These medals bore some similarity to those that Bourlamaque and his comrades so ardently coveted. With the Amerindians receiving these rather French signs of approval, French officers felt slighted in North America.[40]

For French officers, working alongside the Amerindian allies presented a new challenge unlike anything they had experienced in European theaters. In the past they had fought alongside troops from their own country, such as the *troupes de la marine*, who were considered a secondary force, or the *milice*, which, as discussed previously, consisted of untrained temporary fillers. The lower status of these auxiliary fighters had never been in doubt. Alliances with other countries in Europe often involved separate battles on separate fronts, though the eighteenth century did begin to see more coalition armies. In North America, however, French officers had to adapt to fighting with Amerindian allies, who, though the French may have looked down on them, were elite warriors in their own right and would not humble themselves before French authority, even when they fought in conjunction with French troops. When they did not dishonor the French army, as they did when breaking European conventions of surrender during the Fort William Henry 'massacre,' they received a great deal of the credit for victories (even the fighting following the surrender of Fort William Henry received very little attention from French officers, who mentioned little of its occurrence in their letters).[41] Vaudreuil praised the Amerindians to his superiors as the indispensable force, perhaps, he suggested, even more integral to French victory than the French army itself! As French officers had been eager for wars specifically so that they could exhibit their courage and military prowess, they resented having their actions downplayed for the sake of these 'wild men.'

Historians have recognized that both French officers and Amerindian warriors shared a similar passion for war.[42] While specific rituals and often tactics differed, both societies used glory won in combat as a means of determining social status and often wealth. Tension arose between French warriors and their allies because they had to compete with each other for prominence in their clashes with the British. French officers would receive little for their troubles of traveling all the way to the frosty, wild Canadian landscape, facing particular hardships and difficult allies if they did not exhibit their military prowess as the elite warriors of France. That Amerindian allies proved so vital to the war effort, and received such glowing praise from Vaudreuil in his letters to the ministers of war and marine, hurt officers' chances of winning glory, promotions, decorations, and pensions out of the war. French officers found it so difficult to accept Amerindian warriors as their allies not despite their importance to the war in North America, but because of it. Only by winning the most praise and recognition for bravery in combat and credit for serving the king could French officers justify their presence in North America.

French feelings of resentment toward these 'wild men' may explain the universal elation the French officers expressed over their victory at Fort Carillon. In July 1758, the British attempted to storm the French fort, but Montcalm and his French defenders, along with some *troupes de la marine* and Canadians, put up a staunch resistance even though they were outnumbered two to one. After charging several times and being repulsed, the British withdrew, suffering nearly 2,000 casualties, whereas the French suffered fewer than 400. It could qualify as the greatest French victory to date for a number of reasons. Doreil credited the bravery of the officers in the battle, including M. le Bourlamaque, who received significant wounds. Montcalm, too, led the troops valiantly, and left himself continually exposed to enemy fire. What made the victory stand out in French minds, however, was the fact that it was won with 'only French troops.'[43] Vaudreuil, when hearing that the fort was in danger of attack, had sent a large contingent of Canadians and Amerindians to help, but they did not arrive until several days after the victory, and 'the natives of the Five Nations' were merely 'spectators' to the French triumph.[44]

Montcalm and Doreil took great pleasure in describing French valor in the battle and trumpeted their victory, but the absence of the '*Sauvages*' counted as the greatest achievement of all. As Montcalm crowed to Vaudreuil, 'the [French] army, who had only 2,900 combatants of our troops and 400 Canadians or soldiers of the colony, resisted all of the attacks with a heroic courage.' Throughout the battle, 'the officers here did incredible things … and their example encouraged the soldiers to do incredible things as well.... What a day for France ... here is a great action, and perhaps the first that there's been in Canada without *Sauvages*.'[45] Doreil took great pleasure in writing to the minister of the marine to inform him of the victory: 'Messieurs the commandants of the corps and officers made particularly brilliant examples of valor, and nothing was comparable to the courage of the least of the soldiers.' However, even more than French valor, 'what excites the most admiration and public joy is that no *Sauvage* contributed to this great event, something that has not ever happened in this country; not a single one.' This lack of Amerindian warriors, and the ability of the French troops to overcome the difficult conditions in Canada entirely on their own, made 'the glory of the general and the French troops... the most grand.'[46]

Up to this point, all the of the French victories, even those orchestrated by General Montcalm, such as the siege of Fort William Henry and the victory at Fort Chouagen (Oswego), had included bands of Amerindians who likewise demonstrated their 'zeal for the service of the king' and brought glory to his arms. With the battle of Carillon, though, the French army did not have to share any of the credit for the victory with the Amerindian Allies, whose participation and contribution had up to this point muddied the French officers' attempts to gain the glory and prestige they felt they needed. As Montcalm wrote to Marc Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy comte d'Argenson, the secretary of war, 'You will learn with pleasure that without natives, with only our battalions, not having but 400 Canadians, I came and saved the colony, having withstood a combat as lively and tenacious that lasted from one in the afternoon until dusk against an army of at least 20,000 men.'[47] Montcalm was not just proud of the victory, but he specifically emphasized his role in. The battle of Carillon generated such celebratory rhetoric, not just because it was a French victory, but because it highlighted the French army – as no other victory in the war had before – as winning a battle in New France without any help from their Amerindian allies. Even Bourlamaque's bad shoulder wound earned him a promotion to Brigadier General.

The victory was a costly one, however, for the French exultation in their victory resulted in their losing a number of their allies. Vaudreuil considered the French eagerness to fight without the Amerindians to be in poor taste diplomatically. He reported to the Comte de Noailles that his brother and the natives were 'quite mortified not to have participated in the brilliant victory of M. the Ms. de Montcalm'.[48] A solo French victory meant that Amerindians had lost an opportunity to gain war trophies, prisoners, and glory for *their* nations, and French Canada felt the impact of their displeasure. Vaudreuil received complaints from

Amerindians who resented Montcalm's gloating when they arrived at the battlefield with their weapons primed, only to find that the fighting had done. 'My Father,' they supposedly said to Vaudreuil, 'we are here to give evidence of the real pain that we feel in the way M. de Montcalm received us at Carillon. . . . we were quite mortified not to have participated in the victory.' Montcalm had 'brusquely' received them when they arrived after the battle, and said, "'I do not have need of you, you have come only to see corpses."' The next day, when the Amerindians again approached him, they reported that Montcalm 'banged the table and said ... "go to the Devil if you are not happy."' Montcalm then supposedly threw a discontented Amerindian out the door.[49] Vaudreuil could see the writing on the wall. He complained to the minister of the marine that Montcalm 'exalted his victory in such intemperate terms that he produced in his army the most slanderous remarks,' which caused permanent damage to the French, Canadian, and Amerindian relations that Vaudreuil had so carefully cultivated.[50] Shortly before the dramatic battle of Quebec, Vaudreuil sent an alarming message to the minister of the marine that the British had raised a great deal of Amerindian support to help them 'reestablish peace' in the Ohio Valley.[51] Canada's most important resource was slipping away.

Montcalm did not feign any surprise at the decision of several allies to turn their attention toward the British, and he wrote to the minister of war that he had never dared to trust Amerindians in the first place. He further remarked that Vaudreuil was attempting to negotiate the Five Nations into a position of neutrality, but was not optimistic here, either.[52] French behavior toward the Amerindians, especially as embodied by Montcalm, points to the fragility of the officers' status and their deep-set fears of having their service in Canada dismissed. While French attitudes toward their Amerindian allies might seem crude or counter-productive concerning the war effort, the context of the French state-commission army as it had been formed by Louis XIV helps explain the officers' behavior, as they grasped for medals, pensions, and promotions to advance or maintain their social standing. They wrote reams of letters to the minister of war of their own bravery and sacrifices, knowing they had to compete with each other and officers fighting in Europe and India for the available promotions and pensions. Vaudreuil's strong preference for using Amerindian allies and his consequential tendency to laud their efforts and contributions in letters back to France seemed to dilute the efforts and achievements of French officers in Canada. Distaining Amerindian allies may not have been beneficial for winning the war in Canada, but it did prove beneficial for French officers battling their way through a snowy wilderness an ocean away from home, trying to make the best of the campaign opportunities they had to prove themselves.

While the Canadians also received praise for their 'zeal' in the service of the king, they did not receive special honors or awards and could be more easily incorporated into French plans. The two groups came into conflict, however, with their different approaches to conducting war in Canada. Having been responsible for their own defense for over a century, Canadians felt confident in their *petite guerre* style of fighting, operating in small bands and counting on raids and ambushes to distract, defeat, or discourage the enemy.[53] These engagements gave a great deal of autonomy to militia members, compared with the more rigid expectations of discipline in the French army. Even French soldiers under Canadian influence took on some of the 'republican' traits, much to the chagrin of their officers. Contrasting Canadian approaches to warfare with that of the French reveals not just a difference in tactical preferences, but in French reliance on a strict military hierarchy both within the army as well as outside campaign seasons. The lack of French appreciation for Canadian approaches to war shows their dependence on the army to uphold and confirm social hierarchy.

French frustrations with Canadians sprung in part from the nature of the Canadian militia as a kind of citizen army, in which every member of the Canadian militia had other tasks to fulfill, such as farming. Vaudreuil encouraged his militiamen to take advantage of lulls in the war to 'work seriously at everything that they have with relation to their lands and their homes,' as the constant fighting in the Seven Years' War took men away from their farms for too much of the year.[54] By 1758, Vaudreuil found himself begging the minister of the marine to send foodstuffs for Canadian families who could not maintain their usual level of crop production.[55] The militia men were also fighting on home territory and understood how to navigate the terrain and use it to their advantage. They were 'very adept in the war of the woods' and could traverse it in all seasons and weather. At the same time, the vast stretches of Canadian land, much of it still a wilderness, also apparently bred indiscipline. By French accounts, the very 'land and the air' of North America fed the Canadians' disorderliness. French officers were unimpressed that this Canadian militia contained 'neither order nor subordination.'[56]

Despite the appearance of indiscipline or lack of coordination, Canadians had specifically honed their own brand of partisan warfare during a war with the Iroquois in 1707. This war, combined with the wilderness acumen necessary for fur trading, sharpened their skills for war in the woods.[57] The much-mythicized, elite '*coureurs de bois*' or 'wood runners,' would venture deep into the Canadian wilderness, without permission from French authorities, to engage in the fur trade, and the survival skills they honed in doing so proved vital to waging war in North America.[58] While the *coureurs de bois* have become romanticized in Canadian history and literature, and scholars debate their importance to warfare in Canada, their skills as woodsmen were especially valued during long marches through the wilderness or covering their tracks.[59] But French officers did not seem impressed with the martial Canadian, who despite his many skills lacked military discipline. As Comte de Montreuil alleged, 'the Canadian is . . . appropriate for *petite guerre*, very brave behind a tree, and very timid when he is discovered.'[60]

Even if 'timid when discovered,' Canadians enjoyed early victories against their British foe, especially in their combined efforts with Amerindian allies. One of the first reports received by the minister of war included news that '200 natives and some Canadians entirely destroyed a detachment of 164 British' near Fort Carillon.[61] At the beginning of the attack, the British fired heavily from within their fort at the attacking Canadian and Amerindian forces. The boldness of the combined attack, however, especially the cries of the natives, frightened the British so much, that the commander of the fort opened the doors and begged for their lives.[62] Following a much larger attack, the siege of Fort William Henry, the British Lieutenant Colonel Monro admitted to Vaudreuil that he was 'impressed' by the boldness and bravery of the *troupes de la marine*, Canadians, and natives to the point where 'his loss was inevitable.'[63]

French soldiers in particular appeared satisfied with fighting and living with the Canadian army. Reports and correspondence from Canada do not mention any thievery or crimes of the soldiers among the populace,[64] though Vaudreuil reported an instance early in the war when French soldiers pillaged their defeated enemy's goods.[65] Soldiers got along so well with their fellow fighters that Montcalm considered them 'like brothers with the Canadian and the *Sauvage*.'[66] Some had such an affinity for Canada that they married Canadian women with the intention of settling there permanently after the war. Montcalm considered this arrangement to be beneficial for the king and colony, because it would establish good troops to protect the colony when the army returned to France.[67] Even two of Montcalm's officers married *canadiennes* and other men bought parcels of uncultivated land to farm after the war had finished.[68] These pleasant relations also caused a marked dissolution of discipline among French soldiers. French officers had been inconsistent with enforcing discipline for the past century, but what control they maintained over their troops disappeared in Canada. In order to house the soldiers, Montcalm found it necessary for them to be 'scattered in the homes of the inhabitants' where he lived independent from their officers and sergeants. Regular calls for drill or training became nearly impossible, because of the distance between Canadian dwellings.[69] This lack of discipline among the troops did not seem to perturb Montcalm. When he placed French troops in Canadian homes, he knew that he had 'relaxed the discipline' among them. Montcalm considered 'a little indiscipline' to be 'inevitable in this climate,' and seemed pleased that overall 'the mood of the soldier [was] good.'[70]

French officers, however, especially Montcalm, did not appreciate working with the Canadian militia as much as their soldiers did. As with the Amerindians, Montcalm used his reports of their marches with the Canadian forces to promote his officers and troops. After the army's first exhausting six-week march through Canada with the militiamen and *troupes de la marine*, Montcalm sent boastful reports to France about the army's success. 'These Canadians were surprised to see that our officers and soldiers did not cede anything in the genre of marching in which they are little accustomed.... no one in Europe can understand how exhausting it is, when one must, for six weeks, march and sleep half the time in the snow and on the ice, be reduced to bread and lard, and often drag or bring supplies for fifteen days.' But the French soldiers and officers 'did not cede to them a thing.' Rather, he said, 'we bore it with much gaiety and without the slightest complaint.'[71] This friendly competition that drew attention to the French army's feats did not preclude difficulties between the French and Canadian forces. By Vaudreuil's accounts, Montcalm also demonstrated a general impatience with the Canadian fighters. In a letter to the minister of the marine, Vaudreuil recounted a sad tale of his brother, Rigaud, having to plead with M. de Montcalm to allow a Canadian to pause long enough to fill a horn of powder that had been emptied during an earlier skirmish. The simple request apparently caused a great deal of 'trouble.'[72] This incident was only one of many, though, in which Vaudreuil considered the Canadians to have 'suffered much' from M. de Montcalm's 'intensity and anger.'[73] Montcalm remained impatient with their lack of discipline (though it was something that he apparently tolerated in his own troops), and with what he called their 'boasting.'[74] He also resented having to take orders from a Canadian, as Vaudreuil was, until late in the war, the commanding general of all operations, and Montcalm had been ordered to 'be subordinate in all things' to him.[75] This position obviously irked Montcalm, and he complained so heavily to the ministers of war and marine that they finally promoted him to Lieutenant General in January of 1759, and made him supreme commander of the operations.[76] Many historians have cited Montcalm's personality as rather distasteful and found him to be a vain and unflattering character.[77] While Montcalm's papers certainly do not leave much evidence to contradict these judgments, his disposition toward the Canadians may have grown from a larger set of problems within the French army.

Montcalm again exhibited his reluctance to accept Canadians' approach to warfare by insisting that they conduct themselves as European troops and fight in a linear European fashion, especially when he combined the troops at the end of the war and in the battle for Quebec. A disciplined European soldier – one who could hold the line, advance on the enemy, fire in unison with his fellow soldiers, then receive the fire of the enemy – took two years to train, and the Canadians had not received any such preparation. Among the reasons Montcalm was faulted for the loss of Quebec, according to Vaudreuil, was his misuse of the Canadians. At Quebec, Montcalm's 'army was largely composed of Canadians, whom everyone knows is in no way appropriate for fighting in battle lines.' Montcalm could not have been ignorant of their unsuitability for such a style of fighting; it was generally known that the kind of war one 'pursues in Canada is not the kind that one pursues in Europe.'[78] Why, then, did Montcalm insist on applying European-style warfare in Canada?

European armies, especially the French army, occasionally used partisan tactics; they conducted raids, set ambushes, and fought in difficult, mountainous terrain. It was important to Montcalm, however, to execute a European way of fighting that would maintain the strict hierarchy aristocratic officers expected. Montcalm complained shortly before the massacre at Fort William Henry that the lack of order among the Canadian personnel had forced him to take on a more authoritative role. 'The officers, the interpreters, and the missionaries,' he said, 'have in general the spirit of republicans, and I have the misfortune that the *Sauvages* seem to have confidence only in me.'[79] Montcalm regarded the Canadian's 'republican' methods to be more egalitarian, less ordered, and therefore less reliant on the strict hierarchy essential to the regular French army. Canadian laxity was also evident in the soldiers' embrace of the Canadian and Amerindian fighters as well as the difficulties French officers had in accepting them – Canadian warfare favored the soldiers. Montcalm came from a military culture that emphasized military rank and associated one's place in the army with one's place in society – a 'republican' force like the one in Canada affronted his sense of hierarchy and his place in a fighting force that largely favored the aristocracy. Montcalm was not just defending Canada with his army and his arms, but he was also defending the hierarchical military system that defined him and that represented an important part of being 'French.' The crux of the disagreements between the officers, the amity between the soldiers and the Canadian militia, and the sense of competition that hovered among the forces all point to this hierarchical struggle – a change in the type of warfare employed in America necessitated a change in hierarchy as well. To fight the war as Vaudreuil had recommended, focusing most of their energies on raiding the long frontier that stretched from the great lakes down toward Louisiana, would necessitate a further breakdown in discipline and the subdivision of French troops into smaller units. Even if the French army stayed whole and allowed the Canadian militia to conduct most of the fighting, French forces would see little of the action that could earn them attention from the far-away French court.

Generals Montcalm and Vaudreuil and their respective forces held diverging opinions on most things associated with the war, including the ultimate aims of the war in the first place. For Canadians this war signified the defense of their homes and ways of life, whereas Montcalm saw the war as the sole means for his officers and himself to fulfill their roles in French society. Both groups had strong, urgent feelings about the war that were at the root of much of their difficulties as allies. Contrasting Montcalm's and Vaudreuil's letters reveal what the French army expected out of a war, especially one fought far away for a colony that had ceased to become economically useful and whose inhabitants hardly seemed 'French.' Montcalm's letters further expose the culture of reward in the army as an obstacle to French victory in Canada. For Montcalm, it seemed, doing the best he could for his men meant sacrificing French victory in North America, and with it, Canada.

Members of the Canadian militia, fighting for hearth and home, called on their strong feelings of patriotism to propel them into the fray against their British foe. The idea of patriotism was not new to France – it had been praised as a worthy virtue in ancient Greece and Rome and considered partly responsible for their military successes – but before the Seven Years' War it had limited relevance in contemporary Europe. Military success, in particular, relied more on the discipline of the troops than their sentiments regarding the cause of the war. In Canada, however, Vaudreuil used patriotism to rally his men, especially in his desperate attempt to retake Quebec City after it fell to the British. As Vaudreuil explained to the minister of war in France, his desire to retake Quebec came from ‘the sad state of the Canadians, their sentiments of zeal for the service of the king and their attachment to the *patrie*’ or homeland. To take the fort, Vaudrueil called on his ‘brave Canadians,’ to ‘risk all for the conservation of your religion and to save your *patrie*.’[80] Vaudreuil’s militiamen apparently rallied at this call, as ‘it penetrated all hearts as each one of us said loudly that we would [continue to fight] under the ruins of Canada, our natal country, sooner than surrender to the English.’[81] This last patriotic push did not succeed in retaking Quebec or saving Canada, and Vaudreuil pointed the accusatory finger at Montcalm and his recognition-centered motivations for the overall French failure in North America.

Vaudreuil understood that Montcalm saw the war in Canada as a means to advance himself and his officers, and he was not shy in complaining to the ministers of war and marine about it. When Vaudrueil ordered the marquis to execute certain plans for the defense of the colony, for example, Montcalm decided that the attack plan contained too many ‘obstacles’ and decided not to carry out Vaudreuil’s orders. Vaudreuil pacified Montcalm’s concerns and assured Montcalm that he would ‘attribute to him all the glory,’ if Montcalm carried out the attack.[82] This exchange highlights the need for French troops to gain attention from France for their feats, while Vaudreuil concerned himself with simple defense. Vaudreuil wrote later to the minister of war about this exchange and contrasted his ‘true and more solid interest in the colony’ with Montcalm’s own admission that his troops ‘want only to conserve their reputation and would desire to return to France without having suffered a single difficulty.’ In short, Vaudreuil lamented, ‘they think more seriously of their particular interests than of saving the colony.’ Vaudreuil did not seem displeased with the French troops themselves, whom he could not ‘praise enough,’ but he contested the motives and the prerogatives of Montcalm and his officers.[83] French response to these accusations further exhibited the French officers’ need for recognition. Doriel, a French general and firm supporter of Montcalm, argued that Vaudreuil was ‘jealous without a doubt of the glory that M. Montcalm had acquired.’ The ministers of war should therefore ignore any ill reports of Montcalm that they received from Vaudreuil since ‘all [the] disagreements . . . M. the Ms. de Montcalm was exposed to since the first moment of his arrival’ stemmed from this jealousy.[84]

While the rivalry between the two and their evident dislike of each other is important to consider in these damning accounts, French letters confirm Vaudreuil's suspicion of their motives. In one letter to the minister of war, Montreuil confirmed the officers' 'zeal and exactitude,' then reminded the minister that Montcalm had requested a pension for him, and added that in addition to the pension he would like to be honored with a promotion to the rank of Brigadier General.[85] Halfway through the war, Montcalm requested of the king 'some favors' he could give to his officers as means of encouragement as they battled for France, often feeling forgotten in the Canadian wilderness.[86] When medals and favors did not arrive at the expected time, Montcalm was quick to alert the minister of war. He seemed especially perturbed that Vaudreuil had received some awards for his Canadian officers, but the medals he had requested had not arrived.[87]

Montcalm and his fellow officers' obsession with medals, rank, pensions, and other favors of the king characterized difficulties with the larger culture of reward that existed within the French army among the officer corps. As the war in Canada drew to its final denouement, Doreil sent a letter to the minister of the marine, asking for a medal to boost his morale: 'No pecuniary award could console me from being deprived of a decoration, [the only thing] capable of augmenting my zeal.'[88] Louis XIV and Louis XV had long bestowed ranks and commissions as a sign of royal favor, and by the Seven Years' War, the bureaucratization of the French army had made these rewards seem almost expected compensation for brave actions, wounds, or honorable retreats. In the correspondence between French officers and the minister of war, many officers expressed that their individual recognition for services rendered during the war was more important than the actual outcome of it.[89]

Concerning rank and pensions, officers often competed with one another, which disrupted their professional relationship. Montreuil, for example, expressed extreme displeasure at not being promoted, while Bourlamaque, who had served fewer years, advanced in rank. Montreuil cited Bourlamaque's wound at Carillon as having kept him from doing as much during the battle as Montreuil himself, unwounded, had managed to do. Montreuil cited his own 'courage,' 'activity,' and 'cool sense' during the battle, and added that he was 'not less distinguished at the affair of the 2 of April in front of Quebec,' which made him bold enough to ask for the promotion to the rank of Brigadier General like Bourlamaque.[90] While Montreuil had certainly provided ample examples of his bravery in battle, the fact that Bourlamaque had been wounded sufficed for him to receive the promotion. Similarly, when M. Basserade did not receive a medal that Montcalm had recommended him for, Montcalm reasoned that 'his actions and his [recent] wound would procure it for him the next year.'[91] Wounds – blood spilt as a sign of zeal for service to the king – seemed a sure way to secure a promotion or comfortable retirement. Montcalm recommended another wounded officer, the Sieur de Claireville, who 'lost an arm in glorious fashion in a combat on the sea' for a coveted retirement position. Since this man 'would not know how to serve in this colony with an arm and a half,' Montcalm requested that they provide him a pleasant retirement at the Invalides.[92] The importance of wounds or near-death experiences was further evident at the end of the war, when members of the *troupes de la marine* prepared to re-enter service in France and needed pensions, commissions, and promotions. In their correspondence with the minister of the marine, they continually cited injuries, having horses shot from under them, and dangerous interactions as proof of their 'zeal for the king.' They rarely mentioned completed missions, victories, or actual contributions to the war effort. These were perhaps in short supply during the French war in Canada, but they also appeared to be less important than bodily sacrifice.[93]

This emphasis on wounds and the inter-officer competition for rank and awards calls the priorities of the French army and the French state into question. Did the French army ever expect to win, or was the war in Canada a vehicle for something else? W.J. Eccles has described Montcalm and the entire French state as 'defeatist,' when it came to defending their North American territories.[94] While some historians may find Eccles' perspective on the indifferent French attitude toward Quebec a little extreme, many of Montcalm's letters do contain rather pessimistic sentiments about his situation in Canada.[95] 'It is difficult for a well-intentioned general,' he bemoaned, 'to find himself serving 1500 leagues away [from France] . . . and always fearing having to justify it.' Montcalm's fear of having to 'justify' his service in Canada points to its relative insignificance in the war. While such an undesirable commission would 'never diminish' his 'zeal nor [his] constant attention to maintaining the union between the diverse troops,' his 'health, the work, the worry, and chagrin,' of working in Canada placed him in a 'sad situation.'[96] Montcalm assured the minister of war that all of his difficulties in Canada and his lack of enthusiasm for fighting there would never diminish his zeal for the service of the king. In a moving statement, Montcalm vowed: 'I will willingly spill the last drop of my blood and would give the last breath of my life for his service.'[97] These sentiments are noble, indeed, but they especially underscore Montcalm's dedication to the service of the king, not saving Canada. For Montcalm, and for many of his officers, service to the king did not equate to saving

Canada at all. The French officers needed to prove their individual merit to the king, even if it meant sacrificing the colony. That might have been a sacrifice, however, that the French army and the French state were willing to make.

Because the French army fought simultaneously on three continents during the Seven Years' War, the colony in Canada, which Voltaire famously described as merely 'some acres of snow,' might not have received the full strength of the French army because it was less important to maintain than the borders of France threatened by the Prussians.[98] From the beginning, France had sent only 3,000 troops to Canada, and Montcalm had never won a single battle during his previous service in Europe.[99] When the French army sent reinforcement troops in 1757, they were low-level, untrained, conscripted recruits who could offer little support, especially when paired against the large number of well-trained troops that the British army had provided to General Wolfe for the assault on Quebec.[100] France was also slow and ineffective in sending supplies. On 22 May 1759, M. Bigot complained that of the desperately needed supplies that finally arrived, they only received a third of what they asked for, and while it would save them from starvation, he had no idea how they would survive into the next year.[101] The chevalier de Lévis hoped that 'the king will be satisfied with all the efforts that were made for the conservation of New France,' especially since, when in desperate need for more supplies, weapons, ammunition, and troops, only 'one single frigate arrived.'[102]

In the context of the king's inattention, Montcalm's attentions to his officers seemed to have given them a great deal of encouragement, especially toward the end of the war, when defeat seemed inevitable. M. Malartic pointed out that Montcalm 'did not want for glory, and the reputation of the troops under his orders did well this year; despite the critical state of the colony; with only the presence and expertise of the general and the eagerness [bonne volonté] of the troops, there is room to hope for it.'[103] Especially as the war reached its dramatic climax and French troops were 'threatened on all sides by the English' (who had the support of the Amerindians), and anticipated starvation, officers had the courage to 'laugh at these threats,' because 'the long and wise precautions that M. the Mqs de Montcalm took in advance makes us hope that we will defeat the English everywhere.' Part of M. de Montgay's enthusiasm for the war in Canada, despite what appeared to be his imminent demise, was the 'gratification' he had just received from the king.[104] The promotions or awards the officers received did make a difference in their approach to the war and boosted their morale. When

Montcalm died in the battle of Quebec, his officers felt the loss. Bernier recognized that the colony had likely been doomed to the British for a long time, but in losing Montcalm, the army had 'lost a zealous protector who could make even the greatest difficulties seem appealing'.[105]

The importance of recognizing French officers for their service, if not their victory, did not change with the death of Montcalm. The chevalier de Lévis, perhaps the only officer who earned equal respect from French, Canadian, and Amerindian forces through several campaigns, took over Montcalm's duties following the battle of Quebec. While Lévis had supported Vaudreuil in fighting for Canada to the death, as the new commander of French troops at the end of a lost war, he quickly made it a point to recommend various officers for promotion or decorations.[106] Though his letters had never mentioned his own status within the army before, Lévis took advantage of his new position to ask for Montcalm's rank and compensation, which some of his offices supported in a memoir to the minister of war. Lévis's supporters added that since France had cared so little about Canada, its officers were in particular need of encouragement from the metropole.[107] While Montcalm's behavior and priorities seemed foreign and even reprehensible to Vaudreuil, they represented the essence of military service to French officers in the context of the state-commission French army. Like a fortress that must defend itself for a time before surrendering to avoid inevitable defeat and destruction, the French army defended Canada in an honorable way and settled for its honorable loss. The priorities of the French army in Canada can perhaps be best expressed by an article that appeared in the *Gazette de Leyde*, a French-language journal printed in the Netherlands that enjoyed wide French readership. During the entirety of the Seven Years' War, the paper had often printed the latest news on the war in Europe, including thorough descriptions of battles, troop movements, surrenders, and treaties. Its coverage of Canada, however, was restricted to one lengthy article that appeared at the end of every year to provide a general update on the state of the colony. When the French army lost the battle of Quebec and the entire French empire in North America, the newspaper reported that, 'We await more detailed news of the different actions in Canada during this last campaign. One knows that the officers and the troops of all the corps who were employed there gave the greatest proof of zeal and of courage.'[108] For France and its officers, brave actions and desire to serve the king were the key points, not the rescue of its chilly wilderness colony.

While French officers fought honorably in North America, and won decorations, promotions and pensions enough, the fact remained that the French army had lost the Seven Years' War, not just in North America, but in India, and Europe, as well as on the seas. The army had proved an effective vehicle for French officers to prove their mettle, but the army had become no match for its disciplined, organized, and competent rivals. The loss of the war resulted in the loss of nearly all of France's colonies, not to mention international and self-respect. French officers in Canada demonstrated that the culture of the French army did not reinforce victory and competitiveness outside of inter-officer rivalries. The loss of this war, and the mistakes that had caused their defeat in all three theaters, made French officers, military tacticians, and government officials realize that the army required a great deal of reform. Officers of all ranks entered a period of contemplating, writing, and proposing ways to reinvent the French army and the relationship between officers, soldiers, and the citizens of the state.

It is therefore appropriate, in retrospect, to assess the French officers' approach to war in Canada, because in Canada the French army caught a glimpse of what it would strive to understand and imitate over the next 30 years. The Canadian army had been a type of citizen army, relying mostly on a militia that included every capable man between the ages of 16 and 60. They felt a strong sense of loyalty and patriotism for their 'natal land,' foreshadowing the sense of patriotism and even nationalism that would infect the French army in the coming years, and soon be considered essential for any success in military engagements at all. When the French army emerged from a 30-year reform period, it thought of itself as resembling the Canadian militia more than the aristocratic army it had been under Louis XIV.

3

Soldiers into Citizens

The French army lost the Seven Years' War in humiliating and disastrous fashion in all theaters, which saw the end of the French Empire nearly everywhere but the Caribbean. While France hated seeing its colonies swallowed up by Britain in North America and India, the deepest humiliation came from its loss to Prussia, a small state with a fraction of France's population and wealth. France lost the Seven Years' War for many reasons, including naval inferiority and incompetent generals, but one of the most discussed and accepted explanations emphasized the lack of discipline among French troops compared with the renowned discipline of the Prussian soldier. Drilled to perfection by their General-King, Frederick the Great, the Prussian army executed discrete attacks that would target small parts of enemy armies, such as supply lines that were necessary for the function of the greater army. French officers had underestimated Prussia and overestimated their own troops' abilities and discipline as well as their own decision-making capabilities.

Because warfare played such a large role in French culture and social structure, these defeats caused the country to spiral into a time of intense introspection, 'a collective soul-searching the likes of which the French had never experienced.'[1] On one side, non-military thinkers and writers, both from the noble and educated non-noble classes, viewed the Seven Years' War as confirmation of a deeper decay that had eaten away at French society since the days of Louis XIV. Many of these writers had become disenchanted with the corrupted relationship between the monarchy and the nobility and decried the decadence now rife among the noble class. Their ideas to restore 'virtue' to French society and government on a large scale involved rethinking and recasting the French army and its relationship with the rest of society. Members of the French educated classes saw themselves not just as loyal subjects, but as citizens who had an active role in the character and fate of the *patrie*. In addition, military reformers looked to make tangible changes within the military system that would render the French army more efficient and effective. Both groups recognized that massive reforms would be necessary for the French army to restore itself to its former glory. Contemplating these potential changes placed the French soldier at the center of the success of the French army.[2]

Instead of solely taking measures to increase the amount of discipline in the army, however, French readers and reformers were now also more inclined to see a need for cultural change. The Seven Years' War marked a turning point in the emergence of French nationalism, which, while it had roots that stretched back to the seventeenth century, now became more viable, when subjects who actively advanced the interests of France acquired the title of 'citizen.'[3] The French army's new focus on patriotism added great momentum to this movement, bringing together and applying nationalist theories on a broad scale that would encompass all of French society. Focusing on patriotism allowed the French army to develop what officers believed to be their soldiers' natural inclination to protect their country instead of trying to out-discipline the Prussians and risk becoming soulless, disciplined 'automatons.' Such a 'natural' armed force would solve many of the French army's current problems with their soldiers – lack of discipline, poor execution, and desertion – since a properly motivated citizen soldier would love his country and as a result exhibit loyalty, train enthusiastically, and fight fiercely. It would simultaneously improve French society, as only a virtuous society could support such a fighting force. From 1750 to 1783, as French reformers studied ancient citizen armies and contemplated incorporating elements of those armies into their own, they began to 'citizen-ize' their soldiers.

The problems with the French army at the end of the Seven Years' War struck civilian critics as all too apparent, since many of the issues stemmed from societal troubles. To quote Walter Dorn, during this time France 'lacked all unity and coherent direction.'[4] Religious strife, economic instability, and political intrigue had distracted the king and his council from the three-theater war effort. French officers likewise recognized a number of problems that for a long time had plagued the army. They found their units ill-equipped and too disorganized to fight effectively. The French navy suffered a lack of leadership, finances, and able crew and could not break through British blockades in order to deliver necessary supplies to French troops in the colonies.[5] The army had suffered badly on account of its incompetent officers and poorly trained and unmotivated troops. There was a widespread perception among contemporaries that many nobles lacked the necessary experience and expertise to merit their ranks. As disparities in wealth increased within the nobility, it had become apparent that the deciding factor in military promotion had shifted from talent and experience to the financial ability of the officer to adequately outfit his soldiers and fund a campaign. Because high military rank derived from high social rank, and because Louis XV continued to use the military as a means of rewarding court favorites, the officer corps became bloated with inept nobles vying with each other for military positions and the corresponding social status. The troops consequently suffered from poor training and lack of discipline. Most French troops had little interest in cause or country and had similarly little motivation to stay in the army if their pay arrived too late or the training seemed too rigorous, making them prone to desertion. In an effort to keep the soldiers in their regiments, young officers hesitated to enforce discipline or train the troops too rigorously – an approach that had serious repercussions on the battlefield.[6]

Even educated members of the French public who had little connection with the army felt this embarrassment keenly, and in the years after the Seven Years' War French writers published stinging satires of mistakes made during the war, as well as thoughtful reflections on their society's responsibility for some of these military deficiencies. High-ranking officers in particular suffered harsh criticism for their general incompetence. During the infamous battle of Rossbach, General Soubise had pursued the retreating Prussian army that he outnumbered two to one over the crest of a hill, only to discover when he crested the peak that the Prussian troops were waiting for his army with their cannon and artillery primed. The French retreated in disarray, suffering many casualities and a mortifying defeat.[7] Other generals displayed similar incompetence, and they became the butt of satirical jokes and mocking songs.

One such poem lampooned the Duc de Richelieu, one of the bumbling generals in the Seven Years' War, by contrasting him with his predecessor General d'Estrées, who had added the defeat of the English Duke of Cumberland at the Battle of Hastenbeck to his earlier victories before retiring during the war. When Richelieu took his place, the new general continued the campaign in Hanover by merely pillaging the towns in his path. The poem was set to the tune of a well-known song called, 'Voilà! La Différence!' The last two verses contrasting their generalship appear here:

Cumberland fears both these men
And seeks to distance himself from them
There is the resemblance.
From one he flees afraid of his valor
The other he flees afraid of the odor [Richelieu is infected
with odors][8]
There is the difference!

In a beautiful field of Laurels green,
These two warriors can be seen,
There is the resemblance.
One knows how to reap these honorable flowers
The other picks them to pass the hours
There is the difference.[9]

This poem juxtaposes the current generation of the French army with the older generation that had passed on. From the French reading public's point of view, the predecessors had won their battles, and as explained by the poem, they knew how to gather honorable laurels, win glory for the king, and demonstrate their 'valor.' Contrastingly, the current generation knew only how to pick flowers and cannot defeat the enemy. Not only had all of France suffered humiliation from losing this war, but if these poems reflected polite opinion, the army had lost a great deal of respect from the educated population. Even if non-military critics were not well versed in the particular rules and regulations that governed the internal workings of the French army, they understood that it had reached its nadir and urgently required change. Writers acknowledged the part that society at large had played in the failure of the army during the Seven Years' War, and viewed societal change as a necessary element for military change.

Patriotism had become an important value for French society during the Seven Years' War, especially as a means for elevating the French and vilifying the English. An early incident of colonial violence in North America, before the official outbreak of the Seven Years' War, involved a young George Washington, whose native allies attacked a band of French Canadian militiamen and killed one of them, Jumonville, in rather gruesome fashion. This incident became a rallying cry for the French to fight the 'barbaric' English, especially as Jumonville was carrying a message of peace at the time.[10] Other instances of anti-English patriotism arose during the war, and contributed to the early formation of French nationalism. In many ways, patriotism became the new social value essential to many discussions, especially concerning noble officers and the degrading effects of decadence.[11]

For social reformers who looked to patriotism as a cure for France's societal and military ills, the successful model for reform lay in the example of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Men of noble status and the educated elite had long been well-schooled in ancient history, but in this post-Seven Years' War era marked by growing national sentiment, it was the patriotism of ancient societies that caught French attention. Because the ancient Greeks and Romans had achieved some of the most sophisticated and studied societies, governments, and militaries, French writers used them as the example of how an ideal army should operate.[12] The principles that guided a successful government or army were believed to be unchanging, which meant that the lessons of the ancient Greeks and Romans could still apply to contemporary France. Some of the influential writers of the eighteenth century who saw military change as a necessary part of social change – Montesquieu, Rousseau, Maurice de Saxe, Charles Rollin, and Mably – used the ancients to describe and analyze military successes.[13] Montesquieu examined the rise and fall of the Romans in order to expose some of the vices in French society and government and subtly hint at change. Rousseau drew from his impressions of the Athenians and Spartans to comment on the moral implications of the arts and sciences in French society, as well as to advise the nascent government of Poland on how to construct and maintain a virtuous, successful state. Maurice de Saxe was not a man of letters, but one of the most victorious generals in the French army from the War of the Austrian Succession. He examined the Romans for concrete details on how to feed, discipline, and train troops, and drew comparisons between Roman and French soldiers. Charles Rollin's multivolume series on the history of the ancients was standard reading for the educated French.[14] Mably, like Montesquieu, wrote on all aspects of the ancients, often to criticize French society and offer alternative visions of a society free of corruption and luxury. Their works set the tone for how reformers, both inside and outside military circles, would consider changes necessary to the restoration of France's virtue. Despite their different methods and intents, these writers all found models of military greatness and social virtue in ancient Greece and Rome.[15]

All writers acknowledged the rudimentary necessities of victorious armies: tough soldiers that did not shy away from pain or exhaustion, harnessed with a firm sense of discipline. Montesquieu described the Roman soldier as 'more robust and hardier than his enemy,' and the 'knowledge of his own strength' gave him courage.[16] Mably agreed that Romans constantly exercised their soldiers to condition them to hardships and make them impervious to danger.[17] Rollin credited the 'frequent exercises' and 'laborious works' of Cyrus's troops for their fine performance on the battlefield.[18] Spartans, too, supported all the fatigues of war and boldly faced its dangers, because the rudiments of their training required them to go 'barefoot . . . to suffer heat and cold, to exercise by continually hunting, wrestling, running on foot and horseback.' Such toughness and rigor, though, had to be channeled with a firm sense of discipline, the very 'soul of war,' which Spartans ingrained in their children at an early age.[19] Maurice de Saxe agreed that discipline was one of the most important aspects of war, and pointed to the example of the Romans, who 'conquered all nations by their discipline.'[20] In considering the Romans' rise to greatness, Montesquieu observed that Rome did not have to impose any general laws on the army, because the Roman army 'was made by a common obedience' without 'dangerous liaisons' between any of the people in the Empire.[21] Saxe agreed that the Romans owed their victories to 'the excellent composition of their troops.'[22] Rousseau had similar observations on Sparta, where people were simply 'born virtuous, and even the very air of their country inspired virtue.'[23] As the Prussian army had just demonstrated as well, a certain level of discipline constituted a necessary component of a victorious army.

Beyond simple matters of training and discipline, however, what made the armies of ancient Greece and Rome dominant in ancient times was the close relationship between the citizens, the soldiers, and their country, or, as the French lovingly termed it, their *patrie*. The discipline central to making war, Rollin specified, relied on the ability of a state to inspire soldiers 'with a love for their country, for their honor, and their fellow citizens.' This method worked so well for Cyrus, that his common soldiers felt 'zeal for discipline and order.'[24] Mably in particular argued that in the ancient world there was no distinction between citizens and soldiers. 'In Rome,' he wrote, 'everything had the appearance of war in time of peace: to be a citizen and soldier were the same thing.' Romans even trained with weapons that were twice as heavy as the ones they would actually use in combat during peacetime, in order to be constantly prepared for and accustomed to war.[25] For the Greeks as well, 'each citizen was a soldier. Not knowing how to die for the *patrie* . . . would have been an infamy.'[26] Rousseau, in giving Polish officials examples of effective leaders, emphasized Moses and Lycurgus, because these men 'attach[ed] citizens to their *patrie* and to each other.'[27] For the Athenians, this love of country extended beyond the protection of mere property, to a love of their liberty and way of life. When challenged by an oppressive enemy, Rollin recounts, Athenians' 'ardent love of liberty' inspired them to 'abandon, without the least regret, their lands, estates, city, and houses,' to defend their freedoms.[28] The motivation for the ancients, therefore, to maintain their physical prowess under harsh conditions and live in a state of constant discipline was love of citizenship and the *patrie*.

Service to the *patrie*, however, was not a one-way relationship; citizens of the *patrie* likewise honored their citizen soldiers, and celebrated them during patriotic festivals. Rollin's Athenians viewed the Republic as a 'good mother,' who took care of wounded soldiers and met all their needs, which increased troops' courage, even making them invincible. Patriotic festivals exalted soldiers, and those who had 'distinguished themselves in battle' received 'rewards and honors.' Athenians erected monuments to the memory of citizen soldiers who had died while defending their country, and gave 'funeral orations . . . in the midst of the most august religious ceremonies.' All of these public festivals together 'conspired infinitely to eternalize the valor of both nations . . . to make fortitude a kind of law.'[29] The armies of the ancients Greeks, therefore, found motivation in the respect that the citizens of their *patrie* showed them in response to their sacrifices. Rousseau recognized this importance when advising Poland, citing the celebratory yet sober fêtes of the Romans and the public decorations of the Greeks 'that inspired confidence' among the citizens.[30] Speaking through Phocion, a retired Athenian commander who enjoyed conversing on matters of politics and war, Mably articulated all the benefits of a selflessly patriotic military-minded society. 'That our Republic could operate in a more military fashion,' Phocion sighed, 'that each citizen was destined to defend his country.' Phocion envisioned each citizen practicing with his weapons every day, so that he became accustomed to military discipline. Not only would this create 'invincible soldiers' of young men but it would give them 'civil virtues,' which would protect them from corruption and weak morals. 'For if civil virtue, temperance, the love of work and of glory occur in preparing military virtues, each one will support the other.'[31] Though writing through Phocion, Mably made the same plea for France; he made clear that a well-governed polity, a virtuous society, and a well-disciplined, victorious military went hand in hand. Yet as much as these 'classical republicans' held up ancient Rome and Greece as the standard for military excellence, there were very few areas in which the French army could emulate them. As Montesquieu lamented in his *Esprit des Lois*, the majority of ancient governments 'had virtue as law' that enabled them to do things 'which we no longer see these days, and which dazzle our small souls.'[32] Because French society did not boast such virtue, it could never fully emulate the ancients' splendor.

Eighteenth-century writing about the Greeks and Romans not only enumerated their virtues, but also grappled with the reasons why virtue failed and patriotic nations fell. These surveys of failure spoke eerily to contemporary French conditions. One popular subject was the collapse of the Roman Empire, which reverberated strongly after the loss of France's empire in the Seven Years' War. In describing the reasons for the ancient societies' eventual collapse, writers hinted at the aspects of contemporary French society and military practices that prevented their *patrie* from ever rising to the heights of the ancients. Mably had Phocion say that the government, 'in favor of laziness and cowardice, permitted the separation of civil and military functions,' the result being that 'we had neither citizens, nor soldiers.'[33] In a separate work on the Greeks, Mably attributed the fall of the Spartans to their 'greediness for riches.' He lamented that 'the Spartan hands that Lycurgus had destined only for the sword, lance, and shield, became dishonored by instruments of the arts and of luxury.'[34] According to Mably, Athens and Sparta fell not because they were confronted with superior military power but because they allowed their own systems to become corrupted and decay. When their leaders relaxed their insistence on discipline and their strict hold on society, and when their citizens became corrupted by wealth, the proud *patrie* of citizen soldiers dissolved. Rousseau reached similar conclusions concerning Athens, and its love of the arts.[35] Similar circumstances led to Rome's downfall. According to Mably, 'the loss of their [Roman] liberty was not the effect of a sudden revolution, attended with the utmost disorder; but the work of several ages,' in which the people of Rome became so accustomed to 'the prince's gradual tyranny that they did little to hinder it.' A new taste for riches springing from the accumulation of war booty refashioned Roman manners to become more refined and materialistic, their tough bearing that made them so strong in older days came to be considered savage. The attraction of new wealth led to a breakdown of discipline in the army, as soldiers now pillaged freely for goods.[36] Rousseau echoed this theme, noting that decadence caused Romans to 'neglect military discipline,' and 'grievous splendor replaced Roman simplicity.'[37] Mably charged that the very composition of the Roman army (which, according to Saxe, had made that army victorious) changed, in the reign of Tiberius, from righteous citizens to 'contemptible' ones, and the army degraded into a 'multitude of robbers.'[38]

These political theorists suggested in not so subtle ways that modern European militaries and governments resembled the Greek and Roman societies at their luxurious, undisciplined worst, and displayed all the vices that made such glorious empires fall. Mably specifically compared the degeneration of the Roman army to contemporary European armies, both filled 'with the meanest subjects.' Saxe agreed that the soldiers left much to be desired, for which he blamed recruiters who chose 'the most vile and contemptible people,' putting money in their pockets and calling them soldiers. 'It was not,' he mourned, 'with such morals and with such armies that the Romans conquered the universe.'[39] Mably furthermore characterized the monarchy, the very type of government that oversaw these armies, as 'a species of government very fit for a people too much corrupted by avarice, luxury, and a passion for pleasure to have any love for their country.'[40] So long as France lacked patriotism, the achievements of the ideal militaries of the ancients lay out of reach.

Two prominent writers translated the observations about the ancients and the necessity of patriotism for a virtuous society and victorious army into a workable vision for the reform of the French army. The first, the comte de Guibert, created a stir among Enlightenment thinkers and military reformers alike with his *Essai Général de Tactique*, which was published in 1772. The other, Joseph Marie Servan de Gerbey, built on Guibert's success, likewise appealing to military and non-military readers.[41] Unlike writers such as Mably and Rousseau, Guibert made his observations as an insider, rooted in military institutions with ample experience both on the battlefield and as a military administrator.[42] Guibert was a member of the noble officer corps, whose father had risen to the rank of Lieutenant General largely because of his own merit. Guibert received a thorough education in military affairs, and by the time he was 13, entered the army as a Lieutenant. He witnessed first-hand some of the better generalship of the Seven Years' War from the duc de Broglie, as well as the disastrous defeat at the battle of Rossbach. After the war, he served on the administrative side of the army, helping Minister of War Choiseul institute some immediate postwar reforms. Guibert had ample qualifications to address the problems of the French army, and his text, therefore, attracted the attention of officers, veterans, and reformers even though it echoed the adulation for the classics and the search for patriotism that had become typical of Enlightenment thinkers. Judging from his instant popularity among habitués of the salons upon the circulation of his text in 1771, Guibert managed to appeal to both groups simultaneously.

As the title of his work implies, Guibert wrote at great length about tactical choices, battle formations, how to integrate infantry with shock troops, the education of the cavalry, maneuvers, artillery, and other practical military concerns regarding the 'nuts and bolts' of French army operation. But he also began his *Essai* with a thorough discussion of French society and government and their roles in the French army's difficulties. Like the 'classical republican' thinkers of the eighteenth century, he looked to ancient Greece and Rome for the model society. Guibert advanced one step further, however, and openly declared that the best type of army for France would be a citizen army, which, he argued, presented the perfect solution to the societal and military crises plaguing France. His citizen army called for a 'vigorous militia . . . consisting of contented citizens who are interested in defending their prosperous state.'[43] By placing the duty of warfare in the hands of French citizens, Guibert reasoned that the army would no longer serve as a gauge for social celebrity but instead exist purely for defense. The monarch could not use positions in the army as a means to reward his court favorites, and rather than fighting among themselves for royal favors, officers and soldiers alike would work together for the defense of their *patrie*. Because a citizen army would not rely on mercenaries or conscripts, but on citizens motivated by love for their country, the army would not suffer from desertion, nor require a great deal of financial assistance from individuals or the state. The onerous training required to effectively execute line warfare would not be necessary in a citizen army, because citizens would fight in a more 'natural' style akin to irregular warfare.[44]

Most of all, a citizen army would be effective. Guibert explained that neighboring nations would not dare disturb France's tranquility for fear of the terror and vengeance any attack would unleash. If, he stipulated, the citizen soldier is in some way offended, he would go to war 'with the full exertion of his power' until reparation had been duly paid. Unlike the conditions under dynastic warfare, always focused on securing trade routes or expanding empire, the citizen soldier would 'not want to conquer, but only preserve what is rightfully his.' Passion would lead his revenge. 'Terrible in his anger,' the citizen soldier would confront his enemy with 'fire and sword.' The citizen soldier would 'perish, until the last man if necessary,' but he would 'assure, by the fury of his vengeance, his future peace.'[45] Guibert blamed the French government for allowing the morals of society to decay, and for encouraging corruption among elites. The responsibility for victory and vengeance lay in the hands of the individual citizen soldier, who, united in common purpose by patriotic commitment to the *patrie*, would restore civic virtue and serve as the first line of defense for the *patrie*.

Guibert recognized the implausibility of this ideal state; monarchical European governments feared the potential revolts that might ensue from arming the citizenry and would probably continue their attempts to gain additional power by expanding their territories. Guibert indicated in his *Essai*, however, that he had hopes that such a military transformation could be possible. Addressing his *patrie*, Guibert encouraged his nation to adopt a patriotic system, reasoning that '[t]his vision will perhaps not always be a fantastic dream. It could be realized in you.'[46] Despite Guibert's idealistic approach to reform, his *Essai* found a strong following in France. Voltaire praised the text as 'a work of genius.'[47] Guibert received an enthusiastic welcome in salons and in the affections of the famous *salonnière* Mlle. Lespinasse. Throughout the rest of the eighteenth century, both military and civilian writers would cite him as 'the author of the *Essai*.'[48]

Joseph Servan likewise roused military and non-military readers with his ideas on citizen armies in *Le Soldat Citoyen* (The Citizen Soldier), which he wrote from 1760 to 1771 and later published in 1780. As the title suggests, he agreed with Guibert that the ideal solution to France's military woes lay in creating a citizen army. He also fought (briefly) in the Seven Years' War as a volunteer with the Guyenne Infantry Regiment. He eventually made his way through the lower officer ranks, and became the major of a grenadiers regiment just as his *Soldat Citoyen* began to circulate among elites. The work was so well-received in military and court circles, that it earned him the Cross of St Louis in 1783.[49]

In his own words, Servan's objective in *Soldat Citoyen* was 'to perfect the instruments of the Art of War, the soldiers and the armies, both in how to raise them, perpetuate them, train them, improve them, and to employ and discipline them.'[50] In the context of the published literature on the subject of patriotism and army reform, Servan sought to approach the citizen-army idea of Guibert from the level of the soldier. What is necessary, he asked, for France to have an army of patriotic citizens serving in the humblest ranks? To answer this question, Servan of course turned to the ancients and examined the inner workings of the Greek or Roman soldier. He acknowledged that his predecessors had already made a thorough study of ancient military institutions, governments and societies, but had not focused enough on the internal motivations of the individual soldier. 'Do we really know,' he asked, 'enough of the motives, and the rewards that inspired in the [ancient soldier] such an indomitable courage?'[51] In his examination, Servan compared the Greek, Roman, and contemporary French methods of creating soldiers, with particular attention to the roles of national character, education, and government. His questions led him to consider closely, not only the process of recruitment, but also the process of creating a single citizen soldier.

Like the writers who came before him, Servan's assessment of the ancients led to the overall conclusion that society and government had to be supportive of the citizen soldier and worthy of his sacrifice, something that France could not currently claim. Among the Greeks, Servan concluded that 'the republican spirit, the education, the love of liberty and of glory... made them natural heroes' to the degree that 'the citizens were born for the defense of their country.' Servan also pointed to Sparta's famous military society, which was so fixated on military greatness, that 'even games were exercises in courage and virtue.' In both cases Servan emphasized that the government created a 'national character' that united all of the citizens who would willingly defend the *patrie*.[52] With these observations in mind, Servan turned to the contemporary French soldier, who had had quite the opposite experience. 'Our soldiers,' he noted, are not 'natural heroes,' but 'only very ordinary men, enlisted by force or trickery.' Even after they enlisted in the army, they received poor training. Unlike the ancients, French soldiers came from miserable backgrounds and were not motivated to serve or defend the country, because serving in the army in no way added to their happiness. Most of all, the relationship between soldiers and officers was not geared toward loving service, as soldiers only feared their own officers more than the enemy. Above all, Servan cited the French government's responsibility to show more interest in each individual, to cultivate the 'national happiness' that was most essential to cultivating a citizen army.[53] Only in improving the conditions and motivations of the individual soldier could the army truly reform.

Like Guibert, Servan blamed Louis XIV for the problems plaguing the army. When 'Louis XIV held the reins of the state,' Servan wrote, he used 'the most grievous principles to make the nation prosper.'[54] Guibert agreed that Louis XIV's reign had signaled the beginning of the problems in the French army, by corrupting the officer corps with positions at court and taking them away from their troops.[55] Servan blamed Louvois, Louis XIV's minister of war, for being 'hard, cruel, unpitying, who regarded the human race as an instrument for his ambition.' The Dutch War, which had made Louis XIV the unquestionable 'warrior king' were also criticized as a waste of human blood that served little toward the glory or defense of the state. The situation of the individual in the contemporary army was hardly conducive to being a soldier; Servan found it to be just the opposite. 'In the final analysis,' Servan pointed out that the sick, hungry, unmotivated bodies, 'are not soldiers, because the state does not use any measures to render them adept, strong, and robust.'[56] In order to reverse Louis XIV's and Louvois's handiwork, Servan concentrated on two main elements: training soldiers when they were very young and creating a level of equality. As Servan surmised from studying the ancients in comparison with modern-day French soldiers, one had to be raised from early childhood with the expectation of becoming a soldier in order for him to serve willingly and enthusiastically in the army. Young children should have exposure to military lifestyle in their daily lives, and the army should recruit young adolescents. When appealing to teenagers, recruiters should emphasize 'all the good things' a life in the army would afford them.[57]

Believing that people should enroll in the armed forces of their own free will, Servan examined the French *milice* (or militia), which had received little attention from French writers. He observed that the army only 'raised the militia to complete regiments and to serve in times of urgency,' and that this practice had 'inspired a horror and an unfortunate but understandable distancing of the people from the militia.' The militia was often committed where the fighting was the heaviest and therefore suffered disproportionally high casualty rates. Servan further noted that there were 'too many exemptions' for serving in the militia, and that the 'people chosen to preside over this work do so with partiality and injustice', as nobles and wealthy members of society could easily pay a sum to exempt the privileged from service. Servan then made two bold statements to resolve the situation. First, that 'the interest to defend the state must come from someone who loves society.' In other words, if French citizens were satisfied with the benefits afforded by their society, they would be prepared to defend it and the lifestyle that their country provided. This declaration also implied that the people who had property and wealth should be required to defend France by serving in the militia. Second, Servan took this idea that smacked of social equality one step further, claiming the 'best and most fair way to supply' the militia with men 'would be obligatory military service for all citizens, without distinctions from the state, from the age of eighteen until the age of forty.' These citizen soldiers would revel in the recognitions that society would shower on them for their sacrifice. He envisioned 'a day of celebration,' when 'the veteran defenders of the state mixed with these brave and brilliant youth, are praised by their state and encourage those who will one day replace them, to be unfailingly good citizens and brave soldiers.'[58] Nobles, bourgeoisie, laborers, and peasants could all be celebrated together as defenders of the state. Servan was not proposing to level the nobility; in fact he appreciated the idea of retaining an elite military officer corps, but nobles and soldiers would share a similar *métier* and receive equal recognition from the state and their fellow citizens.

In sum, Servan saw the necessity for a citizen-based military force, in which all citizens participated, either in the army or the militia, with an emphasis on dedication to the *patrie* instead of social rank or family status. Despite some nobles' reticence to see themselves on a similar plane with any other citizen who served the *patrie*, Servan observed that 'we are no longer in the era where the noble on his horse composes our armies and constitutes the bulk of our strength.'[59] The French army and society as a whole had to recognize this fact and change in a way that reflected the composition of the *patrie* for its assured defense and for the betterment of society itself. According to Guibert and Servan, who were both public figures and military reformers, the new focus of the army was therefore not the 'nobleman on his horse,' but the common soldier holding his musket.

Military officers and reformers who wrote *mémoires* to the minister of war proposing reforms for their institution also considered the workings of ancient armies, the utility of patriotism, and the condition of the common soldier. Whereas writers who took an interest in military affairs from a societal perspective saw large-scale reforms in both realms as a way to revive French virtue, military officers approached reform from a much more immediate, practical angle. They sought to institute changes that would render the army more efficient and improve overall performance on the battlefield. Even with a different approach and more concentrated set of goals, however, military officers agreed that patriotism and attention to the needs of the individual soldier held the key to effective reforms. Distinguishing themselves from the Prussians, many French officers saw patriotism, not discipline, as their philosophical guide to reform. They also recognized the 'Frenchness' of their soldiers and considered Prussian-style discipline to be entirely inappropriate in their troops. Instead, they too wished to replicate the victorious patriotic armies of the ancients, and used these ancient armies as practical models for reform. Most reformers viewed the citizen army as a promising but problematic alternative to the current French army. While they admired this type of army in the ancients, they had doubts about how it could operate in French society. Discussions for implementing elements of a citizen army, however, focused not on making soldiers *out of* French citizens (which incurred lively debates regarding the militia) but of turning their soldiers *into* citizens.

The idea of citizenship, and what constituted a French 'citizen' at this time was also a matter being discussed in both military and non-military realms. French officers and non-military readers admired the type of citizenship that the ancients had made the building block of their societies, and they longed to emulate it. That type of citizenship, however, required being actively involved in a republican form of government, whereas French 'citizens' lived and operated in a monarchy that few, if any, wished to change. After the Seven Years' War, however, French officers and those who encouraged military or societal changes managed, in their own understandings, to find a happy compromise between being a subject of the king and a citizen of the state. While this kind of citizenship did not infer 'voting' a monarch into power, it did assume that those self-proclaimed 'citizens' took an active role in the evolution of society. French officers during this period rarely, if ever, referred to themselves as citizens, but mostly bestowed the term on members of the third estate who were or would be soldiers. The French army provided an apt laboratory to test modes of citizenship within a monarchy. Officers during the reform period of 1750–1783 did not intend to institute any sense of equality between themselves and their soldiers with these ideas, but they did wish to cultivate a sense of agency among their soldiers, who could serve of their own will, and receive benefits from a state that loved them. Through such discussions of citizenship, officers laid the groundwork for drastic changes that would be made later to improve the condition and treatment of the French soldier.[60]

In the wake of the Seven Years' War, the French army went through a period of terrible turbulence where reforms were made only to be reversed in short order. The next 30 years saw a rapid succession of ministers of war with sudden changes afflicting the army. Every facet of the institution was subject to change, from minor details of how to organize a battalion to more consequential decisions such as who could be an officer.[61] No matter who occupied the office of the minister of war (a decision which had largely to do with court politics), or how often an implemented reform faced a speedy reversal, military officers interested in reform consistently asked for better conditions for their soldiers and brainstormed ways to motivate them. From 1750 to 1783, the multiple ministers of war received thousands of pages from well-intentioned officers eager to help in the reform process that aimed at restoring honor and glory to their army.

Despite a vociferous group of officers campaigning for a more patriotic military force, two ministers of war in particular sought to institute more discipline in the army according to the Prussian model. Choiseul and St Germain both saw value in copying the discipline that had made the Prussian army so successful. Choiseul wanted, by Latreille's account, to 'institute under his watch a German military system,' but court intrigue soon dislodged him from his position.[62] St Germain also had made a seemingly simple reform in proclaiming that soldiers would henceforth be disciplined with beatings from a club or the flat side of a saber. In both instances, military officers responded vehemently that such stringent discipline would only exacerbate existing problems and be entirely unsuitable for the character and disposition of the French soldier. As one reformer cautioned, 'The French soldier will never get accustomed to corporal punishment . . . if this unfortunate penalty is established, we will have men who make up the numbers in the regiments, but we will have very few soldiers.'[63] French officers on the whole largely viewed discipline that involved corporal punishment as wholly inconsistent with improving the French soldier's discipline or fighting ability.

Nearly all reformers who addressed the problem found such punishment to be particular to Prussian culture, and therefore singularly 'un-French.' One reformer explained that 'the German acquired a perfect discipline,' only because 'his character is to obey.'[64] His assessment of Prussian culture found support among other like-minded reformers. Prussians, another reformer argued, were not citizens, as many hoped their soldiers soon would be. Instead, soldiers who eventually served in the Prussian army consisted of 'wage-laborers, vagabonds, and foreigners,' who needed the guidance and discipline. Such discipline came naturally to soldiers, he argued, because it was a part of Prussian culture at large.[65] At the same time, the fact that such stringent discipline was required in order to recruit and maintain soldiers bred contempt among the countrymen. Reformers warned French ministers that 'the composition of the German army does not agree at all with the French army,' and therefore there was no reason to believe that the strict, corporal discipline of Prussia would ever have any positive effect in France.[66] Nearly all reformers were convinced that the system of corporal punishment would have an adverse effect on France's soldiers, and reformers piped up in *mémoires* to the minister of war or the king to defend the men under their charge. French officer Sonhart, who served as a sous-aide major for the infantry, observed that the beatings eternally shamed the unfortunate recipient of such discipline. This punishment did not just punish the body, but wounded the spirit. Sonhart found it ironic that a state which sought to encourage and rally its soldiers would use such 'dishonorable means,' as blows with a saber or baton. Sonhart concluded his appeal with a final cry that such a means of correction would deprive a soldier of 'his liberty.'[67]

Reformers largely saw French soldiers as 'too honorable' for corporal punishment, and entirely contrary to the spirit of the budding French nation. A soldier required 'more honor,' needed his soul to be more 'elevated' and necessitated more 'firmness of courage' than that which French officers believed necessary of the 'ordinary citizen.' Instead of increasing courage, honor, or quality of the soul, beatings 'demeaned the soul' and 'darkened' the French soldier's heart.[68] Reformers described the soldier as coming from 'the gentlest and most honest of people,' who sought, according to these reformers, to increase his 'esteem' and 'zeal to fulfill his duties,' and therefore any kind of corporal punishment would be entirely unsuitable.[69] Even the lowest French soldier, it seemed, had more honor than the most disciplined Prussian. It might seem strange that soldiers, formerly thought to be the vilest sort of creatures, would now engender a reputation among their officers for having great souls, liberties, and honor – attributes not normally consistent with the station of a common soldier. Yet the loss of the Seven Years' War, the resurgence of French patriotism, and the reforms instituting physical punishment for soldiers seemed to awaken French officers' awareness of where their soldiers came from, how they lived while in the army, and how they could be molded into better fighters. Reformers turned their attentions to the plight of the soldier and sought not to beat him into a form that would grant them more victory, but to craft him from childhood into a willing citizen that would fight for the *patrie*. Like the non-military writers interested in more general reforms, these officers took their inspiration for reform not from the Prussians, but from the ancient Greeks and Romans.

Studying the ancient Greek and Roman military institutions – from recruitment to retirement – also led French reformers to conclude that their model presented a citizen army. One officer began his case for reform by stating that there was no better choice for emulation than the Romans on how to create soldiers. Unlike current French or Prussian armies, Romans 'admitted in their legions only citizens, that is to say, men held to the state by the consideration of their goods and their faculties.'[70] Because of their relationship to the state through property and skills, they served as willing defenders. The fact that only citizens were permitted to serve afforded the soldier a certain degree of status. Roman soldiers similarly would defend their state, symbolized by an eagle, 'with the most tenacious courage,' motivated to 'run towards danger.'[71] Drawing from the Spartan example, one reformer suggested that in order to achieve a more military state, the state should choose the healthiest children of five or six years of age who do not have parents and have disabled veterans raise them. These youths would then join the army at 16.[72] Even when these reforms sounded extreme, some officers reasoned that the 'French are capable of taking on characteristics of the Roman.' France, according to this reformer, was 'a warrior nation, and sensitive to its glory.'[73] Taking on the characteristics of a Roman or Spartan army, therefore, seemed entirely possible.

Taking on these characteristics meant that France would be embracing a citizen army, which excited reformers' imaginations of what that would require from the army as well as from general society. A citizen army had certain 'natural' essence; as one reformer reasoned, it must have been the first type of military force in human history. At the 'origin of war,' he explained, every farmer took on military duties to protect his wife and children, as well as the land he cultivated for his livelihood. From this humble, but honorable beginning, these warrior-farmers must have defended their country's frontiers in order to safeguard their rights from their sovereign.[74] One officer saw the potential in Frenchmen for this type of army, for he 'looked in the heart of the French,' and 'found treasures.' For him, it remained but a question only of how to unearth these bounties and put them to use.[75] Another reformer echoed the thought. 'To have good soldiers,' he began, 'it is necessary to begin with making good citizens, and to have the good citizens' the nation would have to 'make them as contented as possible.'[76] This tantalizing dream of having citizen soldiers promised not only an effective army, but a virtuous citizenry, who would draw on their innate desires to defend family and homeland and their love of their country. Citizen soldiers, in the French mindset, seemed to be a special breed of human that was more virtuous and more courageous than the sum of his parts. To attract and keep citizen soldiers, however, France would have to improve itself in order to render citizens and soldiers as contented with the state as possible. In response, French citizens would exercise their inherent virtues and even increase them in their service to the state: a tantalizing image.

Tantalizing, but problematic. The building block of a citizen army usually consisted of the militia, providing ordinary citizens with non-military professions the opportunities to serve the state militarily. Machiavelli, who also drew from the ancients as the basis for much of his political and military writing, envisioned a militarized citizenry as the best army for a state. Britain and the American colonies also boasted militias as the primary defense for their territories, and the French army had just experienced first-hand the dedication that the Canadian militia had shown to its *patrie* and to warfare. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, the French militia operated more like a local police force and the occasional filler for the French army when it needed more men. Few appreciated the militia, and those in it had little military inclination. Reformers recognized the militia's reputation of ripping young men from the arms of their widowed mothers and placing them, without any training, in the area of conflict with the heaviest fighting. M. de Rocher wondered 'how many fathers and mothers' out of 'fear of the militia' abandoned the countryside 'to take refuge in the capital' and larger cities, where young men could be relatively safe from spontaneous service to the army.[77] If the French army was to make a serious attempt at a citizen army, or some incarnation of one, it would not be through the militia.

Reformers, therefore, did not try to make soldiers out of French citizens, but make citizens out of French soldiers. While the soldier had the reputation for being of the 'lowest sort', with little connection to or love for the French populace, French reformers almost universally agreed that he deserved better treatment and greater respect for his position in society, which would render him a better fighter and a worthy citizen. Speaking in terms of a citizen army, which conjures images of equality, may seem like a desire to break significantly from the existing military structure based on aristocratic values, but the officers who dreamed these reforms and envisioned citizen soldiers populating the ranks of the French army did not intend for any real change in the relationship they had with their subordinates. Like Servan, they wanted to maintain an elite officer corps and the strict hierarchy of the army. Making soldiers into citizens would strengthen the feudal bond that already existed between the two. Using the term 'citizen' did not mean that French officers viewed their soldiers as equals – in fact French officers never used the word 'citizen' to refer to themselves in any of their reforms. Rather it denoted soldiers as men whose profession at arms allocated them a certain degree of honor and social prestige. By improving the physical conditions of the soldier, elevating his social status, and infusing him with patriotism, French reformers would achieve, they believed, certain elements of a citizen army. Soldiers would naturally fight better because they would have more love and respect from, and therefore more love and respect for, their *patrie*. And in the process, these soldier-citizens would inspire virtuous behavior in their fellow non-noble citizens, who would in turn be attracted to a life in the army and the honor and social prestige it would afford.

When this period of intense reform began, however, the French soldier had very little to recommend him, his position, or his profession, and reformers recognized and bemoaned his state. The difficult conditions of his life took center stage in French reforms, because as reformers grappled with how to reorganize and reinvent the army, they also debated the very real problem of desertion. All European armies experienced levels of desertion in the eighteenth century, but, especially after the Seven Years' War, French reformers seriously studied the condition of the soldier and sought to identify and rectify the issues that motivated him to desert his duties, his comrades, and his country. French reformers found plenty of reasons for soldiers' desire to desert. His condition 'from day to day [was] more vile and less investigated.'[78] An officer from the Regiment of Limousin found that 'most soldiers are in need of everything,' especially adequate clothing.[79] These were not just hardships that came from difficulties in the midst of combat, but were part of day-to-day life for soldiers, even when not actively engaging the enemy. Being in constant need of basic necessities drove soldiers to pillage and steal, and in turn they suffered a reputation as thieves and criminals.[80] Such scorn further demeaned soldiers' souls and suffocated their honor, which was the foundation for the 'necessary bravery in good military men!'[81] How could a soldier be expected to act bravely when all of society disdained him for merely attempting to eke out his own living?

Before the reform process began, France's military institutions only contributed to the soldiers' misfortunes. Officers had little incentive to familiarize themselves with the needs or the thoughts of their soldiers. Guibert observed that 'the officers no longer have any interest in the mutual encouragement' or stimulation of his troops. And rather than dedicating himself to the welfare and effectiveness of his troops, he 'lives for himself alone.'[82] Throughout the reform period, the rules and regulations of the army changed so frequently and often so completely that 'the troops are unceasingly [and] needlessly worn out,' having no consistency in how the army operated from year to year.[83] The 'nation' itself, in which the institution of the army was operating, proved 'inconsistent' in its treatment of soldiers and its attitudes about warfare in general.[84] Reformers argued that such treatment and such circumstances contradicted the character of French soldiers. On the whole, reformers agreed that 'the French soldier is vivacious, impatient, and full of vanity,' who became easily frustrated with poor decision making from his commanders, 'useless work' and 'puerile training.' If the French army continued to 'add to his misery with the humiliation of corporal punishment' then he would desert and have little reason to return if his *patrie* did not banish such 'mortifications.'[85] Compared with Prussian or even English soldiers, the chevalier de la Rochelambert found French soldiers 'flighty' and relatively 'light.' He considered them 'less faithful' than soldiers of other nations, but instead of rectifying this character with ill treatment, he excused it because of the French soldiers' 'love of liberty' and 'horror of servitude.'[86] The lot of the French soldier would require improvement not only in his physical condition – better food and clothing – but also his spiritual condition. French officers devised multiple ways to improve his circumstances and to cultivate his natural tendencies, his vanity, and his love of liberty. Reformers therefore sought to make changes that would excite these characteristics of the French soldier instead of subduing them.

As one reformer declared openly, 'good soldiers are worth more than money!'[87] And it was generally agreed that the state should increase the soldiers' pay and change the system of payment. The chevalier Preudhomme de Borre observed that the 'soldier of today receives the same pay as the one who served for eight, ten, or twelve years or more,' and to him this system did 'not seem fair.' Instead, he proposed 'progressive pay,' which would reward a soldier in proportion to his service, discourage desertion, and increase re-enlistment.[88] French officer Flavigny added on a practical note that a soldier should 'receive a payment capable of procuring the most important items that were indispensable to his training.'[89] In addition to fair pay and the possibility of increasing payment for long-time service, another officer urged the state, for the growth of the soldier in the profession, 'to keep the old soldiers in their regiments' and employ them as examples for the new soldier 'at the beginning of his career.'[90] Such mentoring would allow new soldiers to learn their duties from those most capable of teaching them and allow them to further cultivate their honor. For the sake of the soldiers' acquisition of honor, another reformer believed that the king should actively model 'honor' regularly before the troops.[91] If the government invested more in the soldier, through basic necessities, pay, and even honor, then soldiers already enrolled in the army would come to resemble those 'robust' and 'courageous' soldiers of ancient Rome. The added respectability in their profession would also bring them closer to the status of citizens than the 'vile creatures' that had long been their reputation.

Key to this transformation of soldier into citizen was a closer relationship with his officers. Throughout this time of reform, officers complained that 'the soldier no longer has anyone to whom he could have recourse in his small needs,' because none of the officers cared for him or dispensed anything other than assignments and punishment. 'The officers of his company when he addresses them,' one reformer complained, 'send him to the état major, who only has duties to prescribe and reprimands to give.' Those officers most closely connected with the soldier were 'much less an object of consolation and of resource for him, than the subject of his hate.'[92] One officer, known as 'Griffon,' made the soldier/officer relationship the entire subject of his memoir. He lamented that neither the soldier nor officer had any intention of attaching themselves to the other: 'the officer sees the soldier because he must, but whether he is sick or healthy, if he has needs or does not, it is all the same to him . . . the soldier knows that the officer cannot do him any good, procure him any nicety, or help him with his needs; he only receives reprimands.' Within any reform, Griffon considered it paramount to re-establish mutual respect and affection between soldiers and officers.[93] As the comte de Melfort stated bluntly, 'the officer no longer regards his soldier as his own, the soldier no longer regards his captain as his father.'[94] Poor relations between officer and soldier not only decreased the morale of the soldier and gave him little recourse for his needs outside of desertion, but they also directly affected the soldier's performance in battle. 'Nothing is so brave,' M. St Analas touchingly stated, 'as the French soldier when he believes' and trusts in his commanding officer. Likewise, 'nothing is so weak or so beaten than him when he lacks confidence in those who command.'[95] Forming tighter bonds between soldier and officer was therefore an urgent concern. Reformers proposed that officers should be both distributors of rewards as well as disciplinarians. The captain, 'finding it in his interest to conserve the soldier,' should learn how to give his men, 'particular care.'[96] Though the French military system had very few opportunities for soldiers to advance in rank or ever become officers, reformers suggested creating a means of reward, through money or distinction that would foster mutually beneficial encouraging relations between soldier and officer. If achieved, this new relationship would also make the status of the soldier closer to that of a journeyman or apprentice working under a master and learning a respectable trade.

While contemplating methods of improving the soldiers already in the king's service, reformers also considered how to recruit soldiers from more honorable parts of society, and following their service, how best to return them to society. Both the marquis de Monteynard and the officer Sonhart favored men from the working classes in society – farmers, artisans, even members of the bourgeoisie – to the vagabonds and libertines that often filled the soldiers' ranks. Monteynard saw recruitment as best done by a captain choosing his own men with the help of soldiers already under his command, so as to be sure not to 'admit dubious young men of these young libertines' found in the bowels of the cities. He considered these types of men to be 'hardly robust and improper for war.'[97] Sonhart agreed that soldiers 'should be taken from the classes of citizens the most proper to furnish' young men 'susceptible to military education.' Sonhart in particular considered the 'young men recruited from the bourgeois and merchants of a little fortune' as having potential to 'become excellent soldiers,' because their education and upbringing rendered them 'susceptible to this energy that characterizes the nation.' He stipulated, however, that these young men would have to begin training no later than their teenage years, so that they could become accustomed to military work at an early age.[98]

Compared with the recruitment practices of Louis XIV's army through the Seven Years' War, when, to quote the maréchal de Saxe, one 'put money in the pocket of a man and called him a soldier,' recruiters and army officers earnestly desired to cull soldiers from areas of society that already provided some education and an honorable living. Officers further imagined a pleasant retirement or second career for a soldier after he had served in the king's army. Flavigny, who had also campaigned for higher pay for the soldiers, thought that the state should 'give the soldier the ability to learn a métier the last year of his service,' so that he would have an appropriate means to make a living for himself when he became too old or wounded for the army, or when his enlistment had expired.[99] Another officer considered it important to give veterans the opportunity to 'establish themselves' after their service had ended.[100] By recruiting soldiers directly from the citizenry and returning them to the citizenry with an active profession immediately following their final term of service, officers proposed, in effect, a closer relationship between soldiers and citizens. Soldiers themselves would be citizens (even if very young) before they entered the service, and would return to it afterwards. Such a system would ideally make the army seem less onerous to potential recruits, and soldiers less distasteful to the populace.

Reformers predicted that if their proposals advocating better conditions and recruitment practices came to pass, the French army would naturally improve, and veterans would win more esteem from the general public. One reformer encouraged honoring veterans publicly, because as 'the veterans grow in honor,' they will 'inspire in the youth a taste' for glory in the service of the state. 'The citizens full of veneration for these brave and old defenders' will add to the defense of the state themselves, while also welcoming the veteran back into society with honor.[101] Veterans who enjoyed the army, and who return to honest work in society will become a major asset in helping attract new recruits. Citizens who encounter these veterans will, according to this reformer, desire to serve the state as well. This proposed transformation must first begin by treating the soldiers as citizens, and cultivating in them the characteristics that would make them willingly desire to serve the state, out of a genuine affection for it.

By the early 1780s, the aristocratic inheritors of Louis XIV's army had recognized its inherent shortcomings and highlighted the plight and needs of its soldiers, desiring to amend the army by transforming them into citizens. After the loss of the Seven Years' War, both the general public and French officers recognized that the army required reform. Having ridiculed the incompetence of generals in the Seven Years' War and feeling embarrassed by the losses in America, India, and on the Continent, members of the reading public looked to the perfection of the ancient Greeks and Romans in warfare. Reading and writing about the ancients reminded French officers that the most successful and victorious armies required discipline and training, but above all patriotism and dedication to the *patrie*. Civilian citizens understood that the state of the army affected them, not just in terms of protecting the frontiers or securing empires, but in facilitating a virtuous society. In order to dispel social corruption, France had to see to its army.

Officers rose to that challenge. While the majority of their proposals never became concrete reforms, they portrayed a change in the French officer's approach to his métier. Consistent with views expressed in the reading public, French officer reform proposals centered on improving the physical condition of the soldier as well as his attitude toward the nation that he sacrificed his liberties to protect. French soldiers had long been the most despised members of the French nation, yet in the spirit of the hoped-for citizen army, reformers proposed changes that would effectively turn current French soldiers into worthy citizens.

These changes in the French army and the debates constantly swirling around them became more intense with the onset of a contemporary event that gave tremendous support to the ideas that patriotism was essential for a victorious army and virtuous society. From 1775 to 1783, the American War of Independence percolated across the 13 colonies, and the entire French nation watched with rapt attention. While the military reformers seemed concerned with citizen-izing French soldiers, the American Revolution, constantly present in French press, literature, pictures, and material culture, endorsed such changes, and perhaps even familiarized the French reading public with the idea of citizens becoming soldiers as an acceptable, even necessary, expression of patriotic fervor. The American Revolution would endorse and legitimize the ideas of equality, patriotism, and the feasibility of the citizen army that France both embraced and debated in the decades just prior to its own Revolution.

4

A Citizen Army in America

The image and perceptions of the American Revolution in France powerfully influenced French military thought and reform in the late eighteenth century. When the war broke out in 1775, France was already knee-deep in its intense efforts to reform the army, and civilian French writers had been puzzling for decades over how to create a more virtuous society and a more efficient army. While military reformers attempted to improve the army by elevating the soldier's status and increasing his sense of patriotism, they witnessed a tangible and contemporary example of victorious citizen soldiers across the Atlantic. A broader readership likewise embraced the American image of a citizen army fighting out of patriotism, and saw in the American Revolution proof that the virtue and patriotism of the ancient world had been reborn in the modern one.

The historiography concerning the American Revolution's effect on France has focused almost completely on comparing the American and French Revolutions or determining if the first actively caused the second – after all, the Treaty of Paris formally ended the American war in 1783, just six years before the fall of the Bastille. Coupled with France's close involvement in the American War for Independence, this short time span between the two Revolutions suggests the likelihood of some kind of relationship, perhaps even a causal one. Such close proximity has affected nearly all studies of the American Revolution's impact on eighteenth-century France. This chapter focuses on how the American Revolution, and more importantly its image, influenced French military thought both among army officers and the general public. Because the French army found itself in a state of reform and contemplating the possibilities of a citizen army during the American Revolution, accounts of hardy militiamen and simple citizen soldiers resonated strongly with

French readers and military reformers. Writing and reading about the American Revolution substantiated and advanced the citizen-army ideas already in place, which in turn moved the French army closer to its revolutionary role.

Since the days of Napoleon, French citizens and historians alike have reflected on the relationship between the French and American Revolutions. Denis Jean Florimond de Langlois, marquis du Bouchet, for example, participated in the American Revolutionary War as a volunteer under General Washington. When revolution broke out in France shortly after Bouchet's return, he emigrated out of fear for his life, only resuming his position as a French officer once Napoleon had firmly established himself as Emperor. Though he had been an eager supporter of the American Revolution, Bouchet later condemned it in his memoirs, saying that 'the English took their revenge on us and in the interest which we had in America, lighting the flame which embraced all of Europe, beginning with our own unfortunate country.'[1] This observation about the American Revolution's effect on France continued to dominate perceptions of the late eighteenth-century Atlantic revolutions until the mid-twentieth century. As writers commemorated the centennial of the American and French Revolutions, numerous publications heralded the amity and influence between the two countries and their respective Revolutions.[2]

For many of these historians, the French army seemed an obvious place for the revolutionary handoff. Some scholars have posited that – whether as volunteers under George Washington's command or as part of Rochambeau's army – French officers and soldiers drew on their participation in this revolutionary moment to initiate radical changes in their own country. Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette remains the quintessential figure in this explanatory chain. He is well known to historians and the general public alike for disobeying his king's commands in order to serve in the American colonies, which he considered a 'safe and venerable asylum of virtue, of honesty, of tolerance, of equality, and of peaceful liberty.'[3] In both America and France, he remains an important revolutionary figure, and he has played a central role in the historiographies of both Revolutions for over two centuries.[4] Lafayette was so unapologetic in his admiration of the American Revolution and his desire for the French to experience their own, that popular minds as well as scholarly minds point to him as evidence that the American Revolution was a principal cause for the French Revolution. It was with this assumption in mind that historians of the 1970s, especially Gilbert Bodinier and Sam Scott, combed through the archives in order to establish the definitive path of revolutionary transference from America to France.[5]

Bodinier and Scott's research revealed, however, that few officers responded to their experience in North America as Lafayette had done. Most officers who had participated in the American Revolution opposed the Revolution in France, and a majority of them, including Lafayette, eventually emigrated for fear of their lives as the Revolution progressed. While Forrest MacDonald attempted to prove that French soldiers in America may have adopted revolutionary yearnings, his classic article could only suggest such a connection.[6]

While it would appear that the French officers and soldiers who served in America did not bring revolution to France, the American Revolution did have powerful, if subconscious, cultural effects in France. These cultural effects were initially manifested in contemporary discussions on patriotism and the link between citizenship and military power. By fitting so neatly into ongoing discussions in France regarding military and social reform and the possibility of a citizen army, the American Revolution created powerful resonances in France.

Most French army officers and interested civilians learned of the events of the American Revolution from the *Gazette de Leyde*, a French-language paper printed in the Netherlands, or *Gazette de France*, a French court paper. Together they sold nearly 15,000 copies twice a week, a sufficient number to ensure widespread readership among the elite.[7] Owing to its thorough descriptions of major European battles, the *Gazette de Leyde* in particular helped military professionals stay abreast of developments on the battlefield, and French officers were regular subscribers.[8] Both regularly published on the American Revolution,[9] but the *Gazette de Leyde* in particular advocated for the American cause, as its editor, Jean Luzac, harbored a decidedly pro-American bias, relying heavily on Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin for reports and information on the war.[10] It was also one of the top-selling newspapers in Europe.[11] Together, the papers constructed an image of the American army and militia that eerily matched the image of ancient warfare so prevalent in reform literature. Conditioned by the writings of the ancients, French readers would have viewed the American forces though a 'classical republican' lens.

According to long-established notions of citizen warfare, citizen armies could only fight defensive wars, and beginning with the Battles of Concord and Lexington, both newspapers cast the British army in the role of the aggressor. In reporting on the Battle of Lexington, for example, the *Gazette de Leyde* included a graphic description of the 'ravages' that the British supposedly committed against American citizens.

Following the battle, 'a great number of houses on the way were pillaged and destroyed, some of them were burned, women who were in their beds were chased naked down the road by the [British] soldiers, who killed old men in cold blood in their homes.' The letters placed on British troops the blame for 'scenes of horror so dark, that they would dishonor the annals of even the most barbaric nations.'[12] The *Gazette de Leyde* added that General Gage reported that he and his men simply carried out orders, destroying only colonial stores of weapons and supplies, but in printing the American account first, with its dramatic language and graphic imagery, both the *Gazette de Leyde* and the *Gazette de France* framed the American war as a colonial response to British aggression.[13]

French readers would have compared these Americans to the ancient Romans and Spartans for exhibiting natural, war-like conduct. They seemed hardier than the enemy, due to rigorous exercise and their acclimation to 'the excessive heat' or cold of their environment, as well as to local diseases.[14] This toughness alone helped them while fighting the British, who 'succumbed to the heat and exhaustion.'[15] One paper described the American army as a group 'of men, who, from their childhood, are accustomed to work, [and] firing a rifle in good manner.'[16] American soldiers had occupations other than soldiering – most were farmers or artisans. The pay for soldiering was minimal, yet the Americans demonstrated a great 'ardor for battle.'[17] By this account, the citizen-warriors of America matched Servan's ideal of the citizen soldier perfectly, being brought up with the expectation to fight in defense of their country and therefore trained while very young.[18] These traits were highlighted on the battlefield, as the majority of the battle accounts depicted the troops' 'love of combat.'[19] British letters stated that 'the Americans equal our soldiers in courage'; they triumphed despite 'inconceivable exhaustion' and even Washington reported that the militia 'assembled in the most courageous manner, firmly resolved to . . . give us as much aid as possible.'[20] Such accounts must have evoked images of ancient warriors fighting on American soil.

In keeping with the themes of training and discipline, the two *gazettes* presented the American officers as educated patriots, whose concern for their country informed their leadership. Because America did not have an aristocratic tradition, social status did not necessarily influence military rank. The *gazettes* printed a few brief biographies of some of the officers, enough to give the impression that they had a great deal of experience and expertise, earned the respect of their soldiers and fellow citizens, and merited their ranks. Like the disciplined ancients, these officers received 'instruction in the art of war in a country where that art is held at the highest degree.'[21] Because these officers could not expect a rise in social rank or a promotion at court, the *gazettes* inferred that they served out of patriotic duty alone.

Though these tough, home-grown patriots seemed a far cry from the noble officers that populated the upper French ranks, the newspapers also presented more genteel aspects of the Americans that must have seemed comforting and familiar to elite expectations. The *Gazette de France* reported an instance in which American General Gates hosted a formal dinner party for British General Burgoyne. Although a board sitting on two barrels served as a dining table, and the meal consisted of watered down rum and plain fare from the officers' mess, both gentlemen enjoyed each other's company and ended the meal toasting their respective chiefs.[22] General Howe recounted in a letter how British General Gage and his family did not have sufficient food until American General Putnam learned of their condition and 'sent Mrs. Gage a quarter of freshly killed veal.'[23] These actions demonstrated that the Americans were more than mere backwoods fighters who believed in their country's cause – they had goodwill, good manners, and good taste, and they recognized the class distinctions in the British army by demonstrating a level of decorum and politeness. These glimpses of American gentility demonstrated that Americans were not wholly divorced from European manners. Americans further refused to starve the British out of New York, which the newspapers reported as an 'example of humanity, which distinguished, during the entire course of the war, the conduct of the American commanders.' This conduct even wooed German mercenaries, who came, over the course of the war, 'to the side of the Americans.'[24] Such reported gestures of mercy and humanity to the enemy at wartime evoked Phocion's maxim that 'the one virtue superior to love of country was love of humanity.'[25]

Rivaling the civic vigor of the Romans and Greeks, patriotic Americans responded to the British attack on their *patrie* by repelling those troops with 'full exertion of [their] power.' Both *gazettes* printed abridged versions of the 'Declaration of the Causes and the Necessity of Taking up Arms,' Congress's explanation for the violence between British and Provincial troops, as well as an outline of the conditions necessary for peace. Consistent with the spirit of Guibert's citizen soldier who 'will perish to the last man if necessary,'[26] Congress declared the American people 'unanimously resolved to die as free men rather than to live in slavery . . . We do not fight for vain glory nor conquest. We will cease hostilities when hostilities have ceased on the part of the aggressors . . . but not before.'[27] Later in the war, after several exaggerated reports of British brutality against American homesteads, the *Gazette de Leyde* printed a phrase from Congress reminiscent of Guibert's citizen soldier being 'terrible in his anger.'[28] If the British soldiers 'persist in their current acts of barbarism, we will take such an exemplary vengeance that it will inspire such a terror' as to put an end to the violent actions.[29]

Near the war's end, the *gazettes* reported George Washington having difficulty dismissing his soldiers, because several of them wished to stay in the army as volunteers. Washington praised 'their zeal and their love for the country,' but insisted they return to their homes. The men departed, but 'with reluctance, and they gave all the assurances the most solemn of their disposition to return, as soon as the interest of their country required it.'[30] The numbers that the *gazettes* reported reinforced this concept of a passionate American citizen army: out of a population of 2.4 million people, 600,000 men, or one colonist of every four, participated in either the American army or local militia.[31] Even Quakers, a community of pacifists, had reportedly constituted their own company of soldiers![32] The remaining members of society contributed to the war effort by making saltpeter for gunpowder or military clothing.[33] As Mably had said of the Greeks, 'each citizen was a soldier. Not knowing how to die for the *patrie* would have been an infamy.'[34] And indeed, according to the reports of the papers, the entire American 'nation' mobilized for war and provided military support for any colony under attack. Shortly after the battles of Lexington and Concord, the *Gazette de Leyde* reported that Connecticut 'offered 10,000 men to New York' in preparation for the ensuing British attack.[35] In 1777, once the war was well under way, American soldiers who busily attempted to replace lost supplies from their magazines in Danburg and Ridgefield 'received much help from the other colonies.'[36]

The *gazettes* were further attuned to the Americans' domestic political culture, which, reminiscent of Rousseau's description of the celebratory yet sober Roman fêtes, consisted of festivals celebrating their independence and commemorating their fallen comrades. Perhaps the most extravagant reports of patriotism appeared in September 1777, when the papers recounted how the Americans celebrated the first anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. In Boston, citizens marked the Fourth of July 'with all the enthusiasm that can inspire a *fête* that recognizes the liberty of Republican souls.'[37] The *Gazette de Leyde* reported that all 13 colonies, 'broke publicly and gloriously the sword which Britain had forged for them; and generously took back the rights that God and Nature had accorded to mankind.'[38] Both newspapers reported the memorials that the army dedicated to their fallen soldiers and officers, reminiscent of Rollin's description of Athens' 'august religious ceremonies' and monuments erected in the memory of fallen citizens. According to the *Gazette de Leyde*, the very tombstone of the beloved General Montgomery accomplished this goal by exclaiming, 'What more noble destiny could the virtue of a patriot desire!'[39]

In short, as portrayed by the *gazettes*, the American war matched the French understanding of a citizen army in nearly every respect: the citizens were invested in the outcome of the war, united in defense of their homeland, and fought for a just government, while citing patriotism as their prime motivation. As a result, they were waging a successful war against one of the most powerful armies in Europe, one that had defeated the French army just 13 years before. As a perfect illustration of this patriotic citizen army, the *Gazette de Leyde* printed a story of the Connecticut militia, which was desperate for more troops. When the governor appealed to men who had extensive families, and thus were officially exempt from military service, they responded to the appeal *en masse*. The reporter for the *gazette* extolled them: 'The example of these respectable citizens proves to what degree patriotism raises their hearts, and how difficult it will be to subjugate a people, in which the vast majority know how to sacrifice their familial ties and their most valued personal interests to save the *patrie* in danger.'[40] Such praise conjured Rollin's description of the ancient Athenians, who for their 'ardent love of liberty . . . abandoned, without the least regret, their lands, estates, city, and houses,' to defend their freedoms against a 'common enemy.'[41] The Americans provided contemporary proof that patriotism brought military success.[42]

By 1777, as America and France drew closer to a military alliance, the newspapers began explicitly referring to the Americans as ancients. General Washington in particular received praise, being compared to the 'great men of antiquity' for his willingness to defend and make sacrifices for his country,[43] and his strategies put journalists in mind of a 'modern Fabius.'[44] Concerning the American army as a whole, the *Gazette de Leyde* reported its troops possessing 'the most noble motives . . . their common goal is liberty, the same principle directed the armies of Rome in the days of their glory.'[45] While French readers must have already seen the parallels between their ancient heroes and the American patriots, by 1777 the connection between the ancients and the Americans must have been undeniable. From reading about the contemporary ancients, the reading public must have seen that it was still possible for the French to achieve military superiority over their rivals, and that citizen warfare, following the models of Guibert and Servan, was the key for doing so.

As reflected in the pages of contemporary journals, French participation in the American Revolution only increased Americans' already extreme patriotic impulses and simultaneously glorified the French army. Both the *Gazette de Leyde* and *Gazette de France* characterized monetary and military French aid as assurance that the Americans would finally win the war. With the signing of the treaty of Amity and Commerce, Congress publicly declared that, 'France grants us all the assistance that we asked of them, and there is reason to believe that they will not be long in taking a greater part by declaring against Britain.'[46] The promised provisions of French troops appeared in the *gazettes* as a promise on behalf of France to achieve America's 'liberty, their sovereignty, and their absolute and unlimited independence.' By the *gazette*'s account, this promise excited 'sentiments of confidence and affection.' All that remained for the war-weary American fighters was to 'persevere,' and they would be 'assured peace, lasting liberty, glory, and sovereignty' for themselves and their children.[47]

Both *gazettes* cast the French army as a benevolent force aiding a grateful and struggling patriotic army. When General Rochambeau and his troops arrived at Newport, the Americans greeted them 'with illuminations and fêtes.' Shortly after his arrival, Rochambeau needed about 300 men to help construct a redoubt, and the American militia responded instantly. Rochambeau reportedly offered them 'bread, meat, whiskey, and money,' but the American militiamen refused, saying 'you come to fight for us [and] that is our compensation,' and for three days they worked 'as hard as galley-slaves but with the greatest gaiety.'[48] The presence of the French army only increased Americans' patriotism. The *Gazette de Leyde* credited the arrival of the French army with a sudden upsurge in the number of American soldiers to the tune of ten thousand volunteers offering their service to General Washington.[49] Such reports both celebrated American civic spirit and elevated the status of the French army, which had been longing for an opportunity to exhibit its military prowess.

The extent to which the image of Americans as citizen warriors saturated educated society is evident in the *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique*, a newspaper used by the French government to garner support for the American war against Britain.[50] Though the paper was primarily a propaganda tool, the editors disguised it as an impartial *gazette* by portraying it as a French-language periodical printed in Antwerp, much like the *Gazette de Leyde*. The comte de Vergennes, France's minister of foreign affairs, heavily subsidized the paper and oversaw its publication in Paris. Edmé-Jaques Genêt, a zealous advocate of the American cause, edited the paper and received several written contributions from Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, who were in France negotiating for military aid.[51] They supplied the periodical with copies of the Declaration of Independence, state constitutions, and letters and reports from American newspapers that were often reprinted in full. Franklin and Adams not only supplied materials from America, but wrote some of the 'articles' themselves.[52] In addition to these contributions, the paper included transcripts of several debates in the British parliament and articles from the British newspaper *The Remembrancer*. The paper dealt primarily with issues of commerce, but the few articles that reported news of the actual war extolled the American army for its virtue and military prowess, much like the other two *gazettes*. That the monarchy would so heavily emphasize the success of a perceived republican army and disparage the army of the English monarchy suggests how deeply the image of the citizen army penetrated the consciousness of European elites.

As portrayed by the *Affaires*, the British army suffered from some of the same shortcomings as the French army, especially difficulties in recruiting soldiers and hiring mercenaries. When the revolutionary war began, the British government contracted several thousand German mercenaries to supplement their forces in America. In what appears to be a transcript of a debate in Parliament concerning the use of Hessians in the American war, the *Affaires* reported Lord Shelburne's critique of employing mercenaries and the 'machine fighting' that resulted.[53] Other members of Parliament were concerned over the cost of the Hessians, their likely fraternization with German-speaking colonists in Pennsylvania, and the image of Britain abroad if she could not supply her own troops.[54] In arguing against mercenaries, Shelburne himself alluded to Guibert's *Essai*, which revealed 'the pitiful mechanism of foreign military discipline. There, you would learn to judge the inadequacy of a similar aid, by the difference in bravery between the soldiers who fight for their liberty and their possessions, and the machines for whom merit consists solely of maneuvers and who fight without the least interest in the quarrel of the Prince who pays them.'[55]

Whether or not Lord Shelburne actually spoke these words to his fellow members of parliament, in printing this speech the *Affaires* offered a stunning portrayal of the British parliament criticizing its own military according to the now widely familiar terms of citizen warfare. Lord Shelburne's ideas about mercenaries revealed how widespread and accepted Guibert's *Essai* had become in Europe, and further supported the French papers' portrayal of the American military as a citizen army. The British parliament appeared to recognize the difference in the quality of fighting when soldiers fought for personal reasons or beliefs rather than for the whim of a monarch. The Americans, fighting for their own interests, would fight more effectively than the Hessian mercenaries interested only in being paid. The idea of a citizen army, which the French described in writing and which the Americans apparently enacted on the battlefield, was not a mere French fancy but an idea that had begun to shake traditional military thinking.

The excitement and certainty with which the French readers embraced this exaggerated and fictionalized American image in the *gazettes* is apparent in the grandiose ways French readers and writers replicated the image through a variety of mediums. The *gazettes*' presentation of the American army and militia was so popular that an eager market devoured reproductions of it in the form of novels, clothes, histories, poems, and art. Illustrated books and cartoons meant that even non-readers could appreciate the revolutionary triumph across the Atlantic. Fashionable women, from either the second or third estates, could wear 'America' in their clothes, hats, or hair. Even philosophers and history writers who adopted a more academic tone to describe the events of the American Revolution produced works consistent with popular imagination.

French readers were so eager for further accounts of the American war that its first history was published in 1778 as a history of the war to date. Paul Ulrich Du Buisson's history, entitled *A Precise Guide to the Anglo-American Revolution since its beginning in the year 1774 until the first of January 1778*, centered on the history of the people in the war and their attitude toward the fighting. By his account, the American people were fundamentally 'farmers and warriors,' who were powerfully armed against their metropole.[56] Before the English government pushed the colonists into war, 'their courage had been inert,' but by 1774, it had 'become a lively force.'[57] Every kind of American patriot found a way to be useful in the effort against Britain, including 'an old man of 84 years,' who, when the militia assembled in Massachusetts to face the British Army at Lexington, 'put himself among the ranks, with the others.' As he took his place, he said, 'with truly heroic magnanimity, "My death can still be useful; I will put myself in front of one who is younger than me, and will receive the bullet intended for him".'[58]

Like the *gazettes*, Buisson maintained the important distinction that the British had been the aggressors in this war, and he reiterated

Guibert's expectation that a citizen army, terrible in its anger, would unleash an absolute force against those who had disturbed its peace. Buisson described the early battles of Lexington and Concord as a group of 'Royalists' who 'fired on [militiamen] with their pistols,' killing eight men at Lexington. On their way to Concord, they were met by several companies of militia, numbering 2,800 men 'burning to exact revenge for the insult they had received.'[59] Shortly after this event, George Washington, whom Buisson described as a 'very rich inhabitant of Virginia' with a vast plantation, 'uprooted his plow for the interest of the Republic in danger.' Like the Roman hero Cincinnatus, he raised and supplied an army entirely of his own expense.[60] Buisson's work focused on other famous patriots, and he lingered over patriotic deaths and famous funeral speeches, especially the speech that extolled the fallen patriot Dr Joseph Warren, a patriot leader from Massachusetts who died at the Battle of Bunker Hill.[61] His funeral oration, a favorite among French authors, called American citizens to arms. Owing to his 'courage and zeal for liberty,' Dr Warren was 'placed in the ranks of his own heroes.' The funeral orator declared, 'Citizens, he is not dead,' but lives, 'in the souls of his compatriots.' Citizens who could not bear arms were told to 'embrace' those that could, 'and may your last wish for them be that they return victorious or die like Warren in the arms of glory and liberty.'[62] Such accounts advanced the image of Americans as virtuous warriors, who view the death of their fellow countrymen, not as a reason to mourn the dead, but as an inspiration to live out their patriotic duty. Finally, Buisson cast the American war as a universal concern. When George Washington decided to invade Canada, he declared that 'the cause of America and of liberty has become the cause of all virtuous citizens.'[63] While Washington addressed these words to Canadians, French readers, who considered themselves virtuous citizens, could not have helped but understand that the American cause was theirs, too.

Little changed in the tone and presentation of the American Revolution in other histories, even those that were written well after the war ended. David Ramsay, an American writer, produced a history of the war as it transpired solely in the Carolinas, and the French translation of his work, appearing in 1788, also perpetuated the *gazettes*' image of the American army and militia, indulging in sentimental presentation of fallen patriots and sacrifices made on behalf of the *patrie*. Like Buisson, Ramsay recounted that the American people's 'lively sense of liberty,' made living under British rule impossible, and they preferred to 'die free.'[64] By rebelling against their monarch, they followed 'the duty of the good citizen' to defend themselves and their threatened *patrie*.

Ramsay also focused much of his book on battle accounts and patriotic vignettes. Sergeant MacDonald, for example, was mortally wounded by a cannon ball, and he 'used the few moments' between the blow and his imminent death 'to exhort his comrades to remain firm in the cause for their *patrie* and their liberty.'[65] Such an account may have reminded French readers of the Chevalier Bayard, a sixteenth-century warrior celebrated in the eighteenth century for urging his comrades to abandon him 'without fear and without reproach' when he was fatally wounded in battle.[66] Another citizen soldier, Moyse Allen, served as a chaplain in the Georgia brigade, and enjoyed a reputation for bravery, always fighting in the front lines in battle and 'looking on all occasions for the most dangerous and most honorable post.' This patriot died heroically while trying to escape from a British prison ship. Knowing he would drown in the endeavor, Allen preferred to die 'in recovering his liberty,' rather than remain a prisoner.[67] Reports of American battles typically consisted of clever American tactics that surprised and confused the British forces. Americans owed their success on the battlefield not to training and discipline, but their 'sincere attachment to the cause of independence.'[68] These works only exaggerated the *gazettes*' image of the patriotic American citizen army, and factual or not, French readers embraced this image in official histories, as they would in other genres.

The American Revolution as portrayed in the *gazettes* entered French psyches in subtler ways. Novelists, such as Michel-René Hilliard d'Auberteuil, used real events in America as the inspiration for sentimental stories that highlighted the dramatic and glorious context of the American Revolution. In his *Mis Mac Rea, roman historique*, based on the possibly real tragedy of Jane McCrea, Jenny, a young woman living in New York with her father, falls in love with a dashing British officer.[69] When her elderly father flies to the aid of General Washington, Jenny conspires with her maid, Betsey, to meet her lover in secret. She is surprised when he tries to seduce her, but promises to marry him as soon as possible. On her journey to his camp, where they plan to wed, however, she is attacked and killed by Indians, who are collecting American scalps for the British. This woeful tale of tragic love highlighted 'one of the most brilliant and atrocious wars' in history in order to contrast 'American innocence with the vices of Europe.' When Nathanial, Jenny's father, hears that Washington's army has been defeated and has fled to Whiteplains, he rallies the neighboring young men and leads them to join Washington in battle. 'My friends,' he says, 'while winter has whitened my hair, it has not frozen my courage; I want to march as your leader, and show you the path of duty and honor.' He did not fear European mercenaries, because 'they do not know liberty, which has toughened us to fight.' By the end of his patriotic speech, the young men have rallied 'to defend [the *patrie*] until the last drop of their blood' is spilt. Like the old man in Buisson's history, Nathanial explains to his daughter that despite his age, he can still be useful by saving the life of a younger man. As he leaves his daughter, he reminds her that the tyrants 'have only discipline and cruelty,' while the Americans have 'courage,' and will be 'victors in turn.' D'Auberteuil then meticulously paints the departing patriots, 'poorly clothed and with bare feet,' but at the same time, 'joyful and full of ardor.' They have little food, but fellow citizens present them with meat, fruit, and medicines, and young women promise to marry them on their return.[70] Such a stirring scene exhibits the extent to which French readers embraced the citizen army image, and works like this continued to sustain the popularity of the citizen army.

Poetic representations of the American army made even tighter connections between the American patriots and the ancients they apparently resembled. M. Baumier's poem, *Hommage à la Patrie*, further perpetuated the image of the Americans as modern ancients:

> The soul of Fabius wandered the earth
> Searching for the last temple of morals and liberty,
> A place that even for tyrants has worth …
> Of Europe's troubles and chains, he was not impressed
> And he crossed the vast ocean into the west
> Where he saw an improvised land, a Shadow of Rome
> Which touched his noble pride, where the land met the foam
> August Liberty, he saw had settled in Boston
> And as Fabius's soul embraced that of Washington
> Their two souls melded, and became one.[71]

This poem embraces America as the new Rome, and exalts George Washington's soul as the same as the ancient Roman Fabius: a general famous for finding clever ways for defeating superior forces, and who also enjoyed a reputation as an authoritative and just ruler. As an indictment of European corruption and weaknesses, Fabius feels more at home in America, especially in the soul of its leading citizen-warrior-general, than among Europeans.

French readers could literally see the American army in action with François Godefroy and Nicolas Ponée's illustrated history of the American Revolution, a series of engravings with detailed captions depicting the major scenes and surrenders of the war. Their version of the American Revolution spanned Florida, the Caribbean, and Spain, as well as North America, emphasizing the conflict's global aspects. Their scenes from North America, however, almost uniquely focused on the actions of the citizen army, rather than on the congress or the economic potential of a newly liberated American ally. One scene, for example, portrayed the surrender of British General Burgoyne to American General Horatio Gates (Figure 4.1). The caption reads: 'Burgoyne's well-disciplined soldiers put down their weapons before the American militia


N° 4
SARRATOGA.
Le 17 Octobre 1777, le général Burgoine avec 6040 Soldats bien disciplinés met bas les armes devant les milices Americaines nouvellement tirees de l'Agriculture et conduite par Horatio Gates.
PRECIS DE CETTE CAMPAGNE.

Figure 4.1 Sarratoga: le 17 Octobre 1777, le Général Burgoine avec 6040 Soldats Bien Disciplinés Met Bas les Armes Devant les Milices Americaines Nouvellement Tirees de l'Agriculture et Conduite par Horatio Gates. Godefroy, François, engraver; after Louis-François-Sebastien Fauvel, artist. The Robert Charles Lawrence Fergusson Collection, The Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, D.C.

newly-raised from their farms and led by Horatio Gates.'[72] While this image is replete with inaccuracies, it faithfully represents what French viewers desired to see. The American militiamen, sporting plumed hunting hats on the right of the image, are hearty, ordered, and seem to be unsurprised in their victory. The British army, on the other hand, seems weak and distraught, as if unable to comprehend their loss to militia 'newly raised from their farms.' The numbers of the Americans, and their upright posture, also assert their ownership of the land, while the British on the left seem bent over and sparse. To the casual viewer, the citizen army outmatches what appears to be a comparatively delicate or feeble army from Europe.

Members of the non-military French elite found their own ways of embracing the victorious American citizen by wearing it as a high fashion of the day. Jouy, a fabric company that catered to wealthy women of the third estate, wove dress fabrics presenting allegorical American scenes. In one scene, George Washington is standing in his carriage, pulled by leopards, and led by an American Indian holding an American flag, while a second Amerindian blows a trumpet. In the carriage with Washington sits an Amerindian woman holding a shield that proclaims 'America Independent ANCE 1776.' In the left hand corner of this scene, cannon balls, shields, and armor are leaning against a self-labeled 'liberty tree.' In the background of this scene, American solders sit on horseback with guns and flags. The freeing of America is evidently a militarily important event, and this scene in particular presents America as a militarily strong country, led by citizen-general George Washington. In addition to these dress fabrics, women could wear their hair in 'American curls,' or as a way to show off the *Belle Poule*, a French ship which won a naval battle against the British in 1778. Those who were not inclined to wear these physically demanding styles could don a 'New England Hat,' a high and heavily decorated version of an American mob cap. This visual representation of the American Revolution again perpetuated the glory of the American citizen army, but also showed that the consumers of this image were not restricted to military men, or even male French readers, but included wealthy ladies of fashion.[73]

The American Revolution in France was more than a product to be sold or a fashion statement to be made. Many *philosophes* responded to the American war with awe and elation, as though this event proved the validity of their previous musings. These *philosophes* reveled in the role of the citizen in making the Revolution and new nation, and the citizens' willingness to take up arms against tyrannical oppression. According to Raynal, Americans understood their own time as 'an era of momentous revolution,' in which this fateful event 'will forever decide the regrets or the admiration of posterity.' Raynal dated the beginning of the Revolution to the closing of the Boston port, an action that caused American citizens to discuss their problems in public places, and publish rallying pamphlets. He characterized these pamphlets as a call to action, and quoted their fiery and determined language: 'Rise up, therefore, O Americans! Never has the region that you inhabit been so covered with somber clouds. They call you rebels, because you do not want to be taxed by any other than your representatives. Justify this pretension by your courage, or seal it forever with the loss of your blood.' When Great Britain responded to American resistance by sending troops, Raynal focused on how America became 'occupied with its defense. The citizens there became soldiers.'[74]

Like the histories, literature, and images that presented the American Revolution to attentive members of French society, Raynal's account of the Revolution centered on the actions of individual citizens uniting against a tyrannical and oppressive government, who were eventually pushed to take up arms for the defense of their freedom-loving way of life. By Raynal's reckoning, Americans recognized the importance of their decision to take up arms against Britain, and that doing so would win them the 'admiration' of future generations, unlike the less-enlightened rioters in France. Raynal pointed out that the irony of the American Revolution lay in its principles. 'These principles,' he said, are 'born in Europe and especially in England,' but 'have been transplanted to America through philosophy.' The Americans took that philosophy, and then used it 'against the metropole that invented it.'[75] Unlike Europeans who philosophize, but whose musings produce little action, these enlightened Americans put Enlightenment principles into practice, and lived the philosophy that Raynal and his contemporaries could only write about. This philosophical base gave the American Revolution a legitimacy that had been absent in any mere peasant rebellion in France or England and separated it from the bloody insurrections in Corsica.[76] Raynal's one regret about the newly established United States was his inability ever to see it for himself. 'Heroic country,' he laments, 'my advanced age does not permit me to visit you. I will die without having seen the period of tolerance, of morals, of laws, of virtue, of liberty. But I would have desired it, and my last words will be prayers addressed to heaven for your prosperity.'[77]

Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, author of the *Conversations with Phocion*, affirmed the idea that the American Revolution had been a fulfillment of certain Enlightenment principles. Compared with Europe, where governments 'do not see citizens as anything other than farm animals who are governed for the particular advantage of property owners,' America's emerging republic upheld the dignity of its constituents. Mably expressed deep gratification that the 'thirteen republics' decided to 'draw on the sources of the wisest philosophy [and] human principles by which to govern themselves.' Specifically, Mably, himself a connoisseur and champion of the ancients, saw in America the revival of Greek and Roman glory. He counted on the new states to 'renew the spectacle' of ancient Greece. Whereas for a long time 'the politics of Europe have been founded on money and commerce' leaving no trace of 'the ancient virtues,' Mably had hopes that they 'could be reborn in America.' He saw the same virtues of ancient Rome thrive in America, those of 'love of country, of liberty, and of glory.' In his excitement about the possibilities of the new American Republic, Mably even dared to venture that the United States might outshine its ancient forbearers. He observed to John Adams that Americans 'find yourselves today in a happier situation than the ancient republics that we admire as the most wise and virtuous; and that you can with less trouble stamp your establishments with a character of stability that render the laws the dearest and most respectable.'[78] With so much virtue and with such a promising future, Mably, like Raynal, confirmed with a philosopher's penetrating insight that the American Revolution had brought the *philosophes*' wildest fantasies to life. America, owing to its citizen-based society, eagerness for military glory, and republican foundation would reinvigorate and perhaps even surpass the ancients who had served as the pinnacle of civilization for so long.

This variety of genres portraying the American Revolution, from history to hats, speaks to its broad appeal that cut across multiple areas of French society. It stood as a screen on which France could project any number of fantasies or desires.[79] It therefore served to strengthen, support, endorse, underscore, or emphasize contemporary French interests in any subject they wanted to put it to – including patriotism and citizen armies. The fact that so many different interpretations and genres focused on parallels between the American and ancient citizen armies shows how deeply this desire to 'make society more military' had penetrated French consciousness. The attractions of a citizen army were not just tempting to military men actively trying to reform the French army, but to other citizens of France, from high thinkers, to fashionable ladies, to illiterate urban workers soaking in American images.

The moral appeal of this American war more importantly gave France a chance to reinvent itself. Still reeling from the loss of the Seven Years'

War and the accompanying humiliation, French readers saw an opportunity to recast their country as a military force to be reckoned with. While Rochambeau's army had few opportunities to showcase its abilities – its only major battle was Yorktown – French authors made much of its participation. Especially after 1777, with French money and, eventually, troops officially committed to the American cause, French writers, readers, and artists redrew France not as a product of Old World Europe, but as the midwife of a republic and a monarchy of liberty. In the hands of *philosophes*, historians, poets, and artists, France would be the mentor of this new Rome, taking part in its ancient virtues and assisting its victorious armies.

Without diminishing the Americans' military acumen, French authors made a point of showcasing the French army at its best. Longchamps, in his three-volume *Impartial History* of the war, focused primarily on the French in his account of Yorktown. He credited Rochambeau with ending the siege, adding that the baron de Vioménil and the M. le vicomte de Deux-Ponts were 'particularly distinguished in the attack' for their bravery and cool-headedness. Longchamps reserved his greatest praise, however, for the marquis de Lafayette, 'who played the biggest part in this great enterprise.' By Longchamps's account, Lafayette singlehandedly moved General Cornwallis to surrender, and commanded the respect and admiration of all those present, including the English, as 'a great man of war,' despite his young age; Cornwallis even insisted on surrendering to him![80] Longchamps's work complimented the English on their bravery and generalship, but 'the patriotism of the English cannot surpass that of the French.'[81] The American war provided France not only an opportunity to confront Britain, but, as Longchamps's over-the-top account of Lafayette at Yorktown suggests, also to showcase French heroism and its increasingly patriotic army.

Because of French actions in the American Revolution, French poets could now put their pens to work on verses that flattered French generals. One anonymous author commemorated the end of the war with a long poem on how France delivered America from its chains of servitude under Britain, in which 'valiant' Rochambeau, too valiant to fear any danger, bravely led French soldiers into the fray. The baron Vioménil received praise as 'the idol, the glory, and the blood of the state,' and young comte de Noailles, who entered the American Revolution near its conclusion, received encouragement to pursue his 'brilliant career,' so that the English would 'taste the dust under the force of your blows.'[82] To commemorate the victory at Yorktown, Caron de Chasnet composed some verses on the 'double victory' of Rochambeau and Lafayette that he dedicated to their wives. In addition to praising the two generals, Chasnet lauded their soldiers, who were so 'courageous' that upon being committed to the American cause by King Louis XVI, they 'looked to brave a thousand new perils,' in order to land on America shores. With French victories, American officers were no longer the only ones who merited comparisons to the ancients, but now 'the name of Rochambeau' could be counted with Washington's among those of 'Cesar, of Augustus, and of Cato.' French officers merited ancient parallels. The entire event glorified France, and its authors reveled in it. As the poet declared, 'How this event is flattering for France! It augments its glory as well as its power.'[83] Minimizing Britain's influence did increase French power, but it was the alliance with an army worthy of the ancients that glorified France.

While French poets were not stinting in their praise of French officers and soldiers, their verses pale in comparison to the hearty gratitude that other French writers imagined as the American response to French aid. In his *Impartial History*, Longchamps quoted Washington's touching sentiments toward Louis XVI's 'attachment to the American cause,' which motivated him to send 'an army [that is] distinguished as much by their officers as by their soldiers' to the Americans' aide. This action, Washington continued, 'inspire[s] in all citizens of the United States the sentiments of inalterable gratitude' for this 'shining success that we have just obtained.'[84] Considering that Washington shared the soul of Fabius himself, this was high praise indeed for the French army. One author pointed out that if the great Washington is no longer dependent on the English, it is because of the French army's aid.[85] Others focused on American gratitude and relief. When the two armies meet for the first time in a sentimental play by J.L. Le Barbier, the playwright has General Washington order his 'soldiers and fellow Americans' to embrace the French 'defenders whom heaven has destined for us.' The sentiments of common American citizens are represented first by an old Virginian whose only son has died in battle. He tells his daughter-in-law and grandson that this meeting 'is sweet for our hearts . . . I would like to die of love and of joy in the arms of the French.' Turning his eyes heavenward, he gives thanks to God for 'the happiness of fixing my last looks on the friendly and intrepid warriors.' His daughter-in-law expresses similar joy in finally seeing 'these brave and generous defenders of our liberty.' She agrees with Washington in seeing the divine nature of the French army, saying that 'heaven avenges us in giving us a good king as an ally and protector.' Even her young son, upon catching sight of the French army, exclaims, 'Maman, my heart beats with joy.'[86] The praise of these common Americans speaks significantly to the ways that the French writers used the American Revolution to rethink the image of the French army. Rather than being an army of conquest, fighting with other European nations for dominance of a particular area of land or trade route, the French army at this moment was an army defending a young republic, protecting a virtuous citizenry from tyrannical oppression.

The French monarchy likewise received a new image during the American Revolution as one that enabled the birth of a republic; because the French monarchy understood the importance of liberty and human rights, it could provide protection against an oppressive tyrant. The values and virtues of France's monarchical institution appeared conducive to working with a republic and its new ancient citizen soldiers, setting the tone for Louis XVI's kingship as one dedicated to liberty. A poem chronicling the stay of Ben Franklin in France had him calling on Louis XVI's 'abundant goodness.' He described the sad state of the people of Boston (who represented general American misfortunes in many French renderings). 'We are exposed to our worst nightmares,' he said, and only Louis XVI, a 'great king' could 'deign to break [American] chains.'[87] Americans celebrated Louis XVI, as a monarch, who, unlike the British monarch, would do anything to help them.[88] Louis's generosity as a leader extended to his own people, as the 'governing Citizen of his subjects.'[89] Here, the author seems to attribute to Louis XVI some of the qualities typically attributed to George Washington; Louis is king and citizen, just as Washington is the highest-ranking general and an American citizen. As a fellow citizen, Louis XVI could inspire his citizen-subjects with his 'sacred aspect.'[90] Louis XVI's willingness to help America gave him a reputation in his own country as an advocate for universal rights. In a French diorama constructed in 1780 to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Louis XVI appeared as 'the protector of letters, the conserver of the rights of humanity, the ally and the friend of the American People.'[91] Another author depicted Louis XVI freeing the Canadians from Britain's rule. Speaking for the king, a Canadian calls his brothers to arms, saying, 'Brave and generous Canadians, break the chains that hold you . . . A young and virtuous monarch will second your efforts and will cover you with his shield.' Unlike the British king, Louis 'prefers to the title of conqueror, one of arbiter of his neighbors and avenger of oppressed humanity.'[92] Perhaps the best representation of how French advocates of the American Revolution recast their monarch is seen in Figure 4.2. These drawings are two of the plates from the obelisk of Port Vendre, on France's western Mediterranean coast, erected in 1783 in honor of the Independence of America, though the images


Bas Reliefs de l'Obelisque du Port Vendres .
Dessiné par Monet Peintre du Roi .
Née Sculp 1786 .
LA SERVITUDE ABOLIE
Le Roi sortant de son Palais annonce la liberté aux Serfs de ses États .
Roussillon N.º 6 .
Dessiné par Monet Peintre du Roi
Née Sculp. 1786 .
L'INDEPENDANCE DE L'AMÉRIQUE .
D'un côté la Ville de Boston et les Peuples de l'Amérique rassemblés sur le rivagé, tendant les mains à la Frégate du Roi qui leur porte le traité qui assure leur indépendance .
Roussillon N.º 7

Figure 4.2 *La Servitude Abolie* [Paris], 1786. Née, François Denis, engraver; after Monet, artist. The Robert Charles Lawrence Fergusson Collection, The Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, D.C.

were printed in 1786. The bottom picture is titled, 'Independence of America' and features the French king's ships arriving at Boston Harbor (which oddly looks like a fortress), to give aid to the suffering Bostonians. The Americans, hands stretched outward toward the French and heaven, again confirm the French as divinely-sent. The effect that this action has on the French is evident in its companion piece, featured on the top, titled, 'Servitude abolished,' in which, to quote the caption, 'the King exits his palace to announce the liberty of the Serfs of his states.'[93] Like the freed Bostonians, the serfs of France are supplicating Louis XVI for their freedom, and he, being a monarch of liberty and friend of the oppressed, grants it (though in actuality Louis XVI only granted freedom to the serfs of his domains, not of all of France).[94] As the picture implies, the way Louis XVI approached the American Revolution influenced, or at least was mirrored in, the way he appeared to behave toward his own people.

Independent of providing military aid and 'granting' liberty to America, the American Revolution was an important event for France in its own right. As one captain of the French army phrased it, 'to honor America is to honor France,' and France's participation in the event would appear 'the most remarkable and the grandest to the eyes of philosophy and posterity.'[95] A poet cast the event as France finally winning a war, after years of military struggle. 'That this event is flattering for France! / It augments its glory as well as its power. / O fortune! O Joy! We triumph at last.'[96] French soldiers and officers did not just honor the Americans with their help and alliance, but they were perhaps more self-consciously, 'fighting for the honor of the French.' This poet saw the American Revolution as France's fight, where the French 'offenses command the war,' and it heralded 'the end of an effeminate century,' in which incompetence and luxury had weakened the French army and lost them their empire in the Seven Years' War. Now, because of the French 'success,' a 'century of grandeur is opened.'[97] By providing France the opportunity to fight with and 'liberate' a virtuous citizen army of ancient proportions, the American Revolution allowed France to view its army as a virtuous institution conducive to fighting alongside citizen soldiers. Participating in the American Revolution brought the French army one step closer to redefining its motives for war in the first place, reminiscent of Guibert's designation of a citizen army, that it 'will not want to conquer, but only preserve.'[98]

At the same time, however, the American war was a crowning triumph for France as a victorious military engagement, making it the champion of Europe's most recent war.

Like French readers and writers who found inspiration in the American Revolution from a citizen's perspective, French military men appreciated the American army and militia as a modern example of a working citizen army. French officers contributed to the idealization of the American Revolution by writing memoirs and publishing letters that supported the established image of the American war. Even if the American army was not as glorious, smooth-running, patriotic, victorious, or reminiscent of the ancients as the French liked to believe, French officers who had participated in the war still presented the American army largely in those terms. Reports to leading officials in France, such as Lafayette's letters to Vergennes, touted the success of the American army and militia. Upon returning to France, officers scrambled to join the French branch of the Society of the Cincinnati, a newly-formed American club to honor its officers and maintain brotherly ties forged during the war. The society not only signified pride in its members' military victory, but it also signified that the French had served with, and in some cases as a part of, the heralded American citizen army. The American war could even be a rich cache of inspirational stories used to educate French soldiers in their patriotic duties.

When French officers returned from America, either having been part of Rochambeau's army or as former volunteers under George Washington, an eager market awaited their firsthand accounts of their time abroad. Many officers seemed only too happy to comply, adding accounts that confirmed earlier French images of how the American army and citizenry operated. François-Jean Chastellux, Rochambeau's second in command, confirmed in his account of American travels that 'North America is entirely military, entirely war-like,' and raising new troops never proved to be a problem. One American officer, General Heath, had been a farmer before the Revolution, but Chastellux was pleased to learn that 'his natural taste tends toward the study of war,' and had many French works on tactics, including 'the one by M. Guibert for which he makes a particular case.' Chastellux confirmed the tight relationship between citizens and soldiers when he related a story of his hosts, Mr and Mrs Hill, caring for an ailing soldier in their home. Mrs Hill had welcomed the soldier's stay with them, even though she had never been acquainted with him, and he had no means to pay her for the room and services.[99] In 1787, the year before Chastellux's account was made available to the public, the *Almanac Littéraire* advertised it as an interesting new work. Part of the description of the book included an anecdote confirming the citizen warfare image of America. Colonel Langhedon, finding a particular meeting had become too tedious for him, excused himself saying, " 'Sirs, you can talk as much as you like; but I know that the enemy is on our borders, and I am going to take my guns and mount my horse to combat [them] alongside my fellow citizens.' "[100] The editors of the *Almanac Littéraire* knew that this was the kind of story their readers longed to see. Chastellux's fellow French officers, such as Rochambeau, Jean-François-Louis de Clermont-Crèvecoeur, Louis de Récicourt de Ganot, Jean-Baptiste Antoine de Verger, Louis-Alexandre Berthier, and the chevalier de Pontgibaud all presented similar stories of courageous fighting, supportive citizens, and American military prowess worthy of ancient Greek and Roman associations.[101] Rochambeau later welcomed a book on the history of the American Revolution written by François Soulés, that 'did not resemble at all the parodies written in France up to this point,' but his own memoir confirmed the mythic descriptions of America.[102] In these texts, returning French officers appeared more interested in adding to the positive writings about America and continuing the idealization process of its citizen army, implicitly approving of these characterizations by entering the genre with their firsthand accounts. All of these published accounts gave readers a strong reason to accept the representations of America that had been circulating throughout France, even to see them as possible goals for their own army.

Senior French officers who served in the American Revolution maintained ties with America and flaunted their service in this popular war through the Society of the Cincinnati, an American society founded in 1783 by American officer Henry Knox. Knox created the Society as a means to stay in touch with fellow officers, help the widows of fallen comrades, and perpetuate the memory of Revolution through future generations. Each former colony had a chapter, and as a sign of amity and gratitude, the Society magistrates extended membership to French colonels and generals – and later high-ranking members of the navy who had fought for American independence. Membership in the society included the privilege of wearing an emblem in the shape of an eagle attached to a blue and white ribbon that symbolized the French–American alliance. As this medal was issued by a foreign army, Lafayette had to garner special permission from Louis XVI for officers to wear it. Louis XVI was so excited about the Society that he not only granted permission – which made the Cincinnati eagle the only foreign decoration allowed besides the Golden Fleece – but he endorsed the Society by requesting membership for himself. French reaction to the Society was overwhelmingly positive. French officers who did not meet the membership criteria presented their arguments for admittance and felt unappreciated if they were not granted it.

Two principal reasons accounted for the popularity of the Society of the Cincinnati among French officers. Despite the French reform efforts that followed the Seven Years' War, French officers still saw medals and promotion as among their top priorities, and they openly requested what they felt was owed to them. The duc de Luzerne wrote Washington on behalf of one of his compatriots, the chevalier Lemeth, who had participated in the battle of Yorktown, but who had not received the rank of colonel until two months after the conclusion of that battle. Luzerne reminded Washington that Lemeth 'was grievously wounded at the Siege of Yorktown.' In response to the battle scars, Louis XVI had 'rewarded him for this in giving him the rank of Colonel,' but because he did not obtain the rank until after the war, 'he finds himself excluded from the Society.' Luzerne argued that, 'his wounds and his zeal merit some favor.'[103] French officers found the military decoration that came with membership particularly appealing, as it allowed them to publicly proclaim their inclusion in the newest elite military society.

The Society of the Cincinnati also proved valuable because it recognized officers' experience with the citizen army. Like the plays and poems featuring the role of France in the American Revolution, the Society proved to be an important part of how France recast itself as a protector of free men. The Society first appeared in France with the following description: 'The officers in the American army, having generally been taken in the number of citizens of America, have the highest veneration for the character of this illustrious Roman, Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, and being resolved to follow his example, in returning to their homes, think that it would be suitable to name their society the Cincinnati.'[104] The very existence of the Society confirmed that the American army consisted of Romanesque citizen soldiers that upheld the ideals of the Roman citizen himself. The comte de Bressey wrote to the Society requesting admittance, because of his 'pardonable ambition of having my name known in the world and transmitted to posterity as the Brother, friend, and companion of such noble advocates for, and defenders of the natural Right of mankind.'[105]

Admittance into the Society became so valued among high-ranking officers that many officers even viewed it as necessary for advancement. Bouchet pleaded with Washington for membership in the Society, not just as a reward for his good service as a volunteer in the American army, but because his career seemed to depend on it. Shortly after his return to France, he again sailed to America strictly to present his case in person before George Washington. Unlike others, he did not list his multiple services to the American army, but emphasized that 'returning home disappointed in my expectation would ruin both my character and all prospect I may have of preferment in the army.'[106] His predicament shows just how important fighting with the American citizen army had become to French officers; fighting with the Americans was not just a fashionable experience, but a legitimizing one as well.

Requests for admittance into the Society continued throughout the 1780s and kept the American Revolution at the forefront of most noble officers' minds, even if it became a potentially threatening institution. The Society quickly became controversial in America, because it had a hereditary clause that allowed membership to be inherited by the eldest son. This aspect of the Society also received criticism in France, most notably from Mirabeau, who, influenced by Benjamin Franklin, wrote *Considerations of the Society on the Cincinnati*. Despite his eloquent words, however, the Society remained extremely popular in France until the early years of the French Revolution, when it was temporarily abolished.[107] The Society of the Cincinnati was another vehicle through which aristocratic officers were able to absorb the ethos of the citizen army.

Finally, the American Revolution held military significance for the French army by providing a laboratory in which writers interested in military matters could observe the citizen army in action. Outside of the sentimental and self-congratulatory literature that came from French involvement in the American Revolution, some authors knowledgeable of contemporary military debates observed the difference between the way the American and European forces operated. Chevalier Deslandes, who composed a didactic piece on the importance of the American Revolution, observed that the American fighting forces were mostly effective because they depended on citizens' 'patriotism, and not demeaning discipline.' Serving under elected generals such brave men 'perform miracles' and would go down in history alongside all other armies that every fought for liberty.[108] Hilliard D'Auberteuil also considered the effectiveness of a citizen army in his book of collected essays on the history and politics of North America. After relating the American victory at Germantown, he observed that unlike paid soldiers of Europe, who must be maintained by discipline, 'republicans, for the defense of their country, animated by the vengeance and the movements of a just indignation,' will always exhibit personal bravery and triumph.[109] Le Michaud d'Arçon, a French officer, tactician, and engineer saw in America the very future of warfare. 'Look at America!' he instructed. 'Washington can conduct his fellow citizens so well' that 'without soldiers, she resists professional armies.' While he was writing in 1779, he predicted, purely 'by the character of war in America,' that Americans would win their liberty. He concluded with the sobering thought that the current European ways of making war would 'be powerless against America!'[110]

Such praise affirmed a citizen army's triumph in battle and its impact on French military thinking, but it further pointed to the irony of the French monarchy helping to separate Anglo-Americans from their king and promoting a style of warfare bent on 'republicanism.' Even if King Louis XVI could be considered a 'governing citizen,' a citizen army still implied the framework of a republic, not a monarchy. Publications on America did have to be approved by a censor, though, because written about an ally of France, such publications likely received a great deal of leeway.[111] At the same time, while French officers must have been aware of the American army's apparent success as a citizen army, and while French officers who had served in America perpetuated the positive image, very few reform *mémoires* mention the American Revolution or the American army. It was one thing to admire the American citizen army, and even ally with it, but entirely another to suggest that the French army try to model itself after it. Doing so would upend the entire structure of the French army, and, even more seriously, imply that France should become a republic. While fully supporting the American Revolution and lauding the American military system, admirers of the citizen army had always portrayed Louis XVI as a liberating monarch, not as a problematic prince. With texts likes D'Auberteuil's and Delandes's, French observers could admire and study the American army without ever suggesting anything antimonarchical for France.

Reformers' ideas of turning French soldiers into citizens could use incidents from the American war, however, to inspire patriotic sentiment in their own troops. In a collection of vignettes meant to provide moral and patriotic instruction to both soldiers and officers, Laurent Bérenger included a tale of bravery from the American Revolution. The story had first appeared in the *Gazette de France*, but Bérenger gave it a Spartan twist, likening the event to the Battle of Thermopylae.[112] He recounted 28 American soldiers trapped on a bridge by a considerable number of Hessians. These 'new Spartans' defended the bridge until only three were left alive, at which point, reinforcements arrive to relieve them, and together the heroes repulsed the Hessians.[113] This story combined the principal beliefs about the American army and militia in a didactic form for the benefit of French officers and soldiers. Perhaps the French army could not replicate the American army's 'system,' but it could emulate the values that the American soldiers seemed to embody and execute on the battlefield.

The American Revolution could not have occurred at a more opportune time for French military reformers. When it commenced in 1775, French reform-minded thinkers inside and outside the military were looking for a way to improve the army's performance and restore virtue to French society. Most writers in military and non-military circles argued that the future of the French army and society required the cultivation of a strong sense of patriotism among both citizens and soldiers. Published works on philosophy and society pointed to the example of the ancients, where citizens served their country as soldiers, and soldiers likewise received respect from citizens for their heroic deeds performed in the name of their *patrie*. Reformers inside the military tried to address the moral needs of soldiers by treating them as French citizens: increasing their pay, providing them with meaningful civilian work after their service was completed, and encouraging non-military citizens to accept them in society.

The American Revolution, in effect, confirmed the pre-existing French ideas about citizen warfare, and because the American army and militia was a contemporary military phenomenon, it made citizen warfare seem a concrete possibility for the first time since the days of ancient Rome. Broader French readership, and even those who were illiterate but caught glimpses of the American war through art and images, also saw an example of a citizenry that at the same time could be military. In France, where citizens and soldiers had been isolated from each other, this was a novel idea. French citizens could respect, include, and even wish to emulate French soldiers. More importantly, the American Revolutionary images repeatedly presented soldiers and citizens working together out of love for their *patrie*.

5

Aristocratic Rupture

French consumption and depictions of the American Revolution had fueled the desire and likelihood of creating a citizen army in France. Representations of the American Revolution showcased a working citizen army in the modern world, encouraged civilians to see military service in a positive light, and recast the French army as an army of liberty that allied with citizen forces to repulse a tyrant. French writers folded American Revolutionary imagery and myths into the ongoing discussions about improvements for the army and society, confirming that reformers were on the right path. Since the Seven Years' War, officers of the French line army had become more focused on the status and happiness of soldiers, and saw them as the key to reforming the French army into a more 'natural' fighting force, fueled by patriotism and love of country. Reforming the army would likewise lead to a more virtuous society. By the 1780s, officers' and civilians' opinions of soldiers had improved, bringing the French army and civilian society into greater familiarity with and closer proximity to the citizen-army model they had admired in ancient societies. With the American example confirming their suspicions, civilian and military writers had begun to see the citizen army not just as a lovely dream, but an actual possibility.

Over the same period of time, however, from the 1760s through the 1780s, the French officer corps had not been able to keep up with the pace and trajectory of these reforms. When officers had talked of including patriotism in the army and fostering love of country, they referred most often to motivating their soldiers and making them more citizen-like; it was rare for reformers to speak the same way about the officers. While some officers eager for reform tried to rearrange the workings of the officer corps, a long-standing commitment to noble privilege in the army prevented many permanent reforms from taking shape. As seen in Canada, the French army suffered from a system of promotion that rewarded court favorites and men who had demonstrated their 'zeal' for their service of the king, without having necessarily demonstrated skills required for the new rank. As a result, the upper ranks of the officer corps ballooned with wealthy or favored nobles often inept in matters of war, while nobles who did not have the privilege or means to reside at court stagnated in lower ranks, with little hope for promotion.

Such inequality in the officer corps impeded the citizen reform efforts of those concerned with solider happiness and creating a more victorious army and virtuous society. The division in the officer corps over how it should function distracted reformers and weakened their ability to make meaningful change. While some officers did not seem to see any difficulties in implementing citizen-solider type reforms while maintaining an aristocratic officer corps, others saw that changes for soldiers would require officers to rethink their own position in society and how they perceived rank and duty. Nobles who owed their high military rank to prestigious court positions in particular seemed to take a defensive position on any question of army reform and could pressure ministers of war to undo new regulations shortly after they had been put into place. Such friction could not stop the trajectory of the reform effort toward a citizen army; it might have even ultimately strengthened the argument for a citizen army in which citizens could be officers, as military officials stumbled through reform attempts exhibiting their incompetence.

As ministers of war wrestled with the difficulties inherent in reforming the officer corps, two promising initiatives both encouraged permanent reform while exposing the tensions in the officer corps. The Ségur *réglement* of 1781 tried to exclude newly ennobled, wealthy social-climbers from the officer corps. Because they did not come from traditionally military families, it was thought, these people could not expect to understand or carry out the duties of an officer very effectively. Six years later, a Council of War consisting of elite officers tried to enforce definitive parameters and rules for the entire army in order to fulfill the decades of wishful reform efforts. Despite its best intentions, the Council of War actually divided the officer corps and threw the entire army into chaos, just as the political and agricultural difficulties of the late 1780s sent the country swirling into violence, famine, and revolution. This context provided the perfect storm for the citizen army to finally come into being, but the process unfolded in a way that reformers had not expected.

Efforts to render the nobility more egalitarian and to refocus promotion and career status on personal merit, rather than wealth or court connections, began in 1751 when Louis XV instituted the *Ecole Militaire*. This institution, located in Paris, oversaw the education of up to 500 young nobles whose families did not have the financial ability to send them to the colleges or academies where most young men intended for the army received their education. Admission to the *Ecole Militaire* required applicants to submit original documents proving their noble lineage and families' active role in the army. Preference was then given to young men whose fathers had died while in the service of the king. While in school, students studied subjects that would be relevant in their careers as officers: mathematics, technical drawing, history, and contemporary foreign languages. Upon completing their studies, the state found them a position working under a colonel and continued to provide financial assistance until the new officer had obtained the rank of captain. Additional financial aid was available if the officers needed extra equipment for particular expeditions (such as the invasion of Corsica) or additional schooling. This specialized training for poorer members of the nobility demonstrated the ministry of war's commitment to maintaining the direct relationship between the army and nobility and to restoring a sense of 'equality' among nobles who would compete with their merit – not their pocketbooks – for positions in the army. The ministry of war took an additional step to provide equality by opening 12 new branches of the *Ecole Militaire* in 1776 in order to increase the number of scholarship students they could teach. In these schools, paying nobles and even wealthy *roturiers* could also attend and study alongside the members of the poorer nobility, but only the scholarship students were guaranteed commissions.[1]

The ministers of war whose tenures followed the creation of the *Ecole Militaire* campaigned to further 'level the drill field' between wealthy nobles and their poorer counterparts by reducing the necessary expenses of low-ranking officers. Minister of War Belle-Isle, who served in that position from 1758 to 1761, increased the pay of subaltern officers and prevented colonels from selling commissions in their regiments. The duc de Choiseul, who succeeded him, continued to reduce the financial burden on young officers by having the state assume many of the administrative tasks that usually fell to captains. Such a measure again lessened the expense that young officers had to bear, but put a larger financial strain on the army.[2] To curb some of the excesses in the army, Choiseul stringently regulated the number of officers on active service, so that no more would be serving during peacetime than absolutely required for training and troop supervision. This reduction in active officers, however, resulted in many of them being cut off in the midst of their careers, with no further hope of advancement, and they attacked Choiseul vigorously for denying them their one vocation. Choiseul had also made ferocious enemies at court, and his influence waned. He left the position in 1770, succeeded by a minister who would not take up his unfinished work or continue to cut wasteful spending and positions, Louis François, marquis de Monteynard.[3]

Monteynard was not indifferent to the cause of equality within the officer corps, but he lacked Choiseul or Belle-Isle's abilities to resist the 'complaints that assailed him' at court. Monteynard had inherited fiercely discontented, high-ranking nobles from Choiseul, putting his tenure as minister of war at a disadvantage from the start. Wanting to satisfy and appease them, Monteynard often acted against his own designs and 'overthrew all the ordinances of his predecessor.'[4] King Louis XV confounded matters by passing out brevets to the favorites of his mistress, Mme Du Barry, then placing the responsibility for them with the ministry of war. Monteynard's successor, the duc d'Aiguillon, also caved in to court pressure to provide more senior ranks for those seeking the social status that came with military service. Even though d'Aiguillon attempted to cater to the court by creating more positions for colonels, he lost much of his popularity when there was not enough money left in the treasury to pay retiring officers their pensions. By 1775, nearly all measures taken by Belle-Isle and Choiseul to purge the French army of wealth's corrupting influence had been overturned. There had been a great willingness among officers interested in reform to effect change, but at every turn they met stiff resistance from those who saw their societal position jeopardized with these new measures.

Maréchal de Muy, d'Aiguillon's successor, attempted to renew officer corps reforms by trying to remove wealth as a factor in promotion and instead reward seniority. In each battalion, the oldest captain would be promoted to major, and replace the superior officers in command when they were absent. Six years of serving as major and garnering experience in higher commands would earn the individual the rank of lieutenant colonel. In order to prevent eager young officers from buying rank or advancing too rapidly as a court favorite, de Muy enforced a seven-year minimum service requirement before officers could be promoted to colonel and a five-year requirement to be captain. Future colonels also had to have experience commanding a regiment of two battalions for at least three years, and no one could achieve the rank of captain until he was at least 23 years old. These strict regulations counteracted the 'abuse' of commissioning too many colonels during d'Aiguillon's tenure, and ensured that the men holding higher ranks would have the experience necessary to execute them well.[5] De Muy's reforms did not receive much support from the court or king, however, as they curbed privilege and the king's discretion to assign rank at will. De Muy died in 1775 after years of poor health, having seen few of his reforms permanently established.[6]

St Germain burst onto the scene as the next minister of war, determined to slash the army's budget and eliminate any unnecessary posts, but his enthusiasm for reform met equally strong ire and resistance among privileged officers. He began with the *maison militaire*, the branch of the army responsible for the king's safety, which had become largely ceremonial and a preferred place for court nobles to serve, as it required little training and came with a great deal of status. In St Germain's eyes, the *maison militaire* introduced and sustained a steady influx of corrupting luxury into the army. He succeeded in cutting only 750 men from the organization (instead of the 2,700 he had initially intended), but still managed to clip some of the noble officers' court privileges.[7] He also completely eliminated the Grenadiers and the Musketeers. He eradicated most of the 'favors' granted from the treasury to officers and court favorites that assigned them to honorable offices complete with a high income. He also assailed venal offices, which he viewed as poison to morale and ability.[8] These reforms, intended to reduce spending and the influence of wealth, had only a small immediate effect on the state of French finances, but caused a great deal of animosity among court nobles. Officers whose positions had been eliminated or who had been forced to retire early demanded compensation for the full amount of time they had intended to serve, and in order to pay them, St Germain had to allow some venality to remain. He did manage to reduce the amount that ranks had been sold for by a fourth of their worth, but St Germain was not satisfied with such a small decrease. Some officers complained bitterly that the end of venality had hurt the esprit of the officer corps, that there were not enough officers to fulfill their duties, and that the work of the subalterns had become more burdensome to make up for the missing men. St Germain received even more criticism for his new rules governing the promotion process for young officers. Rather than entering the army at whatever rank a young man could purchase, St Germain ruled that every officer must serve for one year as a non-commissioned officer and execute those duties without access to wealth or the comforts reserved for officers in order to learn the work of the army and how to care for his men. Young *gentilhommes* would then progress through the ranks by seniority, and no exceptions would be provided for an 'exceptional youth' with friends at court. Incensed nobles argued that a full year of service did not allow them to manage affairs or property and was therefore an unjust requirement.[9]

St Germain, who viewed himself as a friend to soldiers, eliminated the death penalty for deserters. Counterbalancing this measure, however, was his infamous institution of the blows with the flat of a saber, or a baton, as a means of discipline. Soldiers had previously been given prison sentences for disobedience, and while the blows were intended to instill a sharper sense of discipline, they backfired as contradictory to national character and dishonorable for soldiers and officers alike. Complaints against St Germain clouded his successes in giving the French army a stronger and more uniform composition.[10] By 1777, St Germain stepped down from his post, exhausted and suffering from poor health.

The prince de Montbarey followed on St Germain's heels as minister of war. He, too, tried to institute precise rules that would regulate the advancement of officers, but he made limited progress, as his primary duties focused on preparing the French army to enter the American Revolution. Montbarey made some changes in the organization of the army, but nothing to challenge noble privilege. After St Germain's fall from power, the 'years passed without being marked for the army by any useful innovation.'[11] By 1781, the officer corps was trapped in a bad cycle of well-meaning but short-lived reforms, in which officers desired changes but largely balked at any that would compromise noble privilege, especially among the *haute noblesse*.

Officers who later reflected on these disappointing reform attempts expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of permanent reform, recognizing that there had been too many ministers of war who wanted to please the higher court nobility rather than strictly enforce more efficient regulations. Chevalier de Keralio in particular characterized this period as one of constant change, in which ministers of war responsible for instituting reform were either too concerned with their popularity among the officers or did not know how to make necessary reforms last. He accused d'Aiguillon of only desiring to please officers, by giving out too many colonel commissions, pensions, and *Croix de St Louis*, indiscriminately. He blamed the failure of St Germain's reforms on 'the military men of the court,' who desired 'neither order nor discipline' and wrote that M. le prince de Montbarey only made promises he could not keep and discontented everyone.[12] He was not alone in his assessments.[13] Another officer characterized this time from the Seven Years' War to the early 1780s as 20 years in which many ministers made ordinances that produced nothing but confusion.[14] One outside observer characterized the ordinances of the ministers of war as ridiculous and contradictory. He likened the ministers of war to 'fanciful children' who played with military officers like toys, just for the giddy pleasure of creating and destroying.[15] By 1781, officers and interested civilians alike had reached their threshold for well-meaning but fruitless reforms. They were ready for something bold and effective.

The one reform that, at least initially, promised permanent and meaningful results came from the ministry of the comte de Ségur. His Ségur *réglement* of 1781 aimed to provide a certain degree of professionalism while protecting the privileges of court nobles by effectively closing the officer ranks of the army to any individual whose family had not been among the nobility for at least four generations. It prevented wealthy new nobles from entering the officer corps, thus retaining those positions for the nobles of older, more prestigious families, and it helped older and less wealthy military families in the provinces to compete for available positions and promotions.[16] Even if the Ségur *réglement* did work to professionalize the French officer corps it also solidified the relationship between the officer corps and the nobility by tightening restrictions on who could be eligible to serve as an officer. While the vast majority of the French officers had always been of members of the nobility, it had never been necessary to make an official *réglement* declaring the service of non-nobles illegal. This was also the first law that defined who was truly 'noble,' by officially differentiating between nobles of long standing and those who had just recently joined the estate. On one hand, many officers likely applauded this professionalizing measure, because it rid the army of a corrupting influence and affirmed the merit inherent in officers whose families had long served in the army. On the other hand, it also severely limited who could be in the officer corps and worked against the rising tide of egalitarian expectations that were becoming popular in France, especially during and after the American Revolution.[17]

While perhaps seen as the most promising reform to date, the Ségur *réglement* did not magically transform the French army into an efficient fighting force as, several years after its adoption, reform memoirs continued to disdain the officer corps. Even with the absence of the wealthy nobles who had recently sprung from bourgeois families, the French army still suffered from excessive decadence and incompetence. By 1787, for example, Guibert counted 1,261 general officers, a rank that many considered the only suitable goal for a military career.[18] With the exception of Guibert and a few others, generals proved an expensive waste, pulling large pensions, racking up expenditures, and causing general embarrassment. One anonymous author complained that a French general 'commands maneuvers poorly, swears, yells, insulting the officer, striking the soldier, and by his ignorance and his rigor gives everyone at every moment a revolting and ridiculous spectacle.'[19]

Many officers still pointed to the court nobility's destructive effect on the army, owing in part to their relative youth when they assumed command. One critic pointed out that wealthy young nobles who insisted on being colonels and by their thirtieth birthdays had become indifferent toward the army. When these young colonels led soldiers into battle, their inexperience and thirst for heroics spelled doom for the subordinate officers and their troops. Young men did not know how to lead, how to read the terrain, or anticipate the movements of the enemy and therefore would give incompetent orders. Older, more experienced officers filled the lower ranks of a regiment, but their suggestions and warnings fell on deaf ears. The baron d'Arros, a captain in 1784, complained of the teenage commanders who would march 'blindly against the enemy,' operating on 'a false love of glory, an imprudent courage, a dangerous recklessness,' and lead his troops to almost certain death. These same court nobles embraced the wealth and luxury accompanying their rank, making them an embarrassing spectacle before their subordinates.[20] As the chevalier Keralio remarked, 'it is fair to say that the indiscipline is not in the subaltern officers, but in the men holding the highest ranks of the army, who will always be detestable . . . those that one so appropriately calls the high nobility.'[21]

While equality between nobles had been the goal of the *Ecole Militaire*, and the state had alleviated much of the financial burden on officers for the upkeep of their troops, a noticeable gap persisted between the wealthy court nobility and the provincial nobles, who typically came from families that had long been steeped in French military service, but who lacked the wealth to maintain places at court or support the expenses involved in serving in the higher ranks. Despite these officers' considerable experience, they rarely achieved a rank higher than lieutenant colonel. The baron d'Arros in particular lamented this 'crowd of brave officers without wealth, and without places' in the advanced ranks that suffered from 'inertia' because of the lack of promotion opportunities or recognition. These officers, the 'men of real merit' had long waited to receive credit for their service, and to compete with the high nobility for rank and career opportunities.[22] The biting criticism in these complaints against court nobles reflects both reformers' frustrations with the situation and their desire to stem the growing division between court and provincial nobles. Many believed that a Council of War, called to redefine the French systems of promotion, finances, and the continuing problems within the officer corps, would be able to make definitive rulings and create a more permanent and effective 'constitution.' Such a council would be able to finally accomplish the task that all the ministers of war had failed to do: give the army a lasting and effective constitution that would bring permanent improvement and stability.[23]

Unlike a minister of war, the Council of War would be able to make difficult decisions without becoming too embroiled in politics.[24] By operating outside of the court, the Council of War would be better able to execute laws, keep guiding principles steady, reduce expenses, and resist pretentious demands for favors.[25] The many people of a council would render decisions more as a result of thoughtful debate than the whim of one person. Especially in 'a nation where the imagination marches always before judgment,' one reformer reasoned, it would be a great benefit to have a council of sober and experienced officers.[26] Such a council would, one reformer promised the king, ensure that 'reason alone' would govern the Council's decisions, and that it would work 'great improvements in the entire military state of his Majesty.' In this way, they made the case to Louis XVI to allow a council to make major decisions on behalf of the army, and the Council continued to alert Louis XVI to any changes they made to its structure or operating procedures.[27]

Adding to the now dire urgency for a Council of War was the simultaneous crumbling of old regime institutions. Discussions of military reform took place against a backdrop of crisis in the crown's finances and growing unrest among civilians in France. In 1787, the same year that the Council of War came to order, five of the venal financiers for the state declared bankruptcy, dooming Finance Minister Calonne's fiscal program. Amid the financial crisis, the Assembly of Notables gathered to discuss the future of French politics, tax policy, and finance, and its members did not sympathize with the nobles of the court.[28] The great changes anticipated for the government made the Council of War a part of this critical moment. As Guibert ascended to his position as the head of the Council in 1787, he reflected that 'never' had 'the circumstances added more to this moment of immediacy to form the Council of War and to charge it with the renewal' of the army.[29] Few officers were likely thinking of revolution in 1787, but the Council of War would set the stage for it.

In 1787, the Council of War began its work of instituting reforms for the entire army, creating a new constitution, improving soldiers' conditions, cutting department spending, and curbing the court nobility's privileges.[30] Officers, soldiers, and civilians alike had great expectations that the Council's reforms would resolve all of the 'abuses' that had been mounting for 30 years, and Guibert expressed great confidence that it would. He swore to the king that he and the Council would 'give to these corps a new constitution, a better composition and the ways to fulfill [their] functions with diligence and with zeal.'[31] Looking at all the variety of reform ideas and the high expectations for the Council, its members had their work cut out for them. None of the ministers of war who had come before them had managed to create a lasting constitution, due largely to the conflicting and often contradictory visions that various officers had for the institution. Despite the optimism and high expectations surrounding the council, it was doomed from the start in that it would be impossible to please everybody. By 1789, though, the Council of War had instituted numerous reforms that addressed the many complaints about the army, but which also locked in some of the very traditions that reformers had been combating.

Concerning the treatment of soldiers, the Council of War passed what must have been seen as contradictory measures. On one hand, it augmented soldiers' salary by six deniers (half a penny) a day and tried to improve the quality of food, even providing access to vegetable gardens in several provinces so that soldiers could benefit from greater quantities of fresh food. The most senior soldiers of the Order of St Louis received an additional pension.[32] As a sign of soldiers' elevated status, officers were no longer allowed to address them with the informal 'tu,' but had to use the more respectful 'vous.' To help promising soldiers who had not received much education, the Council required each regiment to establish a school for potential non-commissioned officers to teach them reading, writing, and basic mathematics.[33] At the same time, however, the Council reintroduced the beatings with a cane or the flat of a saber as a disciplinary measure. Guibert explained that this regulation differed than St Germain's, because the blows could only be administered in a private 'punishment room' by senior-ranking officers, which would have 'corrected the principle inconveniences' of humiliation and dishonor. Guibert's reasoning, and the Council's others measures on behalf of the soldier, however, did not satisfy the expectations of officer and citizen.[34]

Guibert and the Council created further controversy when they reduced the number of soldiers in the *maison militaire*, and other milieus that favored the *haute noblesse*, but they caused an outright rupture within the army when they instituted a system of two-track advancement. Minister of War Ségur had considered this measure in 1780, but backed down for fear it would create too much disorder and resentment. Guibert and the Council placed court nobles and provincial nobles on different promotional tracks in 1788. This new promotional system would keep the lower-ranking officers in the more functional positions of the army and allow the court nobility to have the advanced ranks, but without as much direct military involvement. Officers from the provincial nobility would enter the ranks as a *cadet-gentilhomme* or as a second lieutenant, and then advance through the lower ranks by seniority. The highest rank that these nobles could achieve, and few would obtain it, would be lieutenant colonel, but those who held the rank would command in place of the colonel whenever he was absent (and he would likely be absent frequently). Since the majors oversaw the instruction and discipline of a regiment, and the colonel (or lieutenant colonel in his place) commanded the regiment, this type of advancement would allow provincial nobles to competently command the majority of the army's activities. Officers of the court nobility had to follow a different process of promotion that involved much less service than the provincial officers, but more service than they had been accustomed to under the old system. After entering the army with the recommendation of the king, these young men would serve in unpaid positions for five months a year and replace regular officers as needed. In five years, these nobles would be eligible to be a full colonel in the king's army. The fast-track advancement and the prestige in being part of the 'first nobility' or the 'upper nobility' would attract the courtiers who preferred the military honors and high rank to actual service, and allow the Council to have more control over who advanced to what rank. Isolating the court nobility would also prevent them from competing for limited positions with provincial nobles.[35]

With the two-track promotional system Guibert acknowledged the long-standing tendency of the old regime for court nobles to obtain the highest ranks, while provincial nobles rarely did so. In institutionalizing the practice, Guibert recognized the unavoidability of high noble preeminence and looked for ways to mitigate its practical impact. Provincial nobles, however, perceived it as formal declaration of the court nobility's superiority. Even if it had been unlikely that a member of the provincial nobility would obtain the rank of general, now it was illegal, regardless of his merit. Incensed officers argued that all nobles had always enjoyed equal consideration before the king, and that this 'ridiculous ordinance,' divided 'the ancient and respectable' French nobility.[36] Nobles from the Baillage of Toul proclaimed this practice inherently unfair, and argued for the eligibility of all gentlemen for high ranks.[37] Other districts, like the Bailliage de Tourain, specifically demanded a return of the 'the most perfect equality' between all the officers of France.[38]

As Rafe Blaufarb has pointed out, this plea for equality did not infer a forward-looking call for the *égalité* of the French Revolution, but a plea to return to a time when the nobility was not corrupted by luxury, decadence, or favoritism – when each noble officer rose through the appropriate ranks because of his personal merit in the eyes of the king.[39] This ideal time may have never existed, but the provincial officers seemed to recognize a pattern of the court nobility pulling closer and closer into itself in the 1780s. The Ségur *réglement* had restricted the officer corps to nobles of at least four generations, enclosing the officer corps around a smaller group of elites. This measure helped the provincial nobility by eliminating wealthy competition for rank. The next tightening of the officer corps under the Council of War, however, brought the upper nobility closer to the king, the court, the highest ranks, and the honors and privileges that went with them, while instituting a model that distanced the provincial nobility from the center.

Guibert answered these complaints on behalf of the Council of War, arguing that the reforms had intended to standardize military practices.[40] He saw this controversial reform as consistent with the king's wishes for order, economy, and an end to abuses. Reflecting on the volumes of *mémoires* addressed to the Council of War, Guibert argued that the public must approve of the measure, as their opinions formed the basis for the Council's changes.[41] Guibert's responses to the critics of the Council of War were to no avail. As the ultimate sign of how the two-track advancement had upset the nobility, Guibert faced disgrace when he offered his services to the province of Berry in March of 1789 to represent the second estate in the Estates General. Guibert could not even deliver his address before being shouted down with cries that he had 'humiliated the nobility,' and he sought sanctuary in a neighboring cathedral.[42]

The Council of War's decision to formally divide the noble officer corps into two branches left the army in a precarious position in 1788 and 1789. Even the Estates General concluded that 'the council of war of 1788 so overturned the army that it has disgusted the officers and the soldiers; nobody knows their place anymore.'[43] Competing ideas of how the army would operate made the army extremely ineffective during the riots in the provinces and in Paris in 1787, 1788, and 1789. While members of the Council of War and their adversaries had been battling for a working constitution, Louis XVI had summoned the Estates General, France's finances were in disarray, and peasants were violently resisting government attempts to collect their grain during a season of famine. As the army tried to respond to the violence building around it, some officers ordered their troops to quell violent demonstrations, others protested by refusing to follow orders to subdue the populace, and many soldiers defected to the side of their fellow citizens. By resurrecting beatings for soldiers and instituting the two-track advancement for officers, the Council of War had sown confusion regarding the direction of the French army, creating an environment where officers and soldiers became reticent to follow orders and poorly situated to respond to the violence around them.

From 1787 through 1789, riots broke out across France over the scarcity of grain and the price of bread. The harvest of 1789 marked the third successive crop failure and, especially from June through August, residents of the provinces feared starvation as they waited for the new crop to be harvested.[44] The dwindling grain supply resulted in a great deal of violence between peasants, artisans, and town authorities over its distribution. In the small town of Limoux in May, for example, a crowd of nearly a thousand people forced itself into the town hall and demanded that the authorities seal the granaries in the town to preserve the grain. They increased their demands the next day by insisting that taxes be abolished and the grain distributed to the needy of the town. When the authorities refused, protestors stormed the municipal offices and dumped the account books into the local river. Even if authorities succeeded in removing the grain, it was susceptible to being forcibly seized by jobless and starving drifters as it traveled across the countryside.[45] Adding to the urgency and intensity of these riots was the opportunity for peasants, artisans, and town dwellers to voice their complaints in the *Cahiers de Doléances*, a collection of complaints to be sent to the Estates General. The scarcity of grain and the political climate combined to encourage many regions of France to resist government interference.

In scenes reminiscent of the Flour Wars of 1775, the most recent clash between soldiers and peasants over grain, French troops arrived in several of the rioting regions to disperse the angry populace, regulate the distribution of grain, and protect bakeries – but this time the army proved much less successful in quelling the violence. The archives at Vincennes contain internal correspondence detailing events at more than a dozen riots between late 1787 and the summer of 1789.[46] Clearly this is not an exhaustive database, but the patterns that emerge from these case studies allow some tentative conclusions about how shifts in the broader culture had reshaped military attitudes.

In some instances, troops did successfully disperse rioters. On 20 April 1789, armed peasants in Avançon inspired villagers from a nearby town to sack the château at Valserres, whose lord was absent, but a light cavalry unit scattered them before they did any damage to the castle.[47] In other areas, the army responded to rioters, but was attacked in turn, and could not control the violence. Such was the case when the villagers from the areas surrounding Amiens attacked a convoy of 11 carts of wheat under an escort. When the officer ordered them to disband, they refused and assaulted him with rocks. He then ordered his troops to fire, and they killed two and wounded five. Only then did the rioters allow the wheat to pass. The commanding officer left soldiers in the area over night to prevent further uprisings, but the peasants threw one soldier into the water, 'burned the brains' of another, and let only the third one go.[48] Similar scenes occurred throughout France, and many towns requested the presence of soldiers to maintain the peace. The duc de Baurron complained that the citizens of Falaize were defenseless against a rebelling populace, and requested a regiment to assist its overwhelmed police force.[49] While during previous riots the duc de Baurron's request would have been reasonable, the riots of the 1780s proved difficult to suppress, even when the soldiers carried out their duties against the populace, which they often did not.

The relative shortage of troops made it especially difficult to restore order in the provinces. One officer speculated that if troops lined up across the frontier of the entire nation to prevent the exportation of grains, it might give the people of France confidence that the grain would stay in France and provide the necessary security to transport it. The volume and intensity of the violence in the countryside, however, made this plan impossible.[50] Adding to the army's problems were officers and soldiers who either chose to be insubordinate or sided with the rebelling populace. The recent unpopular rulings of the Council of War gave resentful provincial officers little incentive to follow orders. Some officers followed a passive-aggressive approach, such as the officers of the Austraise-Infanterie who responded very slowly to the request for troops in Grenoble in 1788. Other officers submitted their resignations when asked to lead troops in quelling the riots, such as officers from Brittany who refused to carry out orders in Rennes. In Toulouse, one officer submitted his resignation, reasoning that 'it was not the business of the army to attack citizens.'[51]

Troops followed a similar suit. In d'Aversus, for example, M. le Cte Esterhazy met with difficulty when transporting grain, because the soldiers who had come to guard it sided with the rioters. The soldiers had quieted the area to allow for the transport of grain, but when inhabitants complained that the price of bread was too high, the soldiers agreed and refused to enforce the new price. A similar event had already occurred at Douay, where the king's soldiers themselves asked for a lower price for bread rather than enforce the existing price.[52] Like the reluctant officers, French troops could have been insubordinate in order to protest the continual problems in the army, but perhaps they were responding to their officers' long-term attempts to 'citizen-ize' them. Throughout this time of upheaval, French soldiers became markedly closer to civilian inhabitants, whose rioting had usually garnered a more violent state-sponsored reaction from soldiers. Had the reforms of the 1760s through the 1780s succeeded in transforming the French soldier into a citizen who now expected more from his *patrie*?

Historians have wondered if participation in the American War of Independence might have also influenced the behavior of French soldiers during these violent stages of the pre-Revolution and early Revolution, but there is little data to support the various interpretations.[53] As discussed in Chapter 4, the greatest impact of the American Revolution was felt in France not because of the testimony of returning veterans, but because of the multitude and variety of written or illustrated sources about the American Revolution that saturated popular culture. These images reinforced French ideas about the importance of ancient virtues and citizenship. American citizens appeared as competent fighters who had experienced the sufferings and glories of military life, and many sources showcased the French army as the ultimate champion of citizens' rights. French civilians echoed these texts and images as they articulated their expectations for the army in the *Cahiers de Doléances*. They saw their role as French citizens changing, and many expressed eagerness to serve in the army as officers in order to support the *patrie* and fulfill their duties as citizens. One province recognized the noble estate as necessary to a monarchy, but wished to see it gradually lose its privileges and become more in line with the province's 'public rights.' These changes included incorporating members of the third estate into the office corps of the army and navy, as exclusions only served to 'snuff out emulation.'[54] Both the province of Limousin and the bailliage of Reims also requested members of the third estate be allowed to become military officers and 'promoted to all the highest ranks,' which in 1789 had just been placed out of reach for even the provincial nobility by the Council of War.[55] Similarly, the bailliage of Nemours pointed out that the nobility enjoyed many benefits, including fiefs and privileges, because it was 'solely obligated to go to war.' Such privileges, though, must become obsolete, as the military obligation has also passed to members of the third estate, who do not enjoy any privileges even though they were often more attached to the *patrie*.[56]

The military hopefuls writing to the Estates General suggested measures that would smoothly incorporate the citizenry into the army. Continuing the theme that officers recognized in ancient armies and that texts and images of the American Revolution perpetuated, they encouraged the army not to conscript or bribe men to be soldiers, but to rely on voluntary enlistment as 'the best way to recruit troops.' If the French army paid soldiers well and kept its promises of providing respectful treatment, then 'well-born men would enroll voluntarily,' and the army would no longer be a collection of the most miserable members of the state.[57] Each province would recruit from among its own people, and consequently the soldiers would be more inspired to defend their natal territory and the people in it. As a safeguard against any French troops acting violently against the population, new soldiers would take an oath never to use their weapons against a citizen of the nation.[58] French citizens saw themselves as taking an active part in French military activity, and recognized it had to be a voluntary act on their own terms.

Citizens applied this now pervasive notion that all soldiers should be regarded as honorable citizens to the French *milice*. This much-hated institution, which was a means of providing extra cannon fodder for the French army out of untrained, unwilling, impoverished peasants, came under universal attack.[59] None of the *Cahiers de Doléances* complaining about the *milice* resented the idea of citizens being involved in military service, only the aspect of the *milice* that compelled them to serve. The parish of Croissy-sous-Chatou condemned the *milice* as 'the greatest scourge of the army' because it was responsible for forcing the only sons of poor families to enlist in the army and leave them devastated by his death.[60] For people in the provinces, serving in the *milice* was the greatest injustice, and the bailliage of Nemours felt certain that French honor would never allow the *milice* to continue, as the rich men who could escape it would feel for their fellow citizens conscripted by force.[61] In place of the hated and soon-to-be abolished *milice*, the parish d'Essonnes envisioned replacing it with 'provincial and voluntary militias' that would allow all members of the third estate – including the wealthy ones – to contribute to the defense of the country.[62] These examples present a general sense of the universal hatred of the *milice* as a pressed service that targeted poorer members of the third estate and the simultaneous eagerness of each province to erect a volunteer military service that incorporated the entire third estate. By these accounts, it was not military service that the provinces objected to, but the fact that militia service was an unevenly imposed obligation. In order for the *milice* to become a citizen militia, it had to rise out of the incentive of its volunteers.

French citizens who supported the notion of a citizen army were not going to wait for the state or French line army to institute it. From 1787 through 1790, many provinces exercised their self-proclaimed right to a volunteer-only citizen militia at the same time that representatives to the Estates General were articulating it. As the French army failed in containing the riots and chaos in the provinces, French citizens took it upon themselves to provide protection and order in the forms of their own citizen militias. In the late spring and summer of 1789, the city of Lille responded to violent outbreaks over the scarcity of grain by creating its own army of bourgeois citizen soldiers – a forerunner to the National Guard that would soon become an official branch of the army in Paris.[63] The French army had sent troops to Lille to maintain order, but when violence did break out, they could not contain it for long. One market day in late April ended in a great deal of turmoil, and 'the pillage of several market stalls and all the bread stores.'[64] The market had begun as usual, but by 11:00 large crowds had gathered at the grain stalls, and troops arrived to calm and dismiss them. The crowd became violent with the arrival of some women, who egged on the men to take the remaining grain. The riot turned against the town's bakers, who were robbed and 'very badly treated.' Two men accused of hoarding sustained attacks in their own homes, which were pummeled with stones. Finally, the crowds dispersed around nightfall. The commander of the troops posted guards at bakery entrances, to ensure the safety of the bakers, and attempted to maintain relative peace in the village. If the riot had been solely about grain prices and availability, then the French troops' actions to guard the bakers and their stores may have been sufficient to maintain order, but M. Esmangart knew the demonstration had also been 'excited by the pamphlets that come from different neighborhoods with the motto "win or die," ' accompanied by a 'symbol of sedition.'[65] Despite the troops' initial attempts at controlling the violence in Lille, they either became ineffective and abandoned the town or were recalled to another area, as the next letter from Lille came months later from a new band of home-grown soldiers. Having organized themselves to contain the violence, they addressed the minister of war in hopes of obtaining legitimacy and more weapons.

The letter presented this new citizen militia as entirely necessary for the security of Lille, and operating under the jurisdiction of the new government and the king. The anonymous author described the violence toward government officials in the town as extreme, requiring immediate action. One mid-July evening, a mob pillaged the homes of several prominent men of the city. In response to this violence, and out of a need for self-protection, 'some good citizens hurried to unite, and to enroll themselves in a militia that all the honest men desire very much to be established.' Citizens elected three new officers for their militia of about two thousand people. This newly established army proved successful, as the officers and volunteers managed to restore peace with relatively little violence, crediting their 'union, intelligence,' and 'zeal.' The letter-writer emphasized, however, that despite its initial success, the militia would have to stay on its guard in order to prevent the town from erupting into chaos again.[66] Successive letters confirmed that the committee and the new citizen militia had become legitimate and permanent: it held formal ceremonies where members of the militia swore oaths to protect the people, and it continued the requests for government sanctions.[67]

The countryside was not unique in its experience of violence and the spontaneous formation of citizen-made militias. Paris was similarly broiled in tension and violence during this period, and the violence in Paris, and the peoples' response to it, provided the key moment for the generation of France's citizen army. As discussed earlier, the officers and reformers of the French army had struggled for decades over reforms, making at times little headway. As attractive as the idea of a citizen-like army sounded to officers, and while many of them genuinely wished for better lives for their soldiers, they could not collectively support the more decisive reforms that would have cost noble officers some of their privileges. The failure of these reforms to make lasting change in France's line army, however, did not doom the French dream of a citizen army. As the officer corps struggled with the recent measures of the Council of War, citizens in Lille and throughout the French provinces were already making ad hoc citizen armies. Adding to these spontaneous citizen-soldier creations, the taking of the Bastille sealed and assured the existence of a French citizen army. What the reforming officers could not force through army protocol, citizen and soldiers themselves created organically. Their efforts in Paris became cemented in the form of the National Guard.

The fall of the Bastille, following closely on the heels of the creation of Lille's new citizen army, represented the culmination of a process in which citizens and soldiers combined forces and determined the direction of military violence. Just as in Lille, citizens in Paris had proclaimed themselves part of a new 'national guard' with the aim of controlling the violence in the city. As in other provinces, many soldiers and the local police, the *gardes-françaises*, sympathized with them and aided their efforts. In an earlier altercation in Paris, some *gardes-françaises* had refused to fire on the rioters, which cemented their growing role as the new allies of the third estate. As more troops poured into Paris to quell the rioting at the behest of Louis XVI, civilians grew anxious and wanted to arm themselves. While the Bastille may have been a symbol of aristocratic oppression, it was more importantly a storehouse of arms and ammunition, which these self-proclaimed citizen soldiers needed in order to be effective. When they heard that French citizens met with resistance at the Bastille on 14 July, large numbers of *gardes-françaises* and soldiers ran to the citizens' aid. Together, they took the Bastille and emptied it of its arms. While many soldiers did stay loyal to their regiments, up to 75 men per regiment deserted during the days surrounding 14 July. Others recorded hearing soldiers declare that they would dismantle their weapons if ordered to fire on the people.[68] Samuel Scott has counted 54 regular soldiers who helped Parisians take the Bastille, but argued that there must have been many more participants who were not recognized.[69] The fall of the Bastille, while it stands as a symbolic beginning of the French Revolution, also became an emblematic moment for the emergence of a citizen army, when the line between who was a citizen and who was a soldier blurred to the point where trained soldiers of the line army could protest with citizens, and citizens could arm themselves to serve alongside the soldiers as allies. It is not a coincidence that the pivotal moment that marked the beginning of the Revolution happened to be the moment that an actual citizen army emerged.

This new relationship between citizens and soldiers, and the possibility of being both a citizen and a soldier at the same time, became formalized with the creation of the National Guard in Paris. Like the extemporaneous uniting of citizen and soldier to take the Bastille, the creation of the National Guard in Paris corresponded with the bourgeois citizen army in Lille. In Lille, town leaders had decided to create their own army to regulate the violence and, on 15 July in Paris, the National Assembly did the same. While Paris's National Guard was not the first exhibition of the new attitudes in France toward citizens and soldiers, its creation in Paris 'would assure the success of the municipal revolution everywhere else' in France.[70] By 13 July 1789, the National Assembly had already decided that 'the people should guard the people,' and though the king was reluctant to agree, wanted to create the kind of bourgeois-citizen militia that was already in place in other areas of France.[71] In addition to institutionalizing the existing citizen–soldier relationship, the National Assembly acknowledged the influence of the American Revolution by appointing Lafayette as its chief.[72] The choice communicated that the National Assembly expected the kind of citizen militia that America had purportedly enjoyed. Lafayette's previous experiences fighting in a citizen army during the American Revolution made him a legitimate choice, both to the new leaders of the French government and to the people so eager to create their own citizen militia. When organized in this fashion, the National Guard attracted all kinds of volunteers from traditional soldiers to usually civilian citizens. Former *gardes-françaises* of Paris joined, as well as a large number of deserters from the Swiss regiments of the French army. Lafayette obtained permission from the king to allow deserters from the army to join the National Guard. The National Guard also consisted of artisans and citizens from all walks of life, truly making it a *National* Guard, and not just a small collection of zealots. Following the example that the capital and some of the provinces had set, many local chapters of the National Guard appeared all over France. Some areas, such as Rouen, boasted multiple corps of bourgeois militia, so eager were citizens to join France's new national fighting force. This new force did not have to answer to the French line army, for its leader, Lafayette, 'the most popular man of the era, was on equal footing with the minister of war.'[73] In the form of the National Guard, at least, France could finally boast that it had a citizen army.

With the National Guard, France in many ways achieved its citizen army. Like the ancient Greek and Roman armies and the American citizen soldiers, National Guardsmen across France volunteered for service out of a desire to defend and sustain their *patrie*. While the National Guard might have started as a local force meant to police its citizens and defend its small corner of France, National Guard forces did participate in the touchstone battle of Valmy, and defended French borders from the Prussians. The institution seemed to fulfill old regime expectations of a citizen army composed of citizens who did not rely wholly on military discipline but used their own morals and values in keeping order among its own ranks.[74] Whereas the French line army presented a broken and confused spectacle in 1789, the National Guard acted as a hearty force, able to keep the king and citizenry under control at the same time. The story of the creation of France's citizen army, however, cannot end here. While it is important to recognize the National Guard for its place in the French Revolution and the embodiment of old regime imaginings, it was never the subject of reformist or civilian musings. The goal had not been to create a new army of citizen soldiers, but to reform the line army into a citizen army. The National Guard would support this army, but the line army was still the largest, most rigorously trained and disciplined, and most significant fighting force in France.

What did the rupture of the officer corps, the fall of the Bastille, and the rising of the National Guard mean for the line army? Would it finally achieve citizen-army status in the Revolution? Many contemporaries seemed to think that the fall of the Bastille signaled the line army's emergence as a citizen army, and eagerly continued reforms to match the perceived new reality. Many signs did point to this era as a time of transition in which a citizen army was being established, such as officers refusing to fire on the citizens and the soldier–citizen fraternization. The complications of a true citizen army, especially under the twists and turns of the Revolution, however, soon would come to light. From 1789 to 1791, officers, soldiers, and civilians alike would rejoice at the realization of the citizen army, but would not be able to organize and institute it in a way that would ensure its effectiveness or longevity.

6

A Dream Deferred

When the National Assembly took charge of the French government and the Bastille crumbled at the hands of disaffected former soldiers and Parisians, signaling the beginning of the Revolution, many officers responded with outright elation. In their eyes, this Revolution heralded not a new beginning or sudden change, but the fulfillment of all the army reforms debated over the past several decades. Since the Seven Year's War, officers, reformers, and even civilian writers envisioned how elements of a citizen army could be embodied in the French army. Modeled on ancient Greeks and Romans, and boosted by idealized accounts of American citizen soldiers, the French idea of a citizen army involved several elements, including patriotism, an officer corps with fewer abuses, and better conditions for soldiers. Despite efforts of multiple ministers of war and the Council of War to remove the abuses and create a lasting military constitution, conflict over privilege and divisions within the second estate blocked satisfying and lasting change. Disputes over reforms and heated conflicts between officers, as well as long-standing dissatisfaction on the part of the soldiers, ruptured the army, which, combined with violence in the provinces and in Paris, appeared to initiate the citizen army that reforming officers had hoped for. In the provinces, citizens formed ad hoc militias to protect their lives and property, soldiers refused to fire on citizens, and officers refused to give the order. In Paris, soldiers abandoned their regiments and joined citizens in tearing down the Bastille to arm the populace. The citizen army, it seemed, had at last arrived.

Enthusiasm for the new citizen army united everyone: civilians in the new National Assembly and officers from all over France embraced it, and both groups continued to believe that common Frenchmen from all walks of life would embrace it as well, as soon as army conditions (inevitably) improved. The National Guard, which sprang organically from the cooperation of citizens and soldiers, certainly embodied many of the expectations for the citizen army.[1] The question remained, however, of what these recent events would mean for the line army, which had been the subject of citizen-army reforms for the last four decades, and which formed the core of the French forces.[2] Officers expected reform efforts from the old regime to continue. Instead of addressing concerns to the Council of War, they would address them to the military committee of the National Assembly, which consisted mostly of high-ranking noble officers. The king remained the chief executive of the nation and the army, and officers pledged their loyalty primarily to him. While the officer corps slowly opened to more men of non-noble status, most officers felt secure in the positions at the outset of this Revolution. They expected devotion and ardor from their soldiers and improved conditions among the ranks. The overwhelming sentiment from the officers of various regiments, as well as the members of the National Assembly's military committee, was that *this* time they would finally get it right; all the glaring problems from the old regime army could and would finally be put to rest.

Despite these great expectations, the early Revolution would prove the final disappointment to reform-minded officers, who would see their ambitions for the new citizen army crumble by 1791. Sam Scott, Rafe Blaufarb, and other historians have designated this moment as the beginning of the French citizen army, but considering officers' reform efforts during the old regime and the widespread enthusiasm for America's Revolutionary-war forces, the early Revolution really marks the citizen army's dénouement.[3] This final chapter reveals how much the citizen army had always been a vision of the old regime that existed more in the minds of elite men of letters and reform-minded officers than it ever did in reality. The citizen army had always been based on and inspired by fantastical or fictional examples: legendary accounts of Sparta and Rome and a much mythicized America – inventions of optimistic reformers. As seen in the previous chapter, their desire for the citizen army had even stimulated the Revolution and to a degree initiated it by having long encouraged soldiers and citizens to become synonymous. On the other hand, the realization and acknowledgment of the citizen army would force noble officers to abandon certain privileges, especially their near exclusive hold on the officer corps and thus their elevated status in both military and social hierarchies. By challenging the officers and making it possible to try the citizen army, events of the Revolution signaled that their dream of the citizen army had been, and always would be just that – a dream.

In a larger sense, the story of the French army in the initial years of the Revolution is in many ways the story of the Revolution itself. The army provided the intersection between debates over citizenship and politics and influenced the creation of the revolutionary political culture. Many studies of language and political culture in the French Revolution have excluded the army, and similarly many studies of the revolutionary army have considered it either on campaign or otherwise separated from the center of revolutionary events. Far from a mere extension of revolutionary aims, however, the army lay at the center of the Revolution, and officials in the National Assembly were determined to see it confirm the Revolution's trajectory through the willing service from eager citizens. Members of the Assembly, officers, and interested writers would use this military milieu to argue about definitions of virtue, citizenship, and expectations for the Revolution. The radical turn that the army would eventually take at the end of 1791 would only just precede the radical turn of the Revolution itself. With eager citizen soldiers in the ranks extolling their new rights, and mostly old regime noble officers at the helm, the new citizen army represented a microcosm of the Revolution's potential for France. Like the larger nation, the army would eventually discover that a ruling class trying to perpetuate its status from the old regime could not coexist with a citizenry straining for more power. From 1789 to 1791, the crumbling of the reformers' vision for the citizen army ushered in the conscript army that France would rely on for the rest of the Revolution and through the Napoleonic era.

At first glance, the French citizen army's brief life seems to continue the unfulfilled reform efforts of the old regime: officers argued mightily for more recognition and better conditions for their soldiers without wishing for any change in their own positions. Full of optimism and based on fantastical examples, few officers considered how a real citizen army would affect them, or how the actual citizens and soldiers in question would respond to it. In their letters to the National Assembly, officers showed their debt to citizen-army rhetoric, but also their lack of understanding in how a realized citizen army would impact their status. Reeling from the Council of War's complete failure to provide a satisfying permanent constitution for the army, officers barraged the National Assembly with their frustration and disappointed hopes. As the Council of War had been just the most recent chapter in a long history of dissatisfying reform efforts, military writers had plenty to complain about as they alerted the Assembly to the army's plight.[4] Compared with earlier assessments of dissatisfactory reform efforts, these harangues practically sizzled with resentment. Accusations abounded of ministers using the army as a 'play thing' that insulted the Frenchmen's natural predilection toward military service.[5] Even worse, recent reforms had driven a wedge between soldiers and their officers, making officers look ridiculous and obscuring soldiers' essential nature as 'brave, sensible, and generous.'[6] Officers seemed especially bitter at the failure of the Council of War to put an end to vacillating reform efforts; its decrees only 'sweetened the pains' without providing any actual improvement.[7] Promotions tended to reward incompetence and flattery, with little regard for merit. The most heinous offense the Council of War had committed, though, was splitting the French officer corps into the different tracks of advancement, an 'odious dissection.'[8] The Forez regiment in particular hoped, now that power over the army had shifted to the National Assembly, that both king and nation would reunite rich and poor nobles and reward them on the basis of personal merit.[9]

Despite the plethora of reforms officers longed to see, they did not anticipate any change in their status or role in the army.[10] The trajectory of reforms they articulated to the National Assembly remained much the same as it had during the old regime: fixing 'vices,' banishing 'intrigue', and rewarding 'merit,'[11] so that 'state of the officer' would become more 'stable,' and soldiers more 'attached to their job.'[12] Concerning their ranks, officers desired more transparency in the process of promotion, one that reflected merit, rather than court favor, and that encouraged rather than disappointed officers.[13] As seen in the process of reform in the old regime, though, any changes in the system of promotion were bound to chafe some nobles, whether of high or lower rank.[14]

Complaints about soldiers' treatment and conditions similarly echoed old regime concerns and requests for better clothes, food, and ammunition, as well as discipline appropriate to their spirit and more opportunities for promotion.[15] Still drawing on ancient examples, the regiments of Forez recommended soldiers follow the example of ancient Romans and work on roads during peace time as a means of employment and exercise.[16] To these lists, the infantry officers in garrison at Bastia in Corsica added that officers must cultivate affection for their soldiers as they would their own sons.[17] Like the proposed reforms concerning the officers, these views on how to improve the soldiers' lot varied little from the types of proposals seen during the old regime.

The Council of War's disheartening and disillusioning failures in addressing all of these long-held complaints only encouraged officers to embrace the new order and the National Assembly as *the* governing body that would finally give ear to these grievances and designs. Officers of all ranks in the regiment at Lille dared to address the Assembly 'with confidence [concerning] our complaints on the vices of our actual constitution, and submit to your *lumières* the ways that we believe proper to destroy them.'[18] The infantry at Aunia honored the National Assembly for having been so eager to receive complaints and ideas from 'zealous citizens' for the larger benefit of the public.[19] Surely the Assembly's 'zeal for the good of all citizens' and order would harken its attention to officers' suggestions. Drawing on their long-held view that patriotism lay at the root of all successful reforms, officers assured themselves that 'the purest patriotism enflames all [the] hearts' of National Assembly members; surely this body would succeed where others had failed.[20] The *bas-officiers*, or lower officers, from Limousin decried the earlier constitutional changes, which varied so greatly that 'the only stable thing is our misery!' But the Assembly's work would assure 'the happiness of all citizens,' as well as 'improve the well-being of the poor French soldiers. Full of confidence in your knowledge, they name you to advance their regeneration.'[21] The regiment of Barrois went a step further, and placed the National Assembly squarely in the middle of the new soldier-citizen complex in France, addressing its members as 'Warrior Citizens,' and continuing to laud them for their concern for and love of the people: 'When we see you embrace with love of the public good, when we see you entirely devoted to the happiness of a nation that we are part of, and that you represented so well, we raise without fear our voices to you.' The purpose of the National Assembly was evident, 'It is to destroy the abuses . . . it is to reignite the hope of beaten soldiers, to reignite in their souls' the desire for service. In return, they would be 'devoted and faithful to the nation' and show submission to their king.[22] Every opportunity rested with the National Assembly. Only this new legislative body could 'give the military career a new splendor.'[23]

Reform-minded officers had reason to believe that with the National Assembly leading the latest reform attempts, their status would not change. The National Assembly worked closely with the minster of war to improve the army, and the military committee of the National Assembly consisted almost entirely of noble officers already active in reform efforts.[24] Furthermore, the ultimate fate of the army still rested with the king, who received their earliest calls for reform in the wake of the fall of the Bastille alongside the National Assembly. As a 'citizen king,' Louis XVI would assure French liberty after careful consideration of his people's grievances.[25] The National Assembly did not replace the king's authority, but merely facilitated the king's use of the army.[26]

In short, French officers of the old regime gleefully promoted the citizen army, largely unconcerned about any change it would bring to their status or usual means of operation. As the Regiment of Rohan familiarly concluded in its memoir: the National Assembly would provide 'new motives for worshiping his *patrie* and his king in each member of the French army' who in return would 'sacrifice for them until the last drop of his blood' was poured out for France.[27]

The citizen-army rhetoric from the old regime had also set up French officers to think of their soldiers as citizens who were voluntarily serving in the army, their enlistment now sprang from personal initiative – their own desire to serve – rather than impressment or desperation. Most reforms in the old regime had been directed at improving the condition of and motivating soldiers, and officers envisioned citizens and soldiers rising to the occasion. This powerful myth of the citizen soldier positioned the officers for a rude clash with reality. Addressing the National Assembly, officers referred to their soldiers in reverent tone to laud their willing sacrifice for the nation, acknowledging that the era of the soldier-citizen had begun. The regiment of Forez eloquently reminded the National Assembly that this new era required a different approach. 'The soldier,' reads the *mémoire*, 'constitutes the military man as the people constitute the nation, their rights are confounded, because each soldier is [a] citizen and each citizen is [a] soldier: thus the nation in recovering liberty has a great interest in emancipating the soldier from the slavery in which he groans, and not to abandon him to the arbitrariness of the ministers, who in their frequent changes destroy almost always the work of their predecessors.'[28] That all soldiers and citizens were now the same added a greater sense of urgency to the reform efforts; as citizens, soldiers suddenly found themselves in a state of liberty, not slavery. Soldiers had chosen to sacrifice their freedoms for the safety of the *patrie* and their fellow citizens. Here the centrality of personal initiative to French ideas of a citizen army came into full play. With the rhetoric of sacrifice, patriotism, and citizenship surrounding the soldier, he was no longer a poor conscript suffering under miserable conditions, but a willing soldier, acting on his personal initiative to serve the state. It was in trying to institute this desire to serve, under the assumption that it existed, that the leadership of this new citizen army would meet with the most difficulties. While many of the reforms addressed to the National Assembly continued old regime goals, the soldier had become a citizen soldier at least on paper, and officers imposed their visions of a citizen army on his motives and behavior. The Infantry of D'Aunia specifically linked the 'sacrifice of his individual liberty' for the larger community as the defining element of a soldier, who should in turn receive his rights that were at present so sorely lacking.[29] This acknowledgment of the citizen status of soldiers and their personal desire to serve was widespread. An anonymous infantryman saw both officers and soldiers as a 'corps of citizens' who happily consecrated their time 'to the happiness of the *patrie*.'[30] A company *of bas-officiers* from the regiment from Province noted that soldiers had always been this way, sacrificing 'their life and their peace for the support of the state.'[31]

Soldiers seemed to recognize their new-found importance, and they did not shrink from using it. Edmond-Louis-Alexis Dubois de Crancé created a small scandal when he apparently referred to soldiers as 'brigands' in a speech that appeared in various newspapers. According to soldiers from the regiments of Armagnac and Auvergne, Dubois de Crancé, while speaking on the larger subject of recruitment and conscription, had asked, what 'father of a family does not tremble to abandon his son, not to the hazards of war, but to . . . a crowd of unknown brigands, a thousand times more dangerous?' *Bas-officiers*, corporals, grenadiers and chasseurs from the Regiment of Armagnac complained to the National Assembly of the insulting statement, especially considering the soldiers' new-found honor. Their officers added their support to the soldiers' demands for justice, believing that it confirmed their admirable sensitivity to national issues. They insisted that the National Assembly rebuke Dubois de Crancé, since 'the love of the *patrie* alone makes French soldiers.' Dubois de Crancé responded immediately to these complaints. He decried the classification of French troops as 'brigands' and denied having ever said such things, crediting 'public enemies' with spreading rumors. To clarify his sentiments on soldiers, Dubois de Crancé talked about the problems with the *ancien regime*'s recruitment methods, and reiterated that all citizens were responsible for defending the *patrie*. His words inspired applause in the National Assembly and satisfied the protestors, but proved a telling example of soldiers' new-found power.[32] Seeing themselves as citizens and worthy of praise for their sacrifices, soldiers pressed for the promised rise in status, and saw the opportunity to get revenge for past abuses.

While the government and army seemed to come to a general consensus over the status of the soldiers as citizens and citizens as would-be soldiers, the question of how citizenship and soldier-hood would materialize in the form of a military constitution – how the National Assembly and the army would institute the personal desire and initiative of citizens to enlist as soldiers and soldiers to behave as citizens – gave way to some creative *mémoires*, but all of which presupposed that people became soldiers of their own personal desire. Villeneuve, an old artillery officer and citizen army enthusiast had a very literal plan to make soldiers into citizens: require them to marry and give them farm land! He argued that this method would eliminate desertion and make all soldiers extremely happy as husbands and fathers, providing them with a more personal stake in protecting French borders. All soldiers would also receive a parcel of land that they could cultivate, and where they would reside with their families. The land could stay in the family until the soldier became too wounded or old to fight, at which point, the land would pass to his eldest son if he joined the army. This proposal sought to institute a citizen army in the most literal sense, giving the soldier land and family to protect, and infusing a soldier's military service with that sense of personal initiative so important to the idea of the citizen army in the old regime. It also referenced agrarian republicanism without threatening the monarchy; a perfect marriage of the old regime and ancient or American citizen army images.

Villeneuve had ideas for the reverse as well, turning citizens, at least poorer citizens, into faithful soldiers that gladly served for life. It included a Sparta-like system of youth education to prepare men for war from a young age. The poorer classes, he realized, were the 'least considered and the most considerable,' and therefore would benefit from the state's attention as well as providing the state with soldiers. By his reasoning, fathers of poor families would welcome the opportunity for a guaranteed honest post for their children. Children would live in state military schools, spend their youth in training, and therefore be a great asset to their corps by adulthood. This upbringing would also ingratiate the young soldier to his *patrie*, and he would view the king as his own father. The government's attentions and provisions for these youths would 'make the most neglected class the class of heroes.'[33] Villeneuve's idea of a citizen army would inspire the soldier to serve the state and bring out his inherent virtue.

M. Flamant, a *chasseur* in the Auvergne regiment in Paris, also had ideas for turning civilian citizens into soldiers and making them militarily useful. In 1790, he addressed a 'military catechism' to General Lafayette, which contained simple instructions for learning military exercises in a short amount of time. Clearly, 'in a time when each citizen becomes a soldier,' people would devote their 'most precious moments to defending his *patrie*,' and Flamant's pamphlet would provide instructions for handling a musket and marching. If 'true patriotism does not cease to guide him,' Flamant believed his pamphlet would become a necessary item for those whose 'patriotic zeal makes them embrace the beautiful public cause.'[34] Contributions from such men as Villeneuve and Flamant demonstrated that officers were eager to incorporate former civilians into the military fold. They assumed that non-military citizens must have been eager to take on the task, which they would be ready for, again, because past discussions of the citizen army had always included personal initiative. The true test of that concept as the center for the citizen army, however, came in the debates surrounding the most controversial aspect of this new citizen-army reality: recruiting.

The general question of recruiting in these early years of the Revolution rested on whether to conscript everyone – thereby assuring that all citizens served in the army and that the army had sufficient troops – or whether to rely on voluntary enrollment and trust that the new spirit of soldier citizenship and improved army conditions would fill the ranks. Ideas on how to achieve this varied, but both army officers and representatives in the National Assembly heavily supported voluntary enrollment. Recruiting had always been difficult, as the regiment D'Auvergne pointed out, because of the general distaste for army life. Even with the new calls to arms, declarations of soldier citizenship, and some improvement in the conditions of military service, it would take time to dissolve the stigma attached to army service.[35] Officers from the Forez regiment felt that with time and an attractive salary, eventually even well-born young men and their families would approach the army as an apt school for young men.[36]

One anonymous military writer supported conscription, but only for a few years, and he did not portray it as being burdensome, as the transformed army would be the perfect place to work as a youth. After four years of required service, young men would become free to pursue any profession. Soldiers during the reigns of Henri IV and Louis XIV, after all, viewed their service as proof of love for their officers and country, and evidence of their liberty. The current transformation of the army would soon inspire universal admiration. The moment of regeneration of the army had certainly come, due to the 'incredible siege of the Bastille,' which guaranteed a happy existence to 'those brave and wise soldiers,' who became dignified and respected that day. From that point on, the French nation yearned to make these men happy.[37] Such an optimistic view saw military service not so much as a duty, but as the natural fulfillment of what the nation promised to the people and a 'happy' time for the youth of the nation.

In the National Assembly, Dubois de Crancé courted controversy again, this time for his motion for conscription.[38] He justified such an idea by contrasting his concept of a conscripted army with the dreaded *milice* that had been so fiercely detested in the *Cahiers de Doléances*. He pointed out that citizens did not reject military service in and of itself, and saw conscription as a way to conserve citizens' love of the army. As France now lived in a time of liberty and equality, military service would be different from the *milice*, when people served by choosing lots. Dubois de Crancé concluded that national conscription would be necessary for the citizen army to work. Such a conscription army would demand merely of an oath to defend liberty, law, and his leaders that all men would take at the age of 15. This ceremony would mark citizens as 'faithful unto the last drop of their blood.'[39] The rest of the National Assembly favored voluntary enrollment. Especially if service in a citizen army did not tax men beyond what they naturally felt as citizens, there would be no need to force them into service. Recruitment by conscription represented 'the more tyrannical and most violent' option, and the 'most contrary to the rights of man, the most opposed to all principles of liberty' – the obvious choice was voluntary enrollment. The duc de Liancourt was confident that, left to themselves, citizens would develop a culture of military service as an expectation among the people, not as something the government would have to enforce. Conscription, on the other hand, would rob military service of its patriotism and turn French citizens into 'slaves.' Like the anonymous military officer, Liancourt saw national education as key to developing patriotism and its fulfillment in army service.[40] M. le vicomte de Mirabeau agreed that the military system should be 'the system of liberty' and therefore favored voluntary recruitment.[41] Voluntary recruitment received more support from the duc de Biron added that paying a good salary to soldiers would ensure their continued enrollment. Furthermore, each municipality could decide how to raise and assemble troops when necessary.[42] The vicomte de Noailles agreed on voluntary enrollment, as did the vicomte de Toulongeon.[43] On 22 July the National Assembly decreed voluntary enrollment for the formation of the active army, reasoning that 'the obligation of personal service attacks the individual liberty of citizens' and would take talented people away from worthy pursuits, only to make 'mediocre soldiers.'[44] All these discussions, even arguably Dubois de Crancé's view of national conscription, reflected the understanding described in the old regime that a citizen army must be based on the personal initiative – the individual inspiration – of each citizen.[45] Because few citizens or soldiers would act as they had been scripted to during the old regime, however, this citizen-army rhetoric that had so enthused French officers ironically ensured that their citizen army was doomed from the start.

From 1789 to 1791, the officer corps and National Assembly maintained an optimistic view of the citizen army, but such a rose-colored perspective did not fully engage with much of the violence in the provinces and in Paris. The early years of the Revolution – before the war with Austria, the Terror, and extreme radicalism – have a reputation for being promising and liberal, but they saw their share of violence in food riots, public lynching, brigandage and general disorder, continuing the turmoil in the provinces that had been witnessed at the end of the old regime.[46] Within the army, disaffected soldiers used this moment of transition and their new status to challenge or even harm or kill their officers, a testament to their suffering from the old regime. Members of the National Assembly were slow to acknowledge this internal conflict brewing within the army, in part because, like other institutions or groups, the army had become a living testament to the level of success of the Revolution. Officers largely represented, willingly or not, the more conservative approach to the Revolution or even the oppression associated with the old regime, whereas soldiers embodied the more radical elements of the early Revolution.[47] By turning a blind eye to the conflicts in the army and insisting that all of its problems rested with a few outlying evildoers, the National Assembly remained optimistic about the Revolution, but allowed deeply-rooted conflicts to wreak havoc within the army.

Even as reform-minded officers were writing the National Assembly to express glee and certainty regarding the citizen army's destined success, Generals Rochambeau and Duportail struggled with the new 'citizen army' in practice. They sent reports from the field in northern France to the minister of war that countered the general enthusiasm. In the areas around Amiens, they met with a disruptive populace, general disorder, and intra-army drama. Rochambeau detailed an episode in which the National Guard of Amiens led the populace in attacking a chateau, seizing some old cannons and various weapons, 'mistreating' the lady of the palace, her children, and her servant, who were beaten and further threatened. He pleaded with the minister of war for a regiment to be stationed there.[48] In March 1791, he reported that a ship of grain destined for Paris had failed to reach one of its check points, as its journey had been threatened by discontented townspeople, who attacked the boat with stones and other weapons. He again requested more troops.[49] By 1 May, General Duportail reported that a growing number of troops in Laon walked the streets armed with clubs and pistols, wearing the revolutionary cockade, making off-color remarks to their officers.[50] There were some examples when officers behaved bravely or acted wisely, but most of the correspondence described the general challenges that Rochambeau and Duportail faced with this ‘citizen army.’

The Nancy Affair, the most prominent military catastrophe, provided another example of how soldiers interpreted the new citizen army. In the summer of 1790, disagreements over regimental accounts escalated into a shootout involving citizens, soldiers, officers, and the National Guard of Metz. The mutiny began with tensions between soldiers and officers stationed in the city of Nancy in northeastern France, who disagreed over the use of unit accounts and regimental funds. Soldiers of the *du Roi* Infantry demanded audits, and, backed by the citizens of Nancy, held an officer hostage for the ransom of 150,000 livres, which they received. Encouraged, the *Chateauvieux Swiss* Infantry and *Mestre de Camp Général* Calvary made similar demands, but their officers responded by beating them with musket straps for their audacity. Infuriated by these actions, citizens joined with the insulted soldiers in rebelling against the officers’ ‘tyranny.’ Influential representatives of the National Assembly as well as Lafayette agreed to send General Bouillé to Nancy with several thousand troops to restore order, in order to make an example of the unruly soldiers. Their actions only escalated the situation. Soldiers in Nancy feared that Bouillé and another general were plotting a counter revolution, and they armed themselves and the people in the town, including National Guardsmen. They also imprisoned most of their officers. By this point, Bouillé was marching on the city with 5,000 men. On 28 August, he demanded that they surrender, lay down their arms and hand over the most mutinous soldiers for trial, or he would take the city and shoot every man seen carrying a gun. Faced with certain demise, the mutinous soldiers agreed to surrender, but when Bouillé entered the city, he received fire from the Swiss regiment and its local citizen supporters. After heavy exchanges of fire and much street fighting, Bouillé’s troops finally established control of the town by 4:30 the next morning. Retribution was swift and fierce: dozens of the mutinous soldiers condemned to death or life on the galleys, one soldier broken on the wheel, hundreds of civilians imprisoned, two of the regiments disbanded, and Nancy removed from service.[51]

The Affair of Nancy is just the most dramatic of many citizen-army-related disruptions, and the National Assembly responded by forming a military committee tasked with handling the officers’ concerns and general indiscipline in the army. In June 1790, La Tour du Pin, the minister of war, came before the National Assembly on behalf of the king to present the army's constant crises. The picture was grim: whole regiments flouted military ordinances and sacred oaths. Soldiers who had been loyal and honorable now slackened in discipline, scorned, threatened, kidnapped, blinded, and even killed their officers. In short, the army had fallen 'into the most turbulent anarchy.' Such widespread behavior threatened the very nation.[52] Combined with the Nancy Affair, such complaints presented the line army's rebirth as a 'citizen army' as a complete debacle. While soldiers and citizens fraternized on many occasions, hostility thrived between soldiers and their officers, whose noble status had just been abolished and which weakened their authority. With support from the people, the army proved unruly, and when citizens and soldiers did not accept themselves as one and the same, the army came under attack.

Outbreaks of violence, concerns about the army, and episodes like Nancy nevertheless did little to discourage members of the National Assembly from pursuing their citizen-army scheme.[53] They were determined to see the citizen army operate successfully, and show that the excited citizen soldiers under old regime-era leadership would prove effective and obedient to the Nation. The problem, they decided, did not lie with the system, but among 'enemies,' 'brigands,' or 'villains,' who sowed seeds of dissent among good, but naïve soldiers. Concerning the Nancy Affair, the marquis de Crillon campaigned for mercy on behalf of the soldiers, who had been seduced by enemies of the state to break their sacred oath. Charles de Lameth immediately agreed that Nancy presented merely the work of a few mischief makers.[54] The National Guard of Marseille, one of the more vehement of the Revolution, decried the 'detestable plot' of France's enemies to turn her over to foreign powers.[55] The National Assembly and National Guard vehemently insisted that Nancy presented an unusual occurrence that implicated few people who were already decided enemies to the state.

Quick to construct the memory of this military mutiny, the National Assembly used the Nancy Affair as a means to honor and praise the citizen army by heralding the brave citizens that fell in taking back the city. They rewrote the massive rebellion by highlighting the well-performing National Guard. General Bouillé, who led the combined forces against Nancy, praised the National Guard of Metz for its 'zeal, courage, and dedication to the public . . . no citizen, except those that were seen with weapons in hand, were attacked, and the most exact discipline reigned among the troops.' Its members 'merit the greatest praises, as much by their courage as by their patriotic zeal.'[56] The National Assembly also made a point of caring for any women left widowed or children left orphaned by the ordeal. Large state funerals, ceremonies, and speeches, which lingered throughout the year, arrested the image of Nancy and kept it from becoming anything other than a confirmation that the citizen army was a triumph.[57] Officers also insisted that everything was fine. One writer expressed the view that 'the French soldier naturally loves his officer,' and since he has understood that he has 'become a citizen,' he has been 'devoted to a revolution' led by the king. While this writer acknowledged that there had been times when soldiers killed their officers and even placed their heads on pikes, he since learned that the soldiers committing such 'excess cannot be French soldiers.'[58] Events like Nancy even ironically served as a battle cry to increase patriotism and the success of the citizen army. The National Guard of Montpellier reacted to the news of Nancy like a call to arms. In words that foreshadowed the *Marseillaise*, National Guardsmen warned the 'vile slaves of tyranny' responsible for the uprising that the millions of Frenchmen poised to rescue France would never bow to oppression while they marched 'under the flags of liberty,' but would eagerly run to battle, to prove with their blood their oath to 'live free or die.'[59]

The Affair of Nancy did make finding a military constitution more urgent, and reinvigorated reformers' commitment to the citizen army. Responding to the violence between soldiers and officers in 1789, Minister of War Tour de la Pin reiterated the need for good order.[60] The solution to the more immediate problem of rebelling soldiers, indiscipline, and mutiny was to confirm their oaths and reinvigorate their dedication to the *patrie* – here again the king was key. He authorized several regiments to take their civic oaths with members of the National Guard during the Festival of the Federation. Such a repeat of the oath-taking would allow the king to recognize the unity of citizens' will for liberty and prosperity, and encourage the return of public order. Each regiment was required to take part in these 'civic fêtes' to solidify the fraternal relationship between citizens and soldiers.[61] The president of the Assembly agreed that 'the title of soldier and that of citizen must be inseparably united.'[62] M. de Noailles added that such a ceremony, in honoring the soldiers, would make them firm supporters of the constitution and assure the end to all military insurrections.[63] Belief in the citizen army remained strong. Sam Scott has shown that the violence among the army lessened for a time after the Nancy Affair, as fewer officers took leave from their regiments and provided better supervision for their soldiers; perhaps efforts of the National Assembly to promote and refine the citizen army met with some success.[64]

Although ugly, even treacherous, intra-army violence could not snuff out the enthusiasm for the new citizen army, widespread discontent among and distrust of the officer corps would. Even though the citizen army was the brainchild of old regime officers, the greatest obstacle to its survival rested not in its dysfunctional operation, but in the disconnect between the officers and the Revolution. While the officer corps had become open to men of non-noble status, it still relied on traditional members of the officer corps to fill its ranks, a problem since more and more nobles had disappeared into exile, especially since June 1790. As early as August 1789, the cancelation of venal ennoblement essentially eliminated nobility, though not everyone realized the long-term implications of this law.[65] On 19 June 1790, the National Assembly voted to abolish hereditary noble status entirely, as well as all of its trappings; perhaps collectively the officers could have saved the second estate if they had banded together at this crucial moment, but they did not try to prevent the National Assembly from outlawing their existence.[66] Lafayette, ever the odd-noble-out, set the example for his fellow former-noble officers by embracing the end of the order. 'This motion' he said, 'is so necessary that I do not believe that it needed to be supported, but if it is needed, I announce that I embrace it with all my heart.'[67] Not all formal nobles seemed as keen as Lafayette to surrender title and privilege. Many former-noble officers, lamented losing certain guarantees of high rank. The Council of War had promised rapid advancement for the *haute noblesse*: lieutenant colonels were guaranteed the eventual rank of *maréchal de camp* (the highest rank in the French army), even allowing them to bypass the intermediary rank of colonel – a perk no longer available under the new rules of the National Assembly.[68] In addition to a change in their status, former nobles were wary of the violence that targeted some of the chateaux and families of the landed nobility. While full-scale emigration would not come until later in 1791 and 1792, former nobles had been trickling out of the country since the Revolution began. Squabbles between former nobles could provoke revolutionary outbursts – a duel in which the duc de Castries defeated Revolutionary Charles Lameth resulted in a mob setting fire to Castries's house. This incident, and others like it, increased the desire of already nervous nobles to emigrate, at least until the radical turn of the Revolution rerouted to a friendlier course.[69] Even celebrated officers from the American Revolution, such as the comte de Noailles, who also served in the Assembly, expressed anxiety about the events unfolding in France. In a letter to George Washington, Noailles requested that all French officers who contributed to American independence – not just colonels and generals – be allowed to join the Society of the Cincinnati. While such a request spoke to attempts toward equality, Noailles also wrote out of concern of their well-being in the Revolution. He expressed optimism that the Revolution 'portends the greatest blessings' especially to those who served in America and who brought an 'American Spirit' to the changes in France. Yet at the same time, Noailles further emphasized that membership of the Society and the accompanying association with the American Revolution would help noble officers navigate this new, tricky political climate. 'Such a brotherhood has been of the utmost help,' he said, 'and will be our greatest prop.'[70] Against this backdrop of mounting tensions between former nobles and the increasingly radical Revolution, military complications took on potent political meanings of opposing 'patriotic' soldiers and 'aristocratic' officers that increased officers' difficulties among their troops,[71] as tensions further mounted between the National Guard and regular army.[72]

M. Bureaux de Pusy, sympathetic to the former-noble officers struggling under the strictures of the Revolution, reported to the National Assembly with greater detail on their discontent. He categorized nobles' complaints into two categories: first, pining for their former status and the pleasures and privilege that it had entailed, and second, the 'insulting disobedience of their inferiors,' who were able to get away with insubordination by 'covering all their faults with a veil in the name of patriotism.' Such a complaint reflected not only the hyper-politicized nature of the line army, but also the ways in which the citizen army – envisioned and planned almost exclusively by army officers – had failed to realize so many great expectations. Rather than grow in love for their officers and country, and propel themselves willingly into war for the sake of their *patrie*, soldiers used patriotism as an excuse for hooliganism. Such disruptions apparently happened frequently, though often the actions of these citizens, M. Bureaux de Pusy argued, were not the fruit of patriotism, but rather the typical imprudence of youth that naturally affected a few men in every regiment.[73] Even as he registered the officers' complaints, de Pusy did not engage with the full magnitude of the problem. Officers also expressed uncertainty over their careers, having heard rumors of being replaced with *bas-officiers*, even soldiers. De Pusy finally concluded with a startling revelation: 'Many officers do not like the Revolution.'[74]

The discovery and confirmation that many of the officers did not like the Revolution inspired two modes of thought in the National Assembly: either implement concrete changes in army operation and organization to make officers happy, which de Pusy and M. de Cazelès proposed, or chase them away as dangerous to the Revolution, which Maximilien de Robespierre urged. Ideally, de Pusy reasoned, he could convince the officers that the Revolution afforded them many more advantages as members of the army, than those 'they lost in becoming citizens.'[75] De Pusy's observation here is key, for he articulates how the noble officers who had dreamed of and supported the citizen army never saw themselves taking part in it *as citizens*. Since the 1760s, officers had thought of fostering patriotism largely as a means of motivating their soldiers to better actions, making their soldiers citizen-like to tap into their more natural passions on the battlefield – for their part, officers had planned on maintaining their status above ordinary citizen soldiers. The demands of the Revolution, however, had erased that noble claim and reduced former-noble officers to the same status as their soldiers, something officers had never anticipated as they sketched their future citizen army. Who would have thought that the military philosophy born from such noble minds as Guibert and Servan would have required such sacrifices from noble officers? While the violence and disappointment of the early Revolution had not destroyed anyone's conviction that the citizen army would triumph, it did throw a great deal of suspicion over former nobles as capable officers, especially as the Revolution chiseled away at their privileges. De Pusy recognized that convincing the nobles of the benefits of their new status as mere military men, like their soldiers, would take a great deal of time and effort, despite the urgency of the Revolution. As suspicions against officers as enemies of the Revolution mounted, de Pusy hastened to come up with a solution that would allow the officers to honestly demonstrate their devotion to the Revolution without compromising their honor.

Knowing that officers could disagree with many aspects of the Revolution, de Pusy emphasized that officers did not have to sincerely love the laws of the state, but only respect them. If officers promised to respect and keep the laws, they could support the Revolution without compromising their honor. Such an oath, publicly sworn, would allow the French public to see the officers as part of the 'general interest.' This solution met with much applause from the National Assembly. The new oath would keep the officers in France, in the Revolution and help them earn the respect of the soldiers, who understood more than anyone how jealously an officer guarded his honor.[76] De Pusy's compromise showed the importance of former-noble officers to the Revolution and the success of the citizen army. Three years into the Revolution, 89% of generals leading the French army had been born noble, even as their status and power had plummeted.[77] On the other hand, officers were no longer driving the reform effort, but had to accept what the National Assembly decreed. Furthermore, while de Pusy and others in the National Assembly still thought highly of the noble-officer corps, the new oath seemed more a condescending concession than an eager inclusion.

Such a fragile position made the officer corps especially ripe for attack from Robespierre, who saw it divided between the few sincerely attached to the Revolution, and the majority whose principals opposed it. With Nancy fresh in mind, he feared that these officers would either continue to cause great disruption between themselves and the soldiers, or seduce the soldiers to work against the nation. This last would create an army 'animated by a spirit of conspiracy and ready to second the most sinister of projects against the constitution.' Making the officers take an oath and holding them to their honor appeared ridiculous, as these officers had already taken multiple oaths, and their 'honor' was not to be trusted. Instead, Robespierre insisted that officers must have real affection for the Revolutionary constitution in their hearts: 'an engagement of honor is not enough.'[78]

Robespierre's words struck a chord, and they received applause from the more radical revolutionaries, but M. de Cazalès, himself an army officer, objected. He argued that in the chaos of the past several years, French officers had often exhibited 'heroic courage.' With enemies gathered at the borders, and division in France, it was hardly a moment to dismiss 10,000 military men, arguably (in Cazalès' reasoning) the finest in Europe, nor to rob soldiers of the officers who were their guides and friends.[79] In *his* estimation, soldiers in fact loved their officers, and would be personally bereft and useless to the nation without them. While Robespierre, de Pusy, and Cazalès focused on the army in their speeches, the debate centered not just on the army, but on the character of the Revolution as a whole. De Pusy and Cazalès of the 'old guard' longed for compromise and reconciliation between the old order and the new, whereas Robespierre insisted on a 'pure' and united Revolution.

The polar opinions of the National Assembly embodied by the Cazalès and Robespierre debate reflected the broader sentiments of actual officers, who in their writings to the National Assembly acknowledged both extreme discontent and optimism. M. des Darides, Lieutenant of the King at the government of St Malo, complained of issues with uneven discipline among soldiers, and still called for 'legislation' that would 'procure [the *patrie*] an unshakeable [military] constitution!'[80] On the other hand, M. de la Brousse, infantry captain in Paris, generally believed that the French had a penchant for military service.[81]

Perhaps M. Du Puy Laron summed it up best in 1791, when he cited general division in thinking about the status of the army: some thought that it has been perfectly organized, and others that it was still not organized.[82] In short, both the National Assembly's and officers' treatment of the citizen army showed that its momentum had stalled. Still divided among themselves, noble officers did not agree on the state of the citizen army, which made them even more vulnerable to their enemies in the Assembly.[83]

Despite their initial position as the driving force of the French army at the beginning of the Revolution, officers had lost control of the army and its reforms by 1791. As exhibited by the very debate in the National Assembly between Cazalès, de Pusy, and Robespierre, officers now fought for their positions and very existence. The chaos and riots in the army, which undermined officers' authority, combined with the legislation blocking or canceling the very concept of noble status, had worked to remove noble officers from their position of power at the head of the army. Representatives of the National Assembly spoke of officers as necessary creatures who had to be placated. Part of the officers' difficulties originated in the very rhetoric of the citizen army. In the vast majority of the reform *mémoires* that officers had penned, and literature that reform-minded citizens had published, the citizen army had centered on soldiers and their well-being. Officers wrote about investing their soldiers with citizen-like qualities and amenities to motivate them, but there had been very few discussions of officers as citizens or how the officers would fit into this new citizen army. Because the citizen army had focused only on soldier-citizens, not officer-citizens, when officers and civilians acknowledged that it had materialized, the reforming officers seemed unnecessary. Officers' struggles for respect, authority, and position in the new regime merely fulfilled what their earlier counterparts had written regarding the citizen army. The reform-minded officer corps had in effect unintentionally written themselves out of the citizen army they had worked to create.[84] As a result, the center of power in the French army had shifted from the officers to the soldiers. As citizens, these soldiers wielded power through power of public opinion and revolutionaries like Robespierre. Despite his own lack of military experience, Robespierre now wielded more power over the fate of the officer corps than the officers themselves.

For the immediate debate between M. de Cazalès, de Pusy and Robespierre in June 1791, de Pusy's plea to try a new oath to inspire the officers must have won the day. The Assembly decreed on 13 June that all officers would engage their 'honor under the pain of infamy' to support the law and the king. Any officer failing in this duty would become unworthy of fighting for France, or even of carrying the title 'citizen.' The decree emphasized that the king would still be at the head of the troops of the line, an element sure to draw officers' loyalty.[85] For the moment, the National Assembly would continue to support old regime officers at the head of the French army. The die, however, had been cast; Robespierre's powerful and public declamations showed how the Revolution had moved beyond the vision of the army officers, whom he rightly recognized could no longer keep up with the changes it demanded. The majority of officers seemed reluctant to support the Revolution on its own merits, but only as far as the king and their honor required. Such a stance would not prove workable as the Revolution moved into a phase that required sincerity. As the National Assembly itself had conceded, the officers' allegiance to the Revolution lay almost entirely in their allegiance to the king.

And then just days after this oath had been approved, the king fled France for Austria. Travelling in a large carriage that held his entire family, Louis XVI crept across the French countryside, missing rendezvous and slipping by on blind luck, until the National Guard at Varennes discovered him just a short distance from the French–Austrian border. Louis XVI claimed that he was taking his family to a fortress at Montmedy, located conveniently on the border, to escape the chaos of Paris and help advance the Revolution quietly from the sidelines. His story failed to convince the people of Varennes; instead it won him and the royal entourage a slow return to Paris, accompanied by the National Guard and sometimes entire towns of citizens, some of whom insulted him and his queen from the road. The official story of the 'kidnapped' king, thankfully recovered before it was too late, placated the crowds for a short time, but the king's attempted escape, confirmed and compounded by a document found in his own hand condemning the Revolution, sealed his fate. The king had betrayed the Revolution. The only person who connected the noble-officer corps to the nation had become the nation's greatest enemy. The crisis this caused has been well-documented by several historians, especially the ways in which it confirmed feelings of paranoia and initiated the radical phase of the Revolution.[86] For the army, it let loose a torrent of difficulties and complications also, throwing it into an uproar and all but guaranteeing a European war.[87] In betraying the Revolution, the king had made it nearly impossible for the officers of the line army to support it, as they had just been presented with an oath that tied them to the Revolution through loyalty to the king. If the king had succeeded in fleeing to

Austria, would the officers have been honor-bound to follow him there? Now that the king had formerly declared himself against the Revolution, would Robespierre's worst fears come to pass, where a mass of military officers would turn their soldiers against the Revolution? The Assembly did not give officers much time to consider the matter, as it very soon required them to take a new oath, one which made no mention of the king at all![88] Members of the military committee of the National Assembly who approved this new oath must have anticipated resistance from the officers; they also required general officers to report on any of their subordinates that refused to take the oath, and suspend any officer that behaved in a manner that was 'suspicious.'[89] Now that the king no longer supported the Revolution, officers could not be trusted. The military committee of the National Assembly discussed combining the line army with the National Guard, which had distinguished itself during the king's flight as patriotic and sufficiently loyal to both the Revolution and the king's safety.[90] They envisioned combining the efforts of Generals Rochambeau, Lafayette, and the minister of war to lead the joint National Guard–line army. This seemed like a fitting triumph for the citizen army: to have the two French heroes of the American Revolution to unite their efforts and their forces in protecting France from counter revolutionaries without and within.

This dream never materialized, either. Officers took the hint from the new oath and the expectations that they would engage in suspicious behavior.[91] Following the flight of the king, over 2,500 officers abandoned their regiments, many of them fleeing across the border, and over the course of the next year, an estimated 6,000 officers, as much as 72 percent of army officers, fled the country, as M. de Cazalès had feared.[92] Emigration by the officers seemed to prove that they had been counter-revolutionary and suspect all along, which in turn lessened the already tenuous trust in the army, leading to even more emigration.[93] On 21 July, the military committee of the Assembly reported that 'regiments are deprived of officers,' and that many of them had fled to other countries.[94] The committee decreed that these officers would be hunted down as renegades and court martialed if they did not return to their regiments within the space of one month. Officers who abandoned their flags, but stayed in the country, were not to be pursued as renegades, but would never be promoted again. The emigration increased soldiers' suspicion of their officers, many of whom faced accusation and arrest, especially in the provinces.[95] As officers fled, new officers rose to take their place, largely from the ranks of non-commissioned officers and civilian families of good standing.[96] This would be followed by Minister of War Du Portail's great purge of top ministers of the army in September 1791, as well as several clerks, who in Du Portail's eyes seemed likely to oppose the Revolution.[97] Whatever turn the citizen army would take at this point, it would do it without the leadership or the help of much of the original officer corps – the part of the army that had crafted it and encouraged it from the time it had existed only on paper and in the minds of eager reformers. Even those who remained operated under much suspicion and had lost their collective control of the army.

When the noble officers abandoned their regiments to flee in great numbers to Austria, they were responding to a failure in their own efforts to create and command a working citizen army and to the changes that had been wrought in France since the Revolution began. While the officers had been in control of the direction of the army (with, as always, the blessing of the king) at the beginning of the Revolution, by 1791 the conflicts they experienced with their soldiers, the people, and their own internal divisions, showed how fruitless their citizen-army effort had become. It may seem as though the officers had turned their backs on France, the army, and the nation, but to the officers, it seemed the Revolution had turned its back on them.

If there was ever a time when France had a citizen army, it existed from 1789 to 1791, just before the king 'took flight,' if for no other reason than that officers and members of the National Assembly believed it in fact had become a reality. Its short and controversial existence was marred by difficulty, and it is questionable if any soldiers or citizens of the third estate felt the existence of the citizen army beyond their local National Guard units. The discussions of the citizen army that go deep into the old regime certainly influenced the army of the Revolution, but the writers and officers who had dreamed of the citizen army would not have recognized the army of the Revolution as such. Forever a goal, but never quite a reality, it would guide and influence the Revolutionary army with its emphasis on patriotism and inclusion of all people in the defense of the *patrie*, but never completely take form. There would never be a citizen army reality in France during the Revolution or Napoleonic period, only an attractive and alluring vision: a dream deferred.

7

Conclusion: Guidons Burning

> 'Soit héro. Soit plus. Soit citoyen.'[1]
>
> – Villeneuve, ancien officier d'artillerie

By 1791, it seemed that France's inflated expectations for citizen soldiers – and perhaps citizenship in general – had inhibited, if not indefinitely deferred, the realization of a citizen army for France. Much of French expectation for the citizen army throughout the old regime and Revolution had depended on the citizen desiring to join the army and fighting vigorously out of love for the *patrie*, with little change to the social hierarchy and status of the officers. The early Revolution, however, while promising the realization of a citizen army, also extinguished it, at least for the next several decades. Like a dream deferred, the citizen army was something that the officers, soldiers, and citizens of France had tried, and just barely touched, but never fully realized. Officers began to flee in great numbers in 1791, and the declaration of war on 20 April 1792 only increased the number of officers who emigrated, seeing it as their last chance to restore their comrades, the king, and their way of life, with the help of another country that still recognized nobility.[2] French Revolutionaries then had to contend with the 'citizen army' that they inherited, just as it crumbled under the rigors of an increasingly radical Revolution and the threats that plagued it without and within. The army of the French Revolution would pursue voluntary enrollment, specifically with calls for volunteers in 1791 and 1792, but the numbers of people who answered the call would not be sufficient to fill the army's ranks, and Revolutionaries would resort to conscription. With the departure of these officers, attempts for the citizen army that had been imagined during the old regime had ended, or at the very least deferred until after the Revolution and Napoleonic period.

Most recent historiography on the 'citizen army' of France usually places the beginning, not the ending, of the citizen army at this moment. Authors refer to the volunteers of 1791, the declaration of war on Austria, the *levée en masse* of 1793, or the wars of Napoleon, which encompassed much of the French nation and affected huge swaths of peoples in other nations as well. In this context, the idea of a citizen army in France has seemed largely connected not to the personal initiative of citizens, but to mere volume of men who served and their expectation for political rights in return for their military service.[3] This definition of citizen army, however, does not correspond to reformers' and early Revolutionaries' visions. Rather, they saw the citizen army as an institution full of willing volunteers, who served out of love for the *patrie*, because they already enjoyed their rights, not because their service earned those rights. While writers of the old regime expected nearly all citizens to fill the ranks of the army, guaranteeing universal participation had not been their primary concern. Through the early Revolution, discussions of the kind of conscription seen in the *levée en masse* revolted writers and politicians. If there was an expectation that people would serve, as in the case of Villeneuve and Servan's proposals, it would be because the *patrie* had already given the young citizens so much that serving in the army would seem natural. There was little talk of recruiting or drafts; as it was the very patriotism of the volunteers more than anything else that would guarantee the existence and battlefield prowess of the citizen army.

The citizen army that officers of the old regime had envisioned would not and could not hold throughout the Revolution for many reasons. On one hand, French officers had not sufficiently envisioned their own role in this citizen army. Much of the discussion of the French army as a citizen army had revolved around the idea of soldier motivation. As officers tried to apply their reform ideas, they primarily aimed at change to benefit the soldiers, with little thought for changing the status of the elite officer corps. With the onset of the citizen army at the beginning of the Revolution, few officers anticipated any change in their position at the top of the army's hierarchy, or their role as commanders of their troops. While they acknowledged the 'abuses' among the officer corps, especially in regard to the means of promotion, they had discussed amending these issues, not with patriotism or citizenship, but more transparency. By leaving themselves out of the reforms concerning the development of a citizen army, and distinguishing themselves so completely from their soldiers, officers inadvertently excluded themselves from this citizen army process and realization. Even after the beginning of the Revolution, officers continued competing with each other for honor and glory and favors from the king. They acknowledged the changes in the status of their soldiers, but did not adjust their own approach to the army or relationship with their troops, resulting in increased violence between the two groups and the officers seeming displaced in their own army. Because military and civilian reformers had praised the citizen army as a desired institution in France, and constantly referred to it in their *mémoires* and published works, when the citizen army seemed to take shape and everyone acknowledged it, it became the new center of military power. The idea of the citizen army that officers had clung to did not take shape as they had planned. In such a way did the Revolution both allow for and simultaneously end their citizen-army dream. At first the Revolution had empowered the soldiers to be citizens and given citizens the impetus to be soldiers. In attacking principles of hierarchy, however, the Revolution introduced an egalitarian principle that had been foreign to the citizen-army ideal imagined by pre-Revolutionary officers.

Soldiers, too, appeared ill-suited for the kind of citizen army that their officers had envisioned for them, and did not warm to army service any more than they had during the old regime. The crux of the citizen army as the officers and members of the National Assembly had envisioned it had been personal initiative on the part of the soldiers and citizens to serve the *patrie*. Once soldiers became widely recognized as citizens, however, they did not rush to defend the frontiers of France or follow the orders of their officers, but rebelled against their officers' and the army's expectations. The Nancy Affair among other catastrophes exhibited the poor relationship between the new citizen soldier and his officers. Furthermore, French citizens, while they showed greater camaraderie with soldiers, did not eagerly join the French line army. The National Guard, intended for more local policing and emergency service, did receive several volunteers, but the new citizen soldier did not swell the ranks of the regular army. When the Assembly called for volunteers to join the army in September 1791, the response was overwhelming but, at the same time, the line army could not fill its ranks, and missed 50,000 people. As the volunteers had been promised more pay and more freedom, many of the line army soldiers had merely quit their post in the regular French line army to become 'volunteers' and take advantage of the benefits. The call for troops in 1792 then found very few willing participants.[4] Even the initial wave of volunteers who embraced military service in 1791 returned to their normal lives a year later, when their enlistment had ended. As citizen soldiers, they could not commit to the French army for the long term, but had to continue their daily, non-military lives. The army of the Revolution became frustrated with these volunteers in the same way General Montcalm and the regular French army had found the Canadian forces wanting. The only partial commitment that a citizen soldier could give was not sufficient for France's military needs. The war with Austria and the violence at home that would define the more radical stage of the Revolution would necessitate a conscript army.

Even if the citizen army had worked from an organizational standpoint, the type of warfare that the Revolution and eventually Napoleon would demand would not be conducive to the citizen army as outlined by Guibert and Rousseau. Napoleon's officers would continue to perpetuate the importance of soldier motivation, and play on soldiers' and officers' sense of patriotism, but the soldiers would still fight in response to coercion rather than patriotic inspiration.[5] The initial idea for the reforms that would lead the French army in the direction of a citizen army assumed that France would only fight defensive, not imperial, wars. Guibert's citizen soldier rose at the first sound of the *patrie* in danger, and the early discussions of the National Assembly concerning the nature of the army anticipated having an emergency force if the borders were ever breached by the Prussians, Austrians, or English. During the French Revolution, however, the army would seek to take the Revolution across French borders, and Napoleon used the army to turn France into an Empire. This more offensive fighting did not fit in the paradigm of rallying the citizen to rise and defend the *patrie*; rather it would require conscription to harvest soldiers in order to fight for reasons that would not always be clear to them, a practice which echoed the habits of the old regime more than the patriotic Revolution.[6]

The Revolution's break with the old regime's vision of a citizen army was potently embodied in the burning of guidons, the flag or standard representing a military company and its commanding officer and decorated with symbols of that unit, often with references to especially important battles won and the glory of the unit's history. If the fleeing of the officers from their posts represented their acknowledgment of the end of the old regime's stretch into the Revolution, the Revolutionaries acknowledged the end of old regime's influence on the army by burning all the old regime guidons. In April 1792, a few months after so many officers had fled France for better prospects in England or Prussia, word reached the Legislative Assembly that some of the old regime guidons continued in the possession of their companies, despite earlier orders that they be destroyed. The military committee demanded that all these flags be collected and burned publicly in Paris. M. Montault pointed out that soldiers were reluctant to let their standards be taken and burned, but he dismissed their feelings not as soldiers attached to their company and its feats of the past, but concerned patriots afraid their former officers would capture their guidons and take them to Austria for use in a counter revolution. After some discussion, the National Assembly decreed that the 'ancient flags, standards, and guidons, as soon as they are replaced, will be burned at the head of the troops in formation [sous les armes] and in the presence of municipal officers, who will then address a report to be sent to the legislative corps and deposed in the archives.'[7] Considering the same guidon had been symbolic of a company for centuries, and considering how attached soldiers seemed to be to their company standards, the burning of the guidons was a potent, emotional gesture that any trace of the army inherited from the old regime must be expunged. That the guidons be burned publicly in the presence of the men who had carried them and viewed them as symbols of their company's honor sent a clear message that not only would aristocratic privilege be expunged from the army, but their legacy and history with their companies as well. The burning of these old regime guidons epitomized the turning point for the French Revolution and the army. With the burning of old standards, the Revolution turned its back on the citizen army of the old regime, and prepared to embrace the conscript army of the Revolution.

This book has problematized the idea of the citizen army in France. Rather than placing it in the French Revolution, I have focused on its life in the old regime, and how it brought together the crisis in the French army following the Seven Years' War, powerful political and social discussions during the Enlightenment, and influences from the American Revolution. The French Revolution did not happen in isolation, nor was it merely a social, cultural, and political event, but a military one as well. Focusing on the French army and its crises, reforms, and relationship to the larger French public allows for a broader understanding of the coming of the French Revolution, and pinpoints the institution where conversations about patriotism, citizenship, and the American Revolution converged. The French Revolution occurred within a wider Atlantic phenomenon, and this book has established a more precise relationship between North America and the French Revolution. The Seven Years' War, partly fought in Canada, set France on its trajectory toward Revolution by exposing weaknesses in French society as well as the army. French officers and soldiers may not have realized it at the time, but fighting with the patriotic army in Canada foreshadowed the kind of military force the French army would attempt to become. In the meantime, the difficulties of the French army while fighting in Canada laid the groundwork for the types of reforms that would attract support and attention during the remainder of the eighteenth century. The American Revolution likewise played no small role in the coming of the French Revolution, as mediated through the power of the printed word and the context of the army undergoing rigorous reform. The highly laudatory (and often fictional) texts that explained the American army and society in terms of a virtuous citizen army carried so much weight with their consumers because they portrayed the kind of army and society that French readers had admired in ancient Greeks and Romans but had feared was not possible in the modern world. The American Revolution's popularity among civilian readers forced them to think of military service in a new way, and the American army's apparent ability to fight against disciplined forces with patriotism gave credence to the trajectory of reform among the officers. Rochambeau, Lafayette, and the other officers and soldiers who fought in America may not have directly transported 'revolution' to France, but public interest in their various adventures and encounters with the 'new Romans' across the Atlantic spurred revolutionary ideas and actions.

Even if the ideal citizen army French readers thought they saw in America was only barely realized for a brief time, in imagining a citizen army, military and civilian reformers laid both the intellectual and cultural groundwork, as well as actual conditions, for the Revolution. The very revolutionary nature of the discussions concerning the French army is evident in one of the National Assembly debates about the French officer corps featuring Robespierre. As Robespierre countered M. de Cazalès's notions on keeping the officers who had served during the old regime, he outlined what an officer corps should look like during the Revolution. Ironically, Robespierre's description could have come from any of the old regime reformers searching to perfect the French citizen army, especially concerning patriotism and more sympathetic leadership to mold soldier behavior. As old regime officers had also surmised, he thought that under the proper circumstances, citizens would rush to become soldiers. Robespierre argued that by replacing old regime officers with true revolutionaries who were 'friends of the law and of the Constitution,' soldiers would be inspired to obey. These new officers would discipline 'softly' and would bring 'justice,' 'equality,' and 'humanity' to the army. Robespierre reasoned that the army performed poorly in the early days of the Revolution because the army aligned 'faithful warriors to revolting chiefs' who forced soldiers to 'choose between the obedience' to their officers and the 'love that they owe to their *patrie*.' He argued that 'without justice, without equality, without humanity, it is not possible to reestablish discipline and subordination.'[8] Robespierre's words are astounding in that they could have as easily come from a *mémoire* for reform addressed to the minister of war in the 1760s. During the old regime, French officers had talked about cultivating closer relationships with their soldiers and dealing with them in a more fatherly manner. They, too, had attempted to create an army and an officer corps that a soldier would voluntarily wish to join and follow. Robespierre, like the military and civilian reformers that had come before him, believed that with the right system and officers, citizens would willingly become soldiers and sacrifice themselves for the *patrie*. When Robespierre argued these points on the floor of the National Assembly, he believed that he was breaking new ground, but in reality he merely repeated the ideas of the *ci-devant* noble officers that came before him. This 'revolutionary' military philosophy did not occur with Robespierre in the 1790s, but with the old regime officers beginning in the 1760s.

The quick shift during the Revolution from an old regime-inspired volunteer army to a conscript army point to the constant fluctuations in the very idea of citizenship. Seasoned artillery officer Villeneuve's *mémoire* on how to turn soldiers into farmers and peasants into soldiers exemplifies those high expectations. Before launching into his descriptions of an army as a family affair, he stated simply, 'Be a hero. Be more. Be a citizen.'[9] Such enthusiasm for citizenship created tensions, however, as the precise definition of citizen fluctuated over time and varied greatly throughout France. Historians' on-going investigations of how the Revolution unfolded at the local level show that every region responded in its own way to the violence of the 1780s and the calls to arms for the National Guard, the volunteers, and the *levée en masse*.[10] Even in the National Guard, which some historians cast as the fulfillment of old-regime visions of a citizen army, members' enthusiasm did not necessarily spring from revolutionary fervor. Jean Pierre Jessenne asked the penetrating question of whether participation in the National Guard reflected a sudden enthusiasm for the new state or merely 'a prolonging of traditional collective practices.'[11] While Bernard Gainot, Bruno Ciotti, and Annie Crépin in particular speak of the French army after 1791 as 'testing ground for citizenship,'[12] other means of expressing or fulfilling citizenship expectations abounded, such as participating in festivals, printing pamphlets, or serving in the government.[13] Issues of race, especially concerning France's colonies, further complicated the idea of citizenship, as did the tension between the Revolution's claims of universality and the presence of 'dangerous foreigners' on French soil.[14] Ideas and definitions of citizenship often contradicted each other or seemed paradoxical. Was citizenship a right by birth, or was it a reward for continued work for the state? Did good citizens support the state or resist it? Answers to these questions changed throughout the Revolution. The soldiers who had rebelled at Nancy in 1790, for example, faced life on the galleys as 'evil-doers' who had corrupted their fellow soldiers, held their officers for ransom, and resisted the troops that had come to restore order. Yet in 1792, these same men were released as part of the Fête de Châteauvieux and heralded as heroes who were unjustly imprisoned.[15] Such seeming contradictions abounded, especially in what it meant for citizens – free men of the state – to be soldiers bound to duty and discipline. French writers and fighters wrestled with the inherent contradictions in a 'citizen army', where men would live freely only by negating their freedom.[16] In such an environment of inherent contradictions and constant fluctuation in the very idea of a 'citizen', a citizen army could perhaps infer voluntary enrollment or even conscription.

When France suspended its policy for mandatory military service in 2001, critics feared that it would damage France's proud relationship between its military forces and its citizenry. The beloved 'citizen army' that began in the Revolution and had been a hallmark of French national pride had come to an end. Andre Rokoto, a lieutenant colonel in the French army, complicated this concern by pointing out that the idea of universal conscription most attributed to the French Revolution did not occur until 1905 and that the end of universal conscription opened a new era for the army. This new military system – which relies on a professional force, not a conscripted one, and which calls on up to 100,000 volunteers to be used if necessary – may be closer to the citizen army as imagined by the old regime than the 'citizen army' achieved by the French Revolution.[17] The reaction to and debate over this change in the army confirm its vital role at the center of French society, politics, and identity. More than just an embodiment of predetermined social and political principles, armies and the people who populate them interact meaningfully with, and often at the forefront of, social change. Not only did the French army take down the Bastille, it proved crucial in the rethinking of French patriotism, nationalism, and identity.

The key to the Bastille, still hanging in George Washington's Mount Vernon home (see Figure 7.1), is a reminder of that symbolism, something that Lafayette and Washington both recognized. From the



Figure 7.1 The key to the Bastille and a drawing of the fortress in the central passage of George Washington's Mount Vernon home. Courtesy of Mount Vernon Ladies' Association.

moment he received the key from Lafayette in the summer of 1790, Washington displayed it in his home, first while living in the New York presidential levee, then at Mount Vernon. The key has stayed in his Virginia estate through successive generations and the transition of the house from private residence to an historic site maintained by the

Mount Vernon Ladies' Association, and it hangs there today, seen by over a million visitors a year. The cold iron key may seem out of place among the stately furniture and elegant architecture, but it remains a potent reminder of the military and Atlantic contexts of the French Revolution, and the optimism and promise that once centered on France's citizen army.

Notes

Introduction: The Key

1. Marquis de Lafayette, *The Letters of Lafayette to Washington*, ed. Louis Gottschalk (New York: Helen Fahnestock Hubbard, 1944), 348.
2. David Andress, *The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 1–3.
3. Jean Paul Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée: Les soldats-citoyens et la Révolution française* (Paris, 1979), 50; Roger Dupuy, *La Garde nationale 1789–1872* (Gallimard, 2010), 106–7.
4. Lafayette, *The Letters of Lafayette to Washington*, 348.
5. Emile G. Léonard, *L'Armée et ses Problèmes au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958); Albert Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation à la fin de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1914).
6. David D. Bien, 'La réaction aristocratique avant 1789: l'exemple de l'armée' *Annales, E.S.C.* 29 (1974): 23–48, 505–34.
7. John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–1794* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 43–9; Alan Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 42. R.R. Palmer, 'Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,' in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (1943; repr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army, 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); Christy Pichichero, 'Le Soldat Sensible: Military Psychology and Social Egalitarianism in the Enlightenment French Army,' *French Historical Studies* 31 (2008), 553–80; Arnaud Guinier, 'L'Honneur du Soldat: La Disicpline Militaire en debat dans la France des Lumieres' Ph.D. diss. (Université de Poitiers, 2012).
8. David A. Bell, 'Jumonville's Death: War Propaganda and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century France,' in *The Age of Cultural Revolutions: Britain and France, 1750–1820*, eds Colin Jones and Dror Wahrman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 33–61; David Bell, *Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 78–106. Edmund Dziembowski, *Un nouveau patriotisme français, 1750–1770: la France face à la puissance anglaise à l'époque de la guerre de Sept Ans* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1998); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (London: Vintage, 1996).
9. Jay M. Smith, *Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); John Shovlin, *The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
10. Dena Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France* (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1993); Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

11. Robert Darnton, *George Washington's False Teeth: An unconventional guide to the 18th century* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003), 119–36; Joyce Appleby, 'America as a Model for the radical French Reformers of 1789,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 28 (April 1971): 267–86; Raymond Birn, *Royal Censorship of Books in 18th-Century France* (Stanford University Press: 2012).
12. R.R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800*, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), vol. 1, 7; Durand Echeverria, *Mirage of the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Martin Lathe Nicolai, 'Subjects and Citizens: French Officers and the North American Experience, 1755–1783,' Ph.D. diss. (Queen's University, 1992); Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, 'Corresponding Republics: Letter Writing and Patriot Organizing in the Atlantic Revolutions, circa 1760 – 1792' Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University, 2011); With the 'Global Turn,' historians are looking at the French Revolution beyond an Atlantic context. See, for example, the essays in *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*, Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson eds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). See also, David A. Bell, 'Questioning the Global Turn: The Case of the French Revolution,' *French Historical Studies* 37 (2014): 1–24. Roger Chickering has seen the citizen army paradigm as a means of better understanding the connections in the Atlantic Revolutions: Roger Chickering, 'A Tale of Two Tales, Grand Narratives of War in the Age of Revolution,' *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1812* ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Förester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–20; Ute Planert, 'Innovation or Evolution? The French Wars in Military History' in *War in an Age of Revolution*, 69–84.
13. Gilbert Bodinier, *Les Officiers de L'Armée Royale: combattants de la guerre d'Indépendance des Etats-Unis de Yorktown à l'an II* (Chateau Vincennes: Service Historique de L'armée de Terre, 1983); Samuel Scott, *From Yorktown to Valmy* (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1998); Forrest McDonald, 'The Relation of the French Peasant Veterans of the American Revolution to the Fall of Feudalism in France 1789–1792,' *Agricultural History Magazine* 51 (1951): 151–61.
14. Lee Kennett, *The French Forces in America 1780–1783* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 169; also cited in Bodinier, *Les officiers de l'armée royale*, 350.
15. Michael Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800–1808* (New York: New York University Press, 2012); Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Howard Brown, *War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 19.
16. Jean-Paul Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 99.

17. Alan Forrest et al. (eds), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3; Alan Forest, 'Citizenship and Military Service,' in *The French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship*, ed. Renée Waldinger et al. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993); David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007).
18. Lynn, *Bayonets of the Republic*, 43.
19. Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 2.
20. Shovlin, *Political Economy of Virtue*; Michael Kwass, *Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Egalité, Fiscalité* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Ken Alder, *Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763–1815* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 6–7, 9.
21. Service Historique de la Défense (hereafter SHD), Vincennes, 1M1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National,' 5 September 1789.
22. Recently, self-labeled military and cultural historians have taken more notice of cultural and military history, respectively. In French history, for example, David A. Bell put his cultural methodology to use in studying the Revolutionary and Napoleonic French army while the military historian John Lynn has considered the relationship between combat and culture: David A. Bell, *The First Total War*; and John Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America* (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2003). Both books tried to bridge the superficial gap between military and cultural history. Military historians in particular have been discussing the incorporation of new methodologies. Wayne E. Lee, 'Mind and Matter – Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field,' *Journal of American History* 93 (2007), 1116–42; Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée* also exemplifies this approach.

1 The King's Army

1. Terms are taken from John Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
2. Andrew Lossky, *Louis XIV and the French Monarchy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 62–3.
3. William Doyle, *Old Regime France 1648–1788* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 171.
4. Historians are currently debating the nature and role of absolutism in seventeenth-century France. Some prominent works include William Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-century France, State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David Parker, *Class and State in Ancien Régime France: The Road to Modernity?* (London: Routledge, 1995); Roland Mousnier, *The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy, 1598–1789* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

5. Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 333.
6. John B. Wolf, *Louis XIV* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968), 182.
7. Joël Cornette, *Le Roi de Guerre: Essai sur la souveraineté dans la France du Grande Siècle* (Paris: Bibliothèque Historique de Payot, 1993), 149.
8. Doyle, *Old Regime France*, 176; See also Paul Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 45.
9. George Satterfield, *Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The army of Louis XIV and partisan warfare in the Netherlands, 1673–1678* (Boston: Brill Leiden, 2003), 41.
10. Carl J. Ekberg, *The Failure of Louis XIV's Dutch War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 13–16.
11. Satterfield, *Princes, Posts, and Partisans*, 37, 40.
12. Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 77.
13. Jay Smith, *Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600–1789* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 41; Also see Armstrong Starkey*, War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 41. He characterizes Louis XIV's approach toward his generals as 'micromanaging.' For more on the relationship between duels and the army see Pascal Brioist, Hervé Drévillon, Pierre Serna *Croise le Fer: Violence et Culture de l'épée dans la France Moderne (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)* (Champ Vallon, 2002), 277–88.
14. Nira I. Kaplan, 'A Changing Culture of Merit: French Competitive Examinations and the Politics of Selection, 1750–1820,' (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1999), 26–7.
15. Chantal Grell, *Le 18e siècle et l'antiquité en France, 1680–1789* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1995), 15.
16. Jonathan Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 57–8.
17. Duffy, *The Military Experience*, 52–4.
18. Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 70.
19. Claude de Marois, *Le Gentilhomme Parfaict*, quoted in Smith, *Culture of Merit*, 71.
20. Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 4–5.
21. Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 35–6.
22. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society* (New York: Praeger Publishers 1970), 134; Christopher Duffy, *Frederick the Great* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 292–3; David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 202; Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (London: George Unwin & Allen, 1983), 11–12.
23. Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 160; Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, 11; Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, 8–12; William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 159–69.

24. Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles, The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 195; John Nef, *War and Human Progress, an Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 157, 165; M.S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789* (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 260; Preston and Wise, *Men in Arms*, 133–49.
25. Anderson, *War and Society*, 189; Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, 11–12; John Nef, *War and Human Progress*, 250–1.
26. Lynn, *Battle*, 140.
27. John Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714* (New York: Longman, 1999), 31.
28. Duffy, *The Military Experience*, 84–6.
29. Christopher Duffy, *Frederick the Great*, 295.
30. Satterfield, *Princes, Posts, and Partisans*.
31. Satterfield, *Princes, Posts, and Partisans*, 42–86.
32. Satterfield, *Princes, Posts, and Partisans*, 70.
33. John Lynn, *Giant of the Grande Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 137.
34. Lynn, *Giant of the Grande Siècle*, 132–41.
35. Lynn, *Giant of the Grande Siècle*, 265.
36. Ronald Thomas Ferguson, 'Blood and Fire: Contribution Policy of the French Armies in Germany, 1668–1715,' Ph.D. diss. (University of Minnesota, 1970), 16.
37. M.S. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748* (New York: Longman, 1995), 172.
38. Edmond-Jean-François Barbier, quoted in Rohan Butler, *Choiseul: Father and Son, 1719–1754* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 707.
39. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, 'Essai Général de Tactique' in *Ecrits Militaires* ed. Henri Ménard (Paris: Copernic Press, 1977), 56.
40. Duffy, *The Military Experience*, 89; Lynn, *Battle*, 124.
41. Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661–1701* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 154–5.
42. Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic*, 46.
43. Lynn, *Giant of the Grande Siècle*, 423.
44. André Corvisier, *L'Armée Française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul: Le Soldat*, 2 vols, vol. 2 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 693.
45. Maurice de Saxe, *Mémoires sur l'art de la guerre* (Paris, 1956), 8.
46. Jean Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée aux XVIII siècle: étude politique et sociale* (Paris: Economica, 1985), 324–5.
47. Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée aux XVIII siècle*, 357.
48. Rafe Blaufarb, 'Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building: French Military Administration after the Seven Years' War,' *French Historical Studies* 24 (2001): 223–46.
49. Guibert, *Essai Générale*, 56.
50. Yves-Marie Bercé, *History of Peasant Revolts: The Social Origins of Rebellion in Early Modern France*, trans. Amanda Whitmore (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 194.

51. Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée aux XVIII siècle*, 352–3.
52. Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée aux XVIII siècle*, 357.
53. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare*, 46–7.
54. David M. Hopkin, *Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766–1870* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2003), 13.
55. Lynn, *Giant of the Grande Siècle*, 162–5.
56. For example, *Archives Parlementaires de 1787–1860 (hereafter A.P.)* ed. J. Mavidal and E. Laurent (Paris, 1867–1913, 1985) vol. 3, 133.
57. Roy L. McCullough, *Coercion, Conversion, and Counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France* (Boston: Brill, 2007), 28–35.
58. McCullough, 80–8, 121.
59. Georges Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964), 262.
60. Cynthia Bouton, *The Flour War: Gender, Class, and Community in Late Ancien Régime French Society* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 95, 117.
61. William Beik, *Urban protest in seventeenth-century France: The culture of retribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 82.
62. Beik, *Urban protest in seventeenth-century France*, 83.
63. *A.P.*, vol. 5, 204.
64. *A.P.*, vol. 4, 305.
65. *A.P.*, vol. 4, 553.
66. *A.P.*, vol. 3, 352; see also Annie Crépin, *Histoire de la Conscription* (Gallimard, 2009), 48–50.
67. *A.P.*, vol. 4, 623, 480.
68. *A.P.*, vol. 2, 606.
69. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession,* 223.
70. Service Historique de la Défense (hereafter SHD), Vincennes, 1M1721, *Observations touchant les troupes légères allemandes*, [1757].
71. SHD, Vincennes, 1M1721, *Idée de troupes légères*.
72. Jean Chagniot, *Guerre et société à l'époque moderne* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), 135.
73. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare*, 24.
74. Gail Bossenga, 'A Divided Nobility: Status, Markets, and the Patrimonial state in the Old Regime,' in *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: Reassessments and new approaches*, ed. Jay M. Smith (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 139–40.
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2 Defeat in New France

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2. SHD, Vincennes, A^{1}3418, Bourlamaque, July 1755.
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4 A Citizen Army in America

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4. Lloyd Kramer, *Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public cultures and personal identities in an age of Revolutions* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
5. Gilbert Bodinier, *Les Officiers de L'Armée Royale: Combattants de la guerre d'Indépendance des Etats-Unis de Yorktown à l'an II* (Chateau Vincennes: Service Historique de L'armée de Terre, 1983); Samuel Scott, *From Yorktown to Valmy* (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1998).
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10. Popkin, *News and Politics*, 87, 76. For more on the inaccuracy of international reporting on the American Revolution, see William Slauter, 'News and Diplomacy in the Age of the American Revolution,' (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2007).

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12. *Gazette de Leyde*, 13 June 1775.
13. *Gazette de Leyde*, 20 June 1775.
14. *Gazette de France*, 22 April 1776.
15. *Gazette de Leyde*, 8 September 1778.
16. *Gazette de France*, 1 July 1776.
17. *Gazette de France*, 5 July 1776.
18. Servan, *Le Soldat Citoyen*, 43.
19. *Gazette de France*, 5 July 1776.
20. *Gazette de France*, 11 August 1775; *Gazette de France*, 29 March 1777; *Gazette de Leyde*, 9 September 1777.
21. *Gazette de France*, 1 July 1776.
22. *Gazette de France*, 2 January 1778.
23. *Gazette de Leyde*, 1 August 1775.
24. *Gazette de Leyde*, 3 April 1778, Supplement.
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26. Guibert, *Essai*, 67.
27. *Gazette de Leyde*, 22 August 1775; *Gazette de France*, 21 August 1775.
28. Guibert, *Essai* 213.
29. *Gazette de Leyde*, 5 January 1779.
30. *Gazette de France*, 27 February 1781.
31. *Gazette de France*, 3 December 1776.
32. *Gazette de Leyde*, 18 July 1775.
33. *Gazette de Leyde*, 9 January 1776.
34. Mably, *Observations sur l'histoire de la Grèce*, p. 31.
35. *Gazette de Leyde*, 23 June 1775.
36. *Gazette de France*, 7 July 1777.
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38. *Gazette de Leyde*, 23 September 1777.
39. *Gazette de France*, 14 July 1777; *Gazette de Leyde*, 22 March 1776.
40. *Gazette de Leyde*, 13 May 1777.
41. Rollin, vol. 3, 558.
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44. *Gazette de France*, 12 September 1780.
45. *Gazette de Leyde*, 3 October 1777.
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47. *Gazette de Leyde*, 10 August 1779.
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52. Durand Echeverria, *Mirage of the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 56; Watts, *Les Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique and John Adams*, 1.
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57. Buisson, *Abrégé de la Révolution*, 17.
58. Buisson, *Abrégé de la Révolution*, 53–4.
59. Buisson, *Abrégé de la Révolution*, 134–5.
60. Buisson, *Abrégé de la Révolution*, 143–76.
61. Caroline Cox, *A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington's Army* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), ix, 238.
62. Buisson, *Abrégé de la Révolution*, 175–7.
63. Buisson, *Abrégé de la Révolution*, 233.
64. David Ramsay, *Histoire de la Révolution d'Amérique par rapport de la Caroline* 2 vols, (1788), vol. 1, 34, 39.
65. Ramsay, *Histoire de la Révolution*, 40, 131.
66. Smith, *Nobility Reimagined*, 160, 162, 163.
67. Ramsay, *Histoire de la Révolution*, vol. 2, 7–8.
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69. Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare 1675–1815* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 111–12.
70. Michel-René Hilliard d'Auberteuil, *Mis Mac Rea, roman historique* (Paris, 1784), vii–viii, 61–3.
71. Baumier, *Hommage à la Patrie* (Bruxelles et Paris, 1782). L'âme de Fabius errante sur la terre / Cherchait en vain un lieu des Tyrans respecté, / Dernier Temple des Mœurs & de la Liberté, / Où du fier Despotisme on bravât le tonnerre. / Après avoir erré sur l'ancien Univers / Après avoir gémi sur nos maux & nos fers, / De l'immense Océan elle franchit la plaine. / A l'aspect imprévu de cette Ombre Romaine ; / L'Amérique s'émeut, & son noble fierté. / On dit qu'au même instant de la voute éternelle, / L'auguste Liberté descendit sur Boston, / Et, qu'embrâsant [sic] soudait l'âme de Washington, / Celle de Fabius se confondit en elle.
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75. Raynal, *Révolution de l'Amérique*, 33.
76. Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 150–6, 161–89.
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78. Abbé de Mably, *Observations sur le gouvernement et les lois des Etats-Unis d'Amérique* (Amsterdam, 1784), 2, 10–11, 26–7, 12.
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83. Caron du Chanset, *La Double Victoire Poème dédié à Madame la comtesse de Rochambeau*, 1781, with an intro by Howard C. Rice, Jr. Institut Français de Washington, 1954, 4, 19, 20.
84. Longchamps, *Histoire Impartiale*, vol. 3, 174.
85. J.D. Bézassier, *Couplets sur la Paix de 1783* (1784), 7.
86. J.L. le Barbier, *Asgill, drame en 5 actes* (Paris, 1785), 34–8.
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88. J.D. Bézassier, *Couplets sur la Paix de 1783*, 1784, 5.
89. Author unknown, *L'Amérique Délivrée, Esquisse d'un Poème sur l'indépendance de l'Amérique* (Amsterdam, 1783), 20.
90. Pierre Duviquet, *Vers sur la Paix*, 1784, 6.
91. Almanach Littéraire, 1780, 125.
92. G. E.-J. Guilhem de Clermont-Lodère, *De l'Etat et Du sort des Colonies, des Anciens Peuples, ouvrage dans lequel on traite du gouvernement des anciennes républiques, de leur droit public, &c., avec des observations sur les colonies des Nations modernes, & la conduite des Anglais en Amérique* (Philadelphie, 1779), 322–3.
93. Monet (artist) and François Denis (engraver), 'L'indépendance de l'Amérique [engraving],' (Paris: N.p., 1786).
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95. M. le Chevalier Deslandes, *Discours sur la grandeur & l'importance de la révolution qui vient de s'opérer dans l'Amérique Septentrionale* (Paris, 1785).
96. Chanset, *La Double Victoire*, 20.
97. Nicolas-Joseph-Laurent Gilbert, *Ode sur la Guerre Présente, après le combat D'Ouessant* (Paris, 1778), 7.
98. Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, 'Essai Général de Tactique,' in *Ecrits militaires*, ed. Henri Ménard (Paris: Copernic, 1976), 67.
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100. Almanach Littéraire, 1787, 198.

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106. SoC, Washington D.C., Du Bouchet to Washington, 17 May 1784.
107. Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution*, 137. Doyle focuses mostly on how criticism of the Society of the Cincinnati presented the first solid criticism against nobility.
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5 Aristocratic Rupture

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nobility, royal service, and the making of absolute monarchy in France, 1600–1789 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 243–4.

2. Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 24, 25–6.
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4. Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation*, 31, 34.
5. Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation*, 53, 59, 63.
6. Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation*, 65–6.
7. Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 29–30.
8. Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation*, 77, 85, 87.
9. Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 30–3.
10. Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation*, 129.
11. Latreille, *L'Armée et la Nation*, 160–3.
12. Service Historique de la Défense (hereafter SHD), Vincennes, MR 1716, M. le Cher. de Keralio, 'Première Mémoire Armée de France,' 1787.
13. See also SHD, Vincennes, A^{1}3766, 'Organisation militaire,' 31 December 1787; SHD, Vincennes, MR 1944, Guibert, 'Première Séance du Conseil de la Guerre,' 28 October 1787.
14. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1944 [Deshauts etramps], 1787.
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22. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1716, Baron D'Arros to Monseigneur le Maréchal de Ségur, 24 March 1784.
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37. *Archives Parlementaires de 1787–1860* (hereafter *A.P.*) ed. J. Mavidal and E. Laurent (Paris, 1867–1913, 1985) vol. vi, 6.
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39. Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 52.
40. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1790, Guibert, 'Rapport au Roi sur la seconde division du travail du conseil de la guerre,' 1787–89.
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43. SHD, Vincennes, A^{4}56, 'Journal des séances des Etats Généraux assemblé,' 1789.
44. Alan Forrest, *Paris, the Provinces, and the French Revolution* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), 59; Jacques Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille July 14th,1789* trans. Jean Stewart (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 128.
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48. SHD, Vincennes A^{4}54, Somniyevue, 1789.
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51. Jean Paul Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée: Les soldats-citoyens et la Révolution française* (Paris, 1979), 41–2.
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59. For more on the *Cahiers de Doléances* and the *milice*, see Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2005), 49–70.
60. *A.P.*, vol. iv, 525.
61. *A.P.*, vol. iv, 120–338.
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63. Hervé Leuwers, 'Les formes de la Citoyenneté (1789–1791)' in *Histoire des provinces français du Nord: La Révolution et L'Empire Le Nord-Pas-de-Calais entre Révolution et Contre-Révolution,* eds Annie Crépin, Hervé Leuwers, Alain Lottin, Dominique Rosselle (Artois Press Université 2008), 50–1.
64. SHD, Vincennes, $A^4$54, [anonymous letter to minister of war], Lille, 30 April 1789.
65. SHD, Vincennes, $A^4$54, M. Esmangart to M. de Puysegur, Lille, 30 April 1789.
66. SHD, Vincennes, $A^4$54, Lille, 1789.
67. SHD, Vincennes, $A^4$54, Lille, 27 July 1789; For more examples of communities who followed a similar pattern as Lille, see Godechot*, The Taking of the Bastille*, 132–3; for more on the creation of the National Guard in the provinces, see Roger Dupuy*, La garde nationale, 1789–1872* (Gallimard, 2010), 66–87.
68. Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille*, 185, 197–8.
69. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 59. See also Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 42.
70. Georges Carrot, *La Garde Nationale: Une force publique ambigue* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 19.
71. Carrot, *La Garde Nationale.*, 41.
72. Lucien de Chilly, *Le premier ministre constitutionnel de la guerre: La Tour du Pin. Les origines de l'armée nouvelle sous la constitution* (Paris, 1909), 39.
73. Chilly, *La Tour du Pin*, 40–5; for more on the creation of the Paris National Guard see Dupuy*, La garde nationale*, 39–42.
74. Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 46, 49–50, 62–3.

6 A Dream Deferred

1. Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Hervé Leuwers, 'Les formes de la Citoyenneté (1789–1791)' in *Histoire des provinces français du Nord: La Révolution et L'Empire Le Nord-Pas-de-Calais entre Révolution et Contre-Révolution*, eds Annie Crépin, Hervé Leuwers, Alain Lottin, Dominique Rosselle (Artois Press Université 2008), 51.

2. Annie Crépin agrees that while the National Guard was a precursor to the citizen army, it was intended to preserve order rather than serve as part of the army. Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2005), 93–5.
3. Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army, 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002); William Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Samuel Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution: The Role and Development of the Line Army 1787–93* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
4. Most of these letters come from a cache of reclamations under SHD, Vincennes, MR1718; they represent more than 50 regiments and 70 French garrison towns from all over France. See Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 53.
5. Service Historique de la Défense (hereafter SHD), Vincennes, MR1718, 'Mémoire sur l'organisation de l'armée française,' [after 1788, not 1791]; MR1907 'Réclamation des officiers du Regt. D'Auvergne.'
6. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1907, 'Constitution militaire propose par M. de Layauté, ancien Inspecter Général d'artillerie des Etats de Virginie,' [also found in MR1718]; MR1718, 'Régiment d'infanterie de Languedoc: lettre des officiers du régiment de Languedoc contenant leurs demandes.'
7. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1907, 'Réclamation des officiers du Regt. D'Auvergne.'
8. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1907, 'Réclamations des officiers des régiments Royal, Alsace, Artillerie, Jesse Darmstadt, corps Royal du Génie.'
9. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National, 5 7bre 1789.'
10. Annie Crépin, *Histoire de la Conscription* (Gallimard, 2009), 64–5.
11. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Mémoire militaire à Messieurs de l'assemblée nationale par Messieurs les officiers du régiment d'infanterie du Maine en garnison à Bastia en Corse 1789'; for the lingering ambiguities over the concept of merit, see Jay Smith, *Culture of Merit*; Blaufarb, *The French Army*.
12. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Nouvelle constitution proposé par l'infanterie française, sans nom d'auteur,' 1789.
13. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Organisation et Administration de l'Armée Observations militaires intéressantes sur toutes les parties d'organisations et d'administration des troupes'; MR1718, le Cte de Renault, 'Observations sur le régime et la constitution militaire, 20 8bre 1789'; MR1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National, 5 7bre 1789'; on the internal divisions within the officer corps, see Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 56.
14. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National, 5 7bre 1789.'
15. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adresse du régiment de Rohan, à l'Assemblée Nationale, 1re 8bre 1789'; MR1718, 'Nouvelle constitution proposé par l'infanterie française, sans nom d'auteur,' 1789; MR1718, 'Vices et abus de la constitution actuelle du militaire français, dénonces à l'assemblée nationale par les officiers des régiments colonel général, la couronne, condé, infanterie, et des chasseurs à cheval des évêchés, composant la garnison de Lille. – suivi de l'adhésion des officiers du régiment de Penthièvre (infanterie) Joint à la lettre des officiers de la garnison de Lille, 6 7bre 1789'; Jean Paul Bertaud,

La Révolution Armée: Les soldats-citoyens et la Révolution française (Paris, 1979), 45–6.

16. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée Nationale, 5 7bre 1789'; also MR 1718, 'Nouvelle constitution proposé par l'infanterie française,' 1789.
17. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Mémoire militaire à Messieurs de l'assemblée nationale par Messieurs les officiers du régiment d'infanterie du Maine en garnison à Bastia en corse,' 1789.
18. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Vices et abus de la constitution actuelle du militaire français, dénonces à l'assemblée nationale par les officiers des régiments colonel général, la couronne, condé, infanterie, et des chasseurs à cheval des évêchés, composant la garnison de Lille. – suivi de l'adhésion des officiers du régiment de Penthièvre (infanterie) Joint à la lettre des officiers de la garnison de Lille, du 6 7bre 1789.'
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21. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Les bas officiers du régiment de Limosin à l'assemblée nationale, le 29 8bre 1789.'
22. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Régiment de Languedoc, Lettre des bas officiers du régiment de Languedoc infanterie contenant les articles qu'ils soumettent à la considération de l'assemblée nationale 1re 8bre 1789.'
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24. Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 58.
25. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National le 5 7bre 1789.'
26. *Archives Parlementaires de 1787–1860* (hereafter *A.P.*), eds J. Mavidal and E. Laurent (Paris, 1867–1913, 1985) vol. 9, 233.
27. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adresse du régiment de Rohan, 1re 8bre 1789 à l'Assemblé nationale.'
28. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National, 5 7bre 1789.'
29. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Observations des officiers du régiment d'infanterie d'Aunia sur l'état militaire 18 7bre 1789 à l'Assemblée Nationale.'
30. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Nouvelle constitution proposé par l'infanterie française, sans nom d'auteur,' 1789.
31. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Régiment de Province, 20 7bre 1789.'
32. *A.P.* vol. 11, 57–64.
33. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, Soit héros. Soit plus. Soit citoyen. 'Etats généraux, Mémoire sur les moyens de donner des défenseurs la Patrie sans diminuer le nombre des cultivateurs et d'empêches la désertion ce vice honteux qui déshonore le soldat en le rendant indigne de servir son roi par Villeneuve, ancien officier d'artillerie.'

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35. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1907, 'Réclamation des officiers du Regt. D'Auvergne.'
36. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Adressée au régiment de Forez à l'Assemblée National, 5 7bre 1789.'
37. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, ' Projet d'une nouvelle ordonnance militaire proposée par un militaire anonyme, il ne lève beaucoup les avantages qui restaureraient de son plan formant 48 articles,' 1789.
38. Blaufarb *The French Army*, 59; Crépin, *Histoire de la Conscription*, 67–9.
39. *A.P.* vol. 10, 606; see also Crépin, *Défendre la France*, 75–8.
40. *A.P.* vol. 10, 583.
41. *A.P.* vol. 10, 585.
42. *A.P.* vol. 10, 619
43. *A.P.* vol. 10, 619.
44. *A.P.* vol. 17, 298.
45. Wolfgang Kruse has argued that Dubois de Crancé was not suggesting compulsory conscription, but the most practical solution for the army. Wolfgang Kruse, 'Revolutionary France and the Meanings of Levée en Masse,' in *War in an Age of Revolution*, 300–1. Annie Crépin sees the defeat of conscription here as a rejection of the citizen soldier concept: Crépin, *Défendre la France*, 83. See also Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 61.
46. Sam Scott, 'Problems of Law and Order during 1790, the "Peaceful" Year of the French Revolution,' *American Historical Review* 80 (October, 1975): 859–88; Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée,* 46.
47. Scott, *Response of the Royal Army*, 136–51.
48. SHD, Vincennes, $B^1$208, M. de Rochambeau, Amiens, 26 February 1791.
49. SHD, Vincennes, $B^1$208, M. de Rochambeau, Amiens, 21 March 1791.
50. SHD, Vincennes, $B^1$208, M. Duportail, Laon, 1 May 1791.
51. Sam Scott, 'Problems of Law and Order'; Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 48.
52. *A.P.* vol. 16, 95.
53. For other examples see Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 46–7.
54. *A.P.* vol. 8, 97.
55. *A.P.* vol. 18, 82.
56. *A.P.* vol. 18, 525.
57. *A.P.* vol. 18, 529. For descriptions of funerals see *A.P.* vol. 19, 21; *A.P.* vol. 19, 72; *A.P.* vol. 19, 108.
58. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Sans date, sans nom d'auteur, sans titre,' [1790].
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60. *A.P.* vol. 16, 95.
61. *A.P.* vol. 16, 95.
62. *A.P.* vol. 16, 95.
63. *A.P.* vol. 8, 97.
64. Scott, *Response of the Royal Army*, 98.
65. Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies*, 216.
66. Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 60–6.

67. *A.P.* vol. 16, 374.
68. *A.P.* vol. 23, 179, 205–7.
69. Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies*, 253, 249, 251.
70. Society of the Cincinnati, Washington D.C., Noailles to Washington 24 April 1790; Memory of the American Revolution stayed popular through the first years of the Revolution. Anontino de Francesco, 'The American Origins of the French Revolutionary War,' in *Republics at War, 1776–1840: Revolutions, Conflicts, and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World*, eds Pierre Serna, Antonino de Franceso, and Judith A. Miller (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 29–36; Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, 'The American Revolution in France: Under the Shadow of the French Revolution,' in *Europe's American Revolution*, ed. Simon P. Newman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), 51–9; Eric Peuchot, 'L'Influence des idées américaines sur les constituants' in *La France de la Révolution et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique*, ed. Gilbert Bodinier (Paris: Masson, 1995), 22–34.
71. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 96–7, Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 48.
72. Thomas Hippler, 'L'État le citoyen, l'armée: volontariat et contrôle sociale' in *Civils, Citoyens-soldats et militaries dans l'État-Nation (1789–1815)*, eds Annie Crépin, Jean-Pierre Jessenne, and Hervé Leuwers (Paris, 2006), 64.
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76. *A.P.* vol. 27, 106, 107.
77. John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–1794* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 94.
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86. Timothy Tackett, *When the King Took Flight* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2004), 222–3; Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies*, 254–60; Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 103–8.
87. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 105.
88. Brown, *War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State*, 34; Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 106.
89. *A.P.* vol. 27, 483; Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 49.
90. *A.P.* vol. 27, 455.
91. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 106.

92. Bertaud, *La Révolution Armée*, 50; Brown, *War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State*, 34; Doyle, *Aristocracy and its enemies*, 255; Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 106
93. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 107.
94. *A.P.* vol. 28, 469–70.
95. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 110.
96. Scott *The Response of the Royal Army*, 112–14; Blaufarb, *The French Army*, 91–100.
97. Brown, *War, Revolution, and the Bureaucratic State*, 21–2.

7 Conclusion: Guidons Burning

1. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Etats généraux, Mémoire sur les moyens de donner des défenseurs la Patrie sans diminuer le nombre des cultivateurs et d'empêches la désertion ce vice honteux qui déshonore le soldat en le rendant indigne de servir son roi par Villeneuve, ancien officier d'artillerie.'
2. William Doyle, *Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 273.
3. John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–1794* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 43; Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall, *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2009), 3; Alan Forest, 'Citizenship and Military Service,' in *The French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship*, eds Renée Waldinger, Philip Dawson, and Isser Woloch (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993); Frank Attar, *Aux Armes, Citoyens!: Naissance et fonctions du bellicisme révolutionnaire* (Éditions du Seuil, 2010); David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007); Annie Crépin equates conscription with citizen army and considers the era of 1800–1867 as the time of the citizen soldier: Annie Crépin, *Défendre la France: Les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept Ans à Verdun* (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2005), 83, 142.
4. Alan Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Duhram: Duke University Press, 1990), 66–7.
5. Michael Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800–1808* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 193.
6. For how the *levée en masse* intimated the practices of the old regime, see Bruno Ciotti, *Du Volontaire au conscrit: les levées d'hommes dans la Puy-de-Dôme pendant la révolution française* (Presses Universitaires Blaise-Pascal, 2001), 127–211.
7. *Archives Parlementaires de 1787–1860* (hereafter *A.P.*), eds J. Mavidal and E. Laurent (Paris, 1867–1913, 1985) vol. 42, 65–6.
8. *A.P.* vol 27, 110–11.
9. SHD, Vincennes, MR 1718, 'Etats généraux, Mémoire sur les moyens de donner des défenseurs la Patrie sans diminuer le nombre des cultivateurs et d'empêches la désertion ce vice honteux qui déshonore le soldat

en le rendant indigne de servir son roi par Villeneuve, ancien officier d'artillerie.'

10. See for example the essays in *Civils, Citoyens-soldats et militaires dans l'État-Nation (1789–1815)*, eds Annie Crépin, Jean-Pierre Jessenne, and Hervé Leuwers (Paris, 2006); Annie Crépin, *Révolution et armée nouvelle en Seine-et-Marne (1791–1797)* (Éditions du CTHS, 2008); Ciotti, *Du Volontaire au conscrit*; Hervé Leuwers, Annie Crépin, Dominique Rosselle, *Histoire des Provinces Françaises du Nord: La Révolution et l'Empire* (Artois Presses Université, 2008).
11. Jean-Pierre Jessenne, 'Nationales, Communautaires, Bourgeoises? Les Gardes Communales de la France du Nord en 1790,' in *Histoire des provinces français du Nord: La Révolution et L'Empire Le Nord-Pas-de-Calais entre Révolution et Contre-Révolution*, eds Annie Crépin, Hervé Leuwers, Alain Lottin, Dominique Rosselle (Artois Press Université, 2008), 207.
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13. Jessenne, 'Nationales, Communautaires, Bourgeoises?,' 207.
14. Bernard Gainot, *Les officiers de couleur dans les armées de la République et de l'Empire (1792–1815) De l'esclavage à la condition militaire dans les Antilles françaises* (Karthala: Paris, 2007); Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2004); Jeremy Popkin, *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Sophie Wahnich, *L'impossible citoyen: L'étranger dans le discours de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1997) .
15. Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 61–82; Rafe Blaufarb, *The French Army, 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 91.
16. Thomas Hippler, 'L'État le citoyen, l'armée: volontariat et contrôle sociale' in *Civils, Citoyens-soldats et militaries dans l'État-Nation (1789–1815)*, eds Annie Crépin, Jean-Pierre Jessenne, and Hervé Leuwers (Paris, 2006), 62; see also Crépin, *Défendre la France*, 83.
17. Andre Rakoto, 'From Conscription to Professional Forces: The French Military Paradox,' paper presented at the United States Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C., 2004, 11. For more on recent French military policies and their relation to conscription, see Annie Crépin, *Histoire de la Conscription* (Gallimard, 2009), 402–14.

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